

JPRS 75868

12 June 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1588



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

12 June 1980

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1588

CONTENTS

COUNTRY SECTION

CYPRUS

- Nicosia Daily Suggests Commonwealth Initiative on Cyprus
(ELEVETHERI KYPROS, 22 May 80) 1

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- TV Network Probes Public Opinion on Political Issues
(Editorial Report) 2
- Journal Polls Public Opinion in Election Year
(Editorial Report) 4
- Demonstrations, Attitude Toward Bundeswehr Causes Concern
(Hans Schueler; DIE ZEIT, 9 May 80) 8
- Brandt Sees Results of 'Too Little Detente'
(DPA, 1 Jun 80) 11
- Chairman Schroeder of Young Socialists Interviewed
(Gerd Schroeder Interview; VORWAERTS, 24 Apr 80) 13
- Simplified Procedures for Those Seeking Asylum Recommended
(Reinhard Wolff; VORWAERTS, 1 May 80) 17
- Industrialist Notes Economic Relations With Poland
(Otto Wolff von Amerongen; HANDELSBLATT, 24 Apr 80) .. 21
- IFO Institute Analyzes Trade With East Bloc
(HANDELSBLATT, 30-31 May 80) 24
- Apel Gives Views on FRG Aircraft Industry
(SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 25 Apr 80) 27

FINLAND

USSR Ambassador Stresses Military Articles of Treaty (UUSI SUOMI, 24 Apr 80)	29
Goran von Bonsdorff Proposes Demilitarization of Nordic Cap (Goran von Bonsdorff; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 7 May 80)	30
Valmet Begins Series Production of Vinka Trainer (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 18 Apr 80)	34
Air Force Buys Pipers While Awaiting Vinka (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 8 May 80)	37
Briefs New Border Patrol Boats	38

FRANCE

PCF's Relationship With Eurocommunist Movement Explored (Lilly Marcou; LE MONDE, 10 Apr 80)	39
UDF Deputy Granet Interviewed on Party Defense Report (Paul Granet Interview; LE POINT, 12 May 80)	44
New 'European Independence Movement' Views European Security (LE MONDE, 9 Apr 80)	46
Number, Geographic Origin of French Political Refugees (LE MONDE, 5 Apr 80)	48
Corsican-French Relations, Minority Rights Issues (Paul Thibaud; ESPRIT, Mar 80)	49
Defense Choices Seen Plaguing UDF Experts (Dominique de Montvalon; LE POINT, 14 Apr 80)	52
Press Speculates on Marchais' Relationship With PCF Intellectuals (LE MONDE, 20 Feb 80)	54
Status of Political, Economic, Cultural Relations With Qatar (LE MONDE, 2-3 Mar 80)	57
Overview of Relations Cooperation in Petrochemical Industry	

Amnesty International Statement on Bahrain Political Prisoners (LE MONDE, 5 Mar 80)	63
PCF's Bruhat Supports Fiasbin's Controversial Book (Jean Bruhat; LE MONDE, 25 Apr 80)	64
Powder Metallurgy Problems, Accomplishments Described (Dominique Benasteau; L'USINE NOUVELLE, 27 Mar 80)..	67
Briefs	
Green Europe	73
Communist Party: Less Zeal	73
Reasons for Poniatoski Trip	73
Terrorism: Security Police for Ministers	73

GREECE

Papandreou Says Time for Political Change Has Come (Andreas Papandreou Interview; TA NEA, 28, 29 May 80)	74
Private Account Bank Deposits Improve Slightly (HELLENEWS EXPRESS, 15 May 80)	81
London Chamber of Commerce Delegation Visit Reported (HELLENEWS EXPRESS, 15 May 80)	83
Status of Trade With Iraq Reported (HELLENEWS EXPRESS, 8 May 80)	85
Statistical Analysis on Cotton Production Published (Elias Mantouvalos; BUSINESS & FINANCE, 3 May 80) ..	87
Briefs	
Trade With China	101
Trade With East Germany	101

ICELAND

Base Opponent Vigdis Finnbogadottir in Presidential Race (Thorsteinn Saemundsson; MORGUNBLADID, 12 Apr 80) ..	102
--	-----

ITALY

First Round Results of Military Elections (Aldo D'Alessio; RINASCITA, 18 Apr 80)	108
Claims of Undisclosed PCI Funds; 'L'UNITA' Attack (Various sources, 13, 18 May 80)	112
'PCI Has Secret Funds', by Luigi Bisignani	
'L'UNITA' Charges	

PCI Bufalini's Editorial Pays Homage to Tito (Paolo Bufalini; RINASCITA, 9 May 80)	119
CGIL's Lama on Labor Costs, Absenteeism, the South (Luciano Lama Interview; AVANTI, 20-21 Apr 80)	123
UIL's Benvenuto Relaunches 'Historic Shift' of Labor Movement (Giorgio Benvenuti; AVANTI, 20-21 Apr 80)	128

NETHERLANDS

Eurocommunists, Moscow-Oriented Communists Will Meet in Brussels (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 23 May 80)	131
Dutch, Hungarian Communists Discuss Political, Social Problems (DE RODE VAAN, 15-22 May 80)	133
CHU Leadership Supports Van Agt Candidacy (NRC HANDELSBLAD, 12 May 80)	136
Dutch Consider Recolonialization of Netherlands Antilles (Peter van der Schaft; ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE, 19 Apr 80)	137

NORWAY

Liberal Congress Approves Program, Elects Leaders (AFTENPOSTEN, 26, 28, 29 Apr 80)	142
'Greens' Look to Party, by Einar Solvoll Against Civil Disobedience, by Einar Solvoll Sidestepped on Abortion, Coalition, Editorial	

SPAIN

PCOE's Lister Comments on Eurocommunism's Future (Enrique Lister Interview; L'ESPRESSO, 11 May 80) .	147
---	-----

TURKEY

Troubles Confront Turk-Is in Wake of THY Settlement (Ozer Oral; MILLIYET, 15 May 80)	150
Kafaoglu, Yalcin Propose Constitutional Amendments (MILLIYET, 15 May 80)	153

NICOSIA DAILY SUGGESTS COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS

NC220650 Nicosia ELEVETHERI KYPROS in Greek 22 May 80 p 1

[From the "Positions and Views" column: "Commonwealth"]

[Text] The Commonwealth has a long history. However, the records of this history do not speak of achievements or historical events, because until recently the Commonwealth mission was limited; it provided some economic facilities and refrained from undertaking political initiatives.

The first major Commonwealth achievement was to raise and solve the Zimbabwe issue in record time. This success must encourage its members to proceed boldly in solving all the serious political problems that concern them. All these problems must be taken up jointly and actively by all the Commonwealth member states.

The Cyprus problem is an issue of primary importance. Since the Turkish invasion it has become an acute problem which has remained unsolved for 6 whole years. A country belonging to the Commonwealth--Britain--is directly connected with the Cyprus problem. Many other Commonwealth countries have shown warm interest in it, and they would be pleased to see the Commonwealth taking an initiative to resolve our problem.

The government of the Cyprus Republic must look carefully at this idea. Let it study carefully all the facts, after discussing their details with the governments of friendly Commonwealth countries. After careful consideration of everything, let it proceed in a well-planned way with its goal to make the Cyprus problem the subject of discussion and solution at the next session of the Commonwealth heads of state.

We do not underestimate the reaction to be aroused, the problems or excuses that would be raised or the political expediencies that we shall encounter during our course. However, we depend on the power, the great power of the Commonwealth member states, many of which have shown affection and respect for us. These states constitute a hope for us!

CSO: 4908

TV NETWORK PROBES PUBLIC OPINION ON POLITICAL ISSUES

DW031433 [Editorial Report] Mainz ZDF Television Network in German at 2145 GMT on 2 June 1980 presents Horst Schaettke's periodical "Political Barometer" to show current FRG attitudes toward various issues. Schaettke notes that with respect to the Olympic boycott the questions and answers in this poll were as follows:

- "1. The athletes should not go to Moscow: 51 percent;
- "2. The athletes should participate in the Olympic Games but waive national anthems and flags: 15 percent;
- "3. The athletes should definitely participate: 32 percent."

The second topic under review, Schaettke goes on to report, involves the question of whether "The result of the North Rhine-Westphalian elections has had any effect on the opinion of the people." The SPD voters and followers had an opportunity to give marks, as it were, to Helmut Schmidt on a scale showing ratings above and below zero.

"Hardly anything has changed for Schmidt. But it is true that for months already he has been enjoying an esteem among his followers which has always shown ratings above 4: His May rating: 4.2."

Referring to the assessment of Franz Josef Strauss by followers of the CDU/CSU, Schaettke presents the following picture:

"The Strauss rating is vacillating around the 3 mark; his rating for May after the North Rhine-Westphalian elections: 2.9.

"For about a year the CDU/CSU voters have been rating Helmut Kohl lower than Franz Josef Strauss. Still, his rating last month climbed from 2.6 to 2.8."

As for the rating given Hans-Dietrich Genscher by the FDP followers, Schaettke reports that "In January, Genscher had the top rating of 3.9, whereas he has a rating of 3.7 now in May.

"These figures, 4 months prior to the Bundestag elections, make it clear that the CDU/CSU surely has quite a bit to do yet to mobilize its voters. This can also be demonstrated by asking the voters whom they would currently prefer as chancellor, Schmidt or Franz Josef Strauss. The SPD followers back Helmut Schmidt in a practically solid front with 96 percent. Of the CDU/CSU followers 59 percent came out for Franz Josef Strauss," Schaettl points out.

As regards the parties, that which applies to the candidates also applies to the parties. The voters have been asked generally what they think of the parties, says Schaettl, adding that this has nothing to do with the party the voters would vote for.

The chart with plus and minus values and the sympathy curve for the parties shows the following, says Schaettl:

"SPD -- slight gains in May, showing 2.1 points;

"CDU -- declining sympathy since February, the May value being 1.1 points;

"CSU -- until March in the positive field, now in May minus 0.2 points;

"FDP -- practically unchanged for 3 months, the May value being 1.3 points;

"The Greens -- They are rejected by most followers of the other parties with the tendency continuing to be down. The April value was minus 1.0 points, the May value is minus 1.4 points."

Schaettl states that "One can say that the Landtag elections in North Rhine-Westphalia have brought influence to bear on the opinion of the populace in at least three areas:

"First, the position of Helmut Schmidt has been strengthened. That can be derived not merely from commentaries of competent journalists, but also from the material presented to us by opinion poll research experts.

"Second, of all the parties the Social Democrats have gained most. Although the FDP is no longer represented in the Duesseldorf Landtag, its assessment by the voters has hardly changed. The fact that the union parties have made less capital out of the North Rhine-Westphalian elections is simply an observation in passing.

"Third, it is interesting that the people take an increasingly critical view of the Greens."

CSO: 3103

JOURNAL POLLS PUBLIC OPINION IN ELECTION YEAR

DWO31157 [Editorial Report] Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German on 2 June 1980 on pages 48-53 publishes an approximately 3,000-word article plus charts which forms the fifth and final part of its series surveying public opinion in the FRG during the current election year. The journal says that while the first two "levels" of the survey carried out by the Bielefeld Emnid Institute primarily dealt with public opinion about leading figures Schmidt and Strauss and about the effects of the triple world crisis--oil price increases, U.S.-Iranian conflict and Afghanistan invasion by the Soviets--on the Germans, the Emnid pollers reached a "third level" in which the questions posed dealt with "basic feelings" because a change in these basic feelings has "often preceded the change in voters' majorities." In probing these feelings, DER SPIEGEL notes, the opinion pollers operate with terms such as displeasure with the state, fear for the future, the potential for protest as well as the "fear gap." In this particular poll they found that the outlook on the young generation's future has never been "as gloomy" as it is now.

The journal demonstrates this by means of a chart which provides the answers to the following question in the Emnid survey: "When you think of the future, will the children be better off than the present adults or will they live approximately the same way as their parents, or will they be worse off?"

Three different groups of 100 persons each were asked one of the following questions, with the number of people answering the particular question as indicated:

"Children will live better"	22
"Children will live like their parents"	43
"Children will be worse off"	33

"Of 100 interviewed persons in each of the categories listed below, the following number believed that the children will be worse off:

"Former pupils of grade schools or 10-grade elementary schools--30;

"Former students of intermediate schools--39;

"Germans with high school diploma--43;

"Interviewed persons with children of their own in their households--32;

"Interviewed persons without children in their households--35;

"Voters of the CDU/CSU:	38
SPD:	24
FBP:	19
The Greens:	57

"Interviewed persons of the age groups:

18-21	38
22-25	41
26-29	34
30-35	33
40-49	30
50-64	31
of pension age	34."

The journal goes on to report that the Emmid pollers posed yet another question concerning the future, namely:

"A lot is changing nowadays in technology, science and the economy. What do you think, will life 30 years from now on the whole be more worth living for man or no longer as worth living as a result"?

Again, the journal notes, "Only a minority (21 percent) voiced optimism. Only 37 out of 100 interviewed persons agreed with the view that technology and science will at least insure the status quo ('as worth living as before'). The number of those deeming life 'no longer as worth living' 30 years from now is greater (41 percent)."

The journal at this point draws attention to the finding that "little is left of the blind belief in the eternal benefit of technical progress." Adding that "many Germans apparently have succumbed to a 'trend of hostility toward technology' which Emmid chief Walter Tacke has ascertained in other, more recent surveys by his institute."

Of 100 citizens of the Federal Republic asked about the political system in the FRG, 72 say they are "very content" with it if they are supposed to make a "rather general" statement.

Majorities between 62 and 66 percent also agree to the following statements:

"The politicians do not care very much what the man in the street thinks or says."

"One cannot orient oneself in politics because most of it takes place behind the scenes."

"The parties are actually only concerned about votes but not about what the people think."

A majority forming an even sharper judgment is not that high, but it still amounts to 55 percent for the statement:

"Politics is a dirty business."

Most Germans tell the Emnid Institute that they are content with the political system in the Federal Republic. But depending on their party affiliation, there are considerable differences. Of 100 persons questioned, 72 are "very content" or "content," while 27 are "less content" or "discontent."

A breakdown by party affiliation is as follows:

Very content or content:

CDU/CSU	61
SPD	90
FDP	81
Greens	35

Discontent:

CDU/CSU	36
SPD	10
FDP	19
Greens	63

All persons questioned were shown the following statements to find out their political stance:

"Politics today is so complicated that I am hardly interested in what is happening:" 46 percent agree, 52 percent disagree.

Many FRG citizens believe that their own economic situation is better than the general economic situation. The Emnid figures of April 1980 show the following:

Of 100 persons questioned, 57 say that their own economic situation is "very good" or "good" and that the general economic situation in the Federal Republic is not as good as theirs;

Some 35 percent say "so, so," adding that the general economic situation in the Federal Republic is better than theirs;

Some 8 percent say "bad" or "very bad," adding that the general economic situation in the Federal Republic is the same as theirs.

"For some years it has been a custom of opinion poll research experts to ask in their polls for prognoses with regard to the next elections. Emnid did it therefore in the poll conducted for DER SPIEGEL in mid-April:

"Somewhat more than 50 percent of those questioned do not believe the Greens will make it to Bonn.

"A two-thirds majority predicted a CDU defeat in the North-Rhine Westphalian Landtag elections.

"The majority is equally large which is predicting a victory for the SPD/FDP coalition on 5 October in the Bundestag elections.

"The results of the poll for DER SPIEGEL indicate that the outcome of the elections will be in line with the expectations of the majority of voters. Strauss and his fellow members of the union will not be able to find any hope in comparisons with earlier public opinion polls either.

"Just before the nomination of the Bavarian as candidate, DER SPIEGEL had a few questions asked through Emnid which have now been repeated. The results were almost the same.

"In July 1979 as well as in April 1980, only 38 percent of those asked supported Strauss when they were asked whom they would vote for in direct elections for the chancellor. At that time 59 percent named Schmidt, this time 58 percent.

"Strauss' election chances right after his nomination were estimated to be even a bit higher than they are now, 5 months prior to election day. At that time 36 percent and now only 33 percent expected a CDU/CSU victory and a chancellor named Strauss, while 62 percent at the earlier date and 64 percent now expect a victory for the SPD/FDP and Chancellor Schmidt as before."

CSU: 3103

DEMONSTRATIONS, ATTITUDE TOWARD BUNDESWEHR CAUSES CONCERN

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 9 May 80 p 1

[Article by Hans Schueler: "Is New 'Count Me Out' Wave upon Us ? - Observations on Bremen Riot and Role of Bundeswehr"]

[Text] No one expected the 25th anniversary of the Federal Republic's joining NATO to be a joyous occasion. After all, the anniversary was taking place in the midst of the most serious international crisis since Khrushchev's attempt to station Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. But no one thought that the swearing-in ceremony for 1,200 Bundeswehr recruits in Bremen, long scheduled to coincide with the NATO anniversary, would trigger bloody riots.

This is an alarming occurrence. We are used to a wide variety of violent demonstrations: against nuclear power plants and radioactive waste disposal sites such as in Brokdorf and in Gorleben and against government law enforcement agencies generally. Some of these protests were legitimate while others were at least understandable. But that rowdies and hooligans try to prevent this swearing-in ceremony at Bremen's Weser Stadium from taking place— nothing of this sort has ever happened before. The Bundeswehr is now 25 years old. But there has never been a violent demonstration directed against it.

It has not yet been determined who the instigators of the Bremen riots were and who simply joined in. But that does not really matter. A democracy has the right of self-defense and the right of preserving its existence. And the Bundeswehr is part of it. The state is entitled to ask its citizens to stand up for these self-evident rights. That is what the demonstrations were against and nothing else.

There is cause for concern. Until now everyone held that support of NATO and the Bundeswehr as well as the need for it was particularly pronounced in times of crisis. It was also held that crises sharpened the awareness of the Bundeswehr's usefulness and of the need for integrating it into NATO. As recently as 1974 the Federal Government stated in its White Book: "There is a direct connection between the evaluation of the international situation and the valuation of the Bundeswehr. Any feeling of an external threat leads to greater approval."

But meantime there is some doubt whether this still holds without reservations. The Bremen events were an outrage, to be sure. But one gets the impression just the same that the citizenry is looking for ways to dissociate itself from German security policies out of a fear of a further deterioration of the international situation. Although he had no idea what the young soldiers would be confronted with in Bremen, Defense Minister Hans Apel told a Bundeswehr commanding officers conference in Trier last week how difficult it is to make a convincing case of the strategy of military balance being a prerequisite for any policy of detente. "These past weeks have shown," Apel said, "that quite a few people in our country have repressed the need over the past few years of pondering unpleasant aspects of our own security, of being prepared to make personal as well as financial sacrifices in order to uphold the balance of forces as a condition for preserving the peace."

When he made that statement, Apel may well have been thinking of some members of his own party. There are not a few who no longer support the Federal Government's policies. At the SPD congress on security policy in Cologne it seemed at times as though they were setting the tone in the party. One speaker said that the FRG should speak out emphatically for its own interests in the alliance—without regard for those of the Americans. Another speaker came out for revising the NATO decision on modernization (medium-range missiles) and the simultaneous offer of arms control negotiations, adding a revealing post-script which was that he could not quite see why the Germans needed to concern themselves with "the nuclear policies of the victorious powers."

A representative of the SPD Working Association of Social Democratic Women said: "If we need weapons to keep the peace, we are on the wrong track." She coupled this statement with the demand that the good will tour of the two Navy missile destroyers Luetjens and Bayern through the Indian Ocean not take place. This was followed by a debate one would not have thought possible among Social Democrats in view of Herbert Wehner's famous speech before the Bundestag on 30 June 1960 when the SPD voiced its approval to join the western alliance.

It is the fear of a world crisis turning into unease about the alliance and the responsibilities it entails. At the same time, this unease regarding NATO turns inward—against the Bundeswehr as an armed force and against its integration into the alliance. One almost has the impression that the debate about arming the FRG which drew to a close more than 20 years ago is about to reopen within the German Social Democratic camp—and not in that camp alone.

In the Evangelical Church, too, which has upheld the rights of conscientious objectors and the moral duty to perform military service in equal measure, the first indications of revisionism can be noticed. The sharpest statement thus far has been made by four professors of theology from Erlangen who took

issue with existing church policy concerning "peacetime service with and without arms," calling it politically ineffective and, upon sober reflection, by now pointless. The memorandum, which the theologians composed under the impression of the Afghanistan crisis and the danger of military conflicts brought on by it, culminates in the statement: "Military service performed within the NATO framework makes sense only as long as deterrence works. It becomes pointless the moment operational orders are issued."

It would be rather unfair simply to call the theologians' arguments defeatist. But one can definitely ask them how they suppose that a Bundeswehr soldier — draftee, enlistee or professional — could justify his military service to himself and in front of his fellow citizens, if he is told in no uncertain terms that he is not performing it to preserve the peace.

It is true that a mere handful of theologians or a group of dissidents within the reigning SPD opposing Bonn's security policies do not by themselves represent grounds for concern. For that matter, not even communists, left wing extremists and radical opponents of the system who take advantage of every opportunity to destabilize the FRG's democratic system. But the Bremen riot clearly showed that we are not dealing with lone wolves. Quite apart from the Bremen protesters — the question is whether we are not seeing the forerunners of a new movement which will take the shape of an opposition to the western alliance and will upset the broad consensus regarding the complicated concept of the balance of forces acting as a guarantee for peace and a prerequisite for the relaxation of tensions.

It is difficult in this instance to differentiate between substantive and purely emotional opposition. Ever since the start of the Afghanistan crisis no responsible political figure or military man in the FRG has said a word that could be construed as being acrimonious. There has been no rattling of sabres and there is no one who has a mind to do so. The Bundeswehr has no reason to dive for cover, nor can its existence be even remotely questioned. Still, a new "include me out" wave appears to be in the offing. The temptation to stand aside becomes stronger, if there is a shred of hope that survival can somehow be bought and paid for. But, as Churchill said: One does not escape from danger by turning one's back on it.

947B

CSO: 3103

BRANDT SEES RESULTS OF 'TOO LITTLE DETENTE'

LD011316 Hamburg DPA in German 1034 GMT 1 Jun 80

[Excerpts] Hanover--SPD Chairman Willy Brandt has advocated the continuation of the policy of detente especially in view of the international crisis situation--and energetic efforts by the great powers to contain their conflicts and to solve the Afghanistan crisis, as well as the early start of disarmament negotiations between East and West, above all in the sector of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Addressing the National Congress of Young Socialists in Hanover, Brandt said on Sunday that the Federal Republic should place its weight, which during the 1970's had markedly increased, on the scales of peace and make its contribution toward solving acute crises. The Federal Republic should help "the world powers to find each other again and at last undertake resolute efforts to ensure that conflicts don't get out of control and that the arms race by the two sides is first slowed down and then eliminated."

Brandt emphasized that conditions for as successful as possible negotiations about old and new medium-range nuclear missiles should be clarified quickly. He asked those responsible in Moscow to take seriously the negotiating offer contained in the NATO resolution and not to dismiss it as propaganda. According to Brandt, the Warsaw Pact proposal for an all-European disarmament conference ought to be conscientiously examined regarding its implementation. The danger persisted now as before for the world to literally arm itself to death. All opportunities for meaningful negotiations ought to be considered.

Brandt declared his loyalty to the NATO Alliance, thus indirectly rejecting criticism voiced at the Young Socialist Congress concerning the Alliance. He called NATO an element of stability in Europe. But he also emphasized that the decisions of an alliance consisting of free peoples should never come about as dictate or surprise move, but by finding a common denominator for the Alliance partners' legitimate interests. The outgoing Young Socialist chairman, Gerhard Schroeder, at the congress, had criticized NATO as an instrument of traditional security policy which should be regarded with suspicion as well as an instrument of American hegemony in Europe.

In particular during recent weeks and months of growing crises in various parts of the world, Brandt believes, it has become increasingly plain that there is no sensible alternative to the policy of detente. "The developments of Afghanistan and Iran, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa are not the result of too much but of too little detente," he emphasized. That the current crises had not led to a great war was also a result of the fact that in Europe, being a center of a huge arms build-up, cooperation had taken root which, despite all its insufficiencies, had not remained ineffectual.

Brandt appealed to the Young Socialists to continue in their support for the SPD, perhaps even more strongly than hitherto. Young Social Democrats ought to be prepared to work hard for peace.

CSO: 3103

CHAIRMAN SCHROEDER OF YOUNG SOCIALISTS INTERVIEWED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 24 Apr 80 p 6

[Report on interview with Gerd Schroeder, chairman of West Germany's Young Socialists, by correspondent Gode Japs: "Not Necessarily to the Young Socialists' Disadvantage"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The Greens have no definite strategy for the implementation of their goals, says Juso (Young Socialists) chief Gerd Schroeder. But, to be sure, in the dialogue with the ecology movement, short-range successes cannot be achieved. Nevertheless, Schroeder is optimistic: "In the long run, we shall prevail."

VORWAERTS: Mr Schroeder, you will not be a candidate again at the Juso Federal Congress in Hannover at the end of May. During your 2 years in office, it has become astonishingly quiet around the Young Socialists. Has Gerd Schroeder integrated the SPD youth organization to death?

Schroeder: It is correct that there is less in the media about us than before. This "silence" is what we wanted. But I do not consider it acceptable to measure the political substance of a democratic-socialist youth organization by its presence in the bourgeois press. I am a resolute opponent of personalized disputes. In regard to contents, we have nothing to be ashamed about.

I also have not "integrated the league to death." It is true that what mattered first of all was to prevent the league's disintegration. The two executive committees to which I belong have accomplished this. We have discussed and also resolved a series of important intra-league problems. This applies to the problem of the organization of work with students as well as the relationship to the labor union youth which has developed in a very positive manner. There were also conflicts as regards content, for instance when the federal executive committee criticized the development of the SHB (League of Social Democratic College Students) which increasingly is turning into an irrelevant sect concerned exclusively with forging alliances whose total membership could easily fit into one small car.

VORWAERTS: And in the party?

Schroeder: There also, we have been engaged in hard, to-the-point controversies which were not necessarily decided at the Jusos' expense. The results prove this. Nobody is talking any more about the agreement guidelines and similar intra-party repressive measures. I consider this a success of the executive committee.

VORWAERTS: But isn't it true that a little more wind wouldn't hurt?

Schroeder: I do not consider it good if in one way or another the VORWAERTS participates in the dissemination of clichés. In the debate about nuclear energy, we made it clear where we differ from the party. We said that we don't think much of NATO's armament resolutions. We have argued for the maintenance and expansion of political democracy and for instance against [politically motivated] job restrictions. We have openly and publicly condemned undemocratic intraparty conditions. That was necessary and also partially successful. To make "wind" is not the job of the Young Socialists. We have been and are present in social conflict areas. This happens even if it conflicts with the wishes of the party leadership. Conflicts for contents' sake are necessary. Conflicts for show are simply stupid.

VORWAERTS: Many young voters who formerly could be counted among SPD followers are today with the Greens. What have the Jusos and the SPD done wrong?

Schroeder: The strategy of the majority of the party consists of coordinating within the framework of the existing socioeconomic structure the interests of the union-organized skilled workers with those of the progressive entrepreneurs. This safeguards the prevailing social stability. But of course it also precludes fundamental socio-political changes and produces ever larger minorities.

These minorities, and large parts of the youths in particular, do not feel themselves represented any longer by official policy. Their values, for a long time, have not been the values of this performance-oriented society. The far-reaching control of the party by the government has made it lose faith that with the SPD's help the political direction it rejects can be changed. But the Young Socialists are identified with the policies of the party's majority to a much greater extent than they are ready to admit. The Greens are the apparent way out for these minorities. This is certainly wrong, but for the moment this is the way it is.

VORWAERTS: It is surely somewhat oversimplified to place the blame exclusively on the party leadership?

Schroeder: This is by no means my intention. I do not deny in the least that the Young Socialists have made mistakes. Our political format, our

manner of coming to terms with issues does not differ sufficiently from what is going on in the party. In the meantime it remains true that we are often told: "With all due respect to your goals, still the final say in your party rests with others."

VORWAERTS: Where does one have to start to regain for the SPD the young generation, which sees its interests better represented with the Greens?

Schroeder: The Young Socialists must be able to defend their goals to the outside world without interference. A youth organization kept on a short leash by the party is not a credible discussion partner for the youth. Our discussion with those who tend towards the Greens will show that in many areas our goals are identical with theirs.

But in this dialogue it must of course also be made clear that we must not see ourselves merely as representative of an academically educated minority but that we must make good on our claim to organize the working youth in our organization. They have needs which must not be neglected. Decent vocational training must be our goal as much as our stand in favor of safe energy and a clean environment.

The Greens have no definite strategy for the implementation of their goals. In many respects, they simply exclude questions regarding their policy conditions so as to prevent the eruption of disagreements in their organization. They behave much more opportunistically than the Young Socialists ever have. That is, no one who talks about political limitations on growth can exclude the question of control of the means of production. If he does so anyhow, he behaves dishonestly and he must open himself up to the reproach that he either has not thought things through sufficiently or that he engaged in pure tactics aimed at sweeping under the rug the discrepancy of views between the socialist Rudolf Bahro and the reactionary Haussleiter.

This is what the Young Socialists have to tell the youths. Because of the discrediting of the SPD among the young, short-run successes in this dialogue cannot be achieved. In the long run, however, we shall prevail.

VORWAERTS: What, in your opinion, will be the primary tasks of the Young Socialists?

Schroeder: The Young Socialists must see to it that the problems connected with safeguarding the peace once again become the center of political discussion. We must make sure that safeguarding the peace is once again understood as a political fighting task which must always be met anew against the armaments lobby and its political accomplices in the CDU/CSU.

The Young Socialists must engage with renewed vigor in the discussion of the North-South problems. Resources necessary to further the self-determined development of the countries of the Third World become free only through decisive disarmament. In our country also, development policy is

much too much looked at with a view of finding markets for our industrial products. But foreign policy concerned with the Third World must not ask what serves our economy but rather what helps the rational development of the countries in question.

It is finally the Jusos' task to inquire into the development concept of the industrial societies. Growth has become of questionable value. It is evident that, the growth concept having become problematical, class-political questions appear anew. It is the primary mistake of the Greens that they overlook these problems.

The Jusos will, finally, have to continue their stand against the curtailment of political democracy. They will have to make clear what an after all theoretically conceivable power-takeoff by Strauss can mean for the political development of the Federal Republic. We must clarify that the difference between the designation of human beings as rats and blow-flies and their treatment as such is not a difference in principle but at most a difference in degree. To equate Schmidt's policies with the policies expected from a Strauss is merely an irresponsible propaganda trick of some of the Greens' activists. To oppose this is one of the Young Socialists' most important tasks.

VORWAERTS: One final question: With Willi Piecyk, Reinhard Schultz and Peter Wolf, three of your present deputies are aspiring to succeed you. Is one of the three your choice-candidate?

Schroeder: In my opinion, Willi Piecyk is the appropriate candidate. He stands for a policy approach which makes it possible to reintegrate people who have reservations about us. It is a policy approach characterized by frankness and readiness to discuss, which accepts alternative life and behavior styles.

Wolf's policy approach is different. Wolf is guided by a small circle of SHB functionaries. This circle claims to know "what is going on." Such circles always have the tendency to distance themselves from social reality and to stew in their own juice.

Reinhard Schultz thinks politically rather like Willi Piecyk. But he can become chairman only if Wolf steps down in his favor. The price Reinhard Schultz would have to pay for this would be the surrender of his own political identity. This cannot be what either he or his friends want. He should therefore realize that a governing body headed cooperatively by Willi Piecyk would be the most likely to correspond with his political approach and with that of his friends in the district of Western Westphalia.

9011

CSO: 3103

SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES FOR THOSE SEEKING ASYLUM RECOMMENDED

Bonn VORWAERTS in German 1 May 80 p 8

[Article by Reinhard Wolff: "Acceleration Instead of Defensive Reactions"]

[Text] The number of people seeking asylum in the FRG increased further during the past year. Developments during the first few months of this year indicate that a doubling of the number of such people can be expected during 1980. "Simplifications" of the procedure involved in the granting of asylum, which often signify nothing else than doing harm to the principles of a government based upon the rule of law, are being proposed now from all sides.

In the first place, the starting point for any discussion should be the taking of an unemotional view of the actual situation: more than 4 million foreigners are living in the FRG at present. Slightly fewer than 40,000 of them are refugees who obtained political asylum during the past 14 years. That by no means makes the FRG the leader in comparison with other West European countries. Quite the contrary. Most of the comparable industrial nations have accepted many more refugees than the FRG in past years.

Among those who are seeking asylum at present, the Pakistanis, whom the communications media prefer to speak of, and who often are guided here by unscrupulous "escorts," are not the most numerous. Instead, it is the refugees from Turkey. A situation actually amounting to civil war, with innumerable--some 3,000 by now--political murders has existed in that country for 2 years. But since the political persecution does not originate with the organizations which go to make up the government but, at the most, is caused indirectly by the government's inability to keep the political disputes between the groups of extremists within noncriminal limits, most of the people seeking asylum are not accepted under the present law.

That narrow interpretation of the idea of asylum can constitute an acute danger, in particular, for the life and limb of those seeking asylum who are rejected and expelled and from whose experiences and reasons for

fleeing it is apparent that even government agencies--and particularly police agencies in various parts of central and eastern Turkey, especially, in the case of Turkish refugees--do not stand aloof from the political disputes but close their eyes to the violence which goes on, or at least that originating at one of the two extremes--mostly that of the fascist "Gray Wolves," at present

In 1978, the Bundestag adopted a resolution, because of situations of that sort, calling for investigation of the suitability of extending assistance, within the framework of what is permissible under the Foreigners Law, to individuals from areas where civil wars are in progress who are seeking protection but are not seekers of asylum in the narrower sense.

Politically Persecuted People or Poor Rich?

Up to the present, decisions in regard to the granting of asylum have been made in accordance with that resolution, except that the procedure of granting asylum was completely dispensed with in the case of the 20,000 "quota refugees" from Vietnam--as with the Cuban refugees. Although that is very desirable, one thing should not be forgotten: before the sensational mass flight of the boat people began, many Vietnamese refugees in the FRG had to struggle with difficulties like those now being encountered by most of the Turkish people who are seeking asylum. That was only changed as a result of a political decision--a decision not to impose any procedure at all in connection with the granting of asylum for those people. It was intended that the FRG would avoid giving the impression that it classified refugees in different categories.

Certainly not all refugees from Turkey, any more than those from Vietnam, are political refugees in the narrower sense, and certainly most of the Pakistanis seeking asylum at present are "economic refugees." But here we should remember what Herbert Wehner said in the Bundestag in 1966, when he asked whether people did not know that in countries under totalitarian rule "the intertwining of what is called commercial life there with what is actually politics and persecution is so close that it does not befit our bureaucracy, in the first place, to place the burden of proving what he is on a refugee here."

Economic distress, generalized persecution of members of a minority or a particular political group and conditions resembling those prevailing during a civil war are often only the forerunners--or causes--of political persecution in the narrower sense. The present practice in regard to the granting of asylum demands that persons who are persecuted or discriminated against in that way remain in their homelands until "something happens"--until they are politically persecuted quite personally and directly. Most of the Jews who had left Germany before the Kristallnacht would have fallen through the broad meshes of the asylum netting and would have been rejected and expelled if such standards had been applied, for most of them were "only" persecuted economically and discriminated against "generally." Such a comparison--even though it is inadmissible--should provide food for thought.

In other areas where the law is concerned and also in the field of supra-national law and international legal relationships, the ways basic economic and social rights have found expression and been put into practice have been regarded as a step forward and an important instance of the success of an entire outlook--and an outlook which is no longer merely formal--for some time now. Why not in regard to the law concerning the granting of asylum, too?

The attractiveness of the FRG as a country granting asylum is not based primarily on its prosperity, but rather on the unimaginable poverty in the refugee's homeland. Also, the assertion, or at least the insinuation, that most of the people applying for asylum would not want to work here but would only want to receive welfare of some kind is quite simply not true. More than two-thirds of those seeking asylum were holding jobs during the past year. They often do work for which it is still hard even to find foreign workers. They pay taxes and social contributions and--approximately 95 percent are expelled--do not even get those payments they have made returned to them.

The ones who only receive welfare--that is true of fewer than one out of every six applicants for asylum--do not do so of their own free will in the majority of cases, but are sentenced to inactivity by the authorities. Either they do not get a work permit or the "toleration permit," which usually is limited to only one town or district, which the applicant for asylum then cannot leave, prevents them from obtaining a job in a neighboring town or district which urgently needs to be filled.

Whereas, on the one hand, more generosity seems to be called for, on the other hand there is need for a simplification and acceleration of the procedure of granting asylum, but not in the sense of giving greater powers to the Border Guard officials or the local foreigners' offices. That would be unfair, for it would simply overload those officials with work. If that were done, the granting of asylum would ultimately depend, in extreme cases, upon the information which the local official processing the case had on events in one of a hundred countries from which refugees might come, upon his knowledge of foreign languages, the availability of a suitable interpreter and the refugee's ability to express himself, and they are usually confronted with a culture and a legal system which are completely foreign and incomprehensible to them.

Not Only Numbers, but Also Relationships Must Be Seen

There is therefore a need for a speeding up and a simplification in other ways: an expansion of the Bundestag's general legal capacity for recognizing foreign refugees and a decentralization and strengthening of that agency, an improvement in the equipping of the administrative courts empowered to handle asylum cases, a concentration of legal measures on what is required by a government based upon the rule of law and prevention of the frequent coexistence side-by-side of governmental actions and actions taken by administrative and district courts.

The situation in the FRG in regard to the handling of matters concerned with the granting of asylum is not encouraging. Along with the removal of a situation in connection with political refugees which has been inherited from the past and is no longer up-to-date and a reform of the procedure of granting asylum which takes the principles of a government based upon the rule of law into consideration, a rethinking of the situation on the part of the public is necessary, above all. The increased flow of individuals seeking asylum must be understood as a consequence of world-wide tensions and crises and the burdening of the FRG resulting from them must be perceived in its relationship to that world-wide situation of which the miserable conditions in which refugees must live are a characteristic symptom. According to United Nations estimates, at least 15 million people must be regarded as refugees at present. A poor developing country like Somalia has to deal with more than a million refugees from Ethiopia at present, and the situation is similar in many African and Asiatic countries. Against such a background, the tens of thousands of applicants for asylum in the FRG do not justify any constitutionally dubious and exaggerated defensive reactions.

Table: Pressure by the Seekers of Asylum; Applicants for Asylum in the FRG.

Year	1977	1978	1979	1980 (estimate)
No of Applicants	16,410	33,136	51,493	Over 100,000

Place of Origin in 1979 in Percentage:

Location	Percentage
Near East	9
Eastern Europe	8
Africa	6
Asia	35
Turkey	35
Other	7

9266

CSO: 3103

INDUSTRIALIST NOTES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH POLAND

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 24 Apr 80 p 11

[Article by Otto Wolff von Amerongen: "New Initiatives Should Increase the Scope"]

[Text] Since the conclusion in October 1970 of the long-term agreement between the government of the FRG and the government of the Polish People's Republic on the traffic of goods and on cooperation in the economic and the scientific and technical areas, economic relations between the two countries have developed considerably.

The turnover of goods rose from DM 1.4 billion in 1970 to DM 4.6 billion in 1979. Consequently, the Polish People's Republic continues to be the FRG's second largest Eastern trading partner, after the Soviet Union, while--the other way around--the FRG is at the head of the Polish People's Republic's Western trading partners.

Development has been continuous. As with other East bloc countries, the exchange of goods is characterized by a more or less elevated credit balance in the FRG's favor.

Warsaw Has Imported Less

While the FRG's exports to the Polish People's Republic increased by leaps and bounds at the beginning of the 1970's, and remained at approximately DM 3.2 billion in the mid-1970's, they have decreased in the last few years to DM 2.4 billion. Exports from the Polish People's Republic, on the other hand, grew gradually from barely DM 750 million in 1970 to DM 2.2 billion at the beginning of 1980. It is not out of the question that an equalization in the trade balance will soon be reached, but mainly by holding back on imports from the FRG. The varying goals of Polish economic policy are also reflected in a certain way in this development. At first the goal was the erection and consolidation of Polish industry with up-to-date Western investment goods, which almost necessarily led to an appreciable indebtedness. Then followed attempts through increasing its own exports

and throttling exports from Western countries to reach an equalization in the trade balance.

Simultaneously, efforts to cooperate with Western partners in Poland itself and in third markets were appreciably strengthened. This refers to large projects such as new industrial enterprises and the opening up of raw materials, as well as to the less significant joint manufacture of goods for domestic and foreign markets.

For some time, both sides have been trying increasingly to include intermediate and smaller sized enterprises in economic cooperation. The Eastern Commission of the German Economy and the Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce try together, within the framework of their tasks at the time, to support cooperative work between the German and Polish economic circles in question.

In spite of numerous difficulties it is possible that up to now more than 100 cooperative actions have been effected. It is desirable for many to follow. Possibilities are many and growing--not only industrial but also in the increasingly valuable area of raw materials.

Cooperation With Smaller Firms as Well

In contrast to the FRG, poor in raw materials and dependent on imports, the Polish People's Republic has, besides coal, numerous deposits of raw materials, especially copper, sulfur, silver and other noble metals important to industry, as well as large iron ore deposits, only recently discovered.

Thus, it is not by chance that a few months ago a contract for the improvement of copper mining was concluded with the assistance of German bank credits; it provides for the supply of 40,000 metric tons of copper per year for several years. Moreover, the present position in energy supply also offers good opportunities for close cooperation. Here we have in mind not only a coal gasification project but also the supply of mining machines and equipment.

Details of the new 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan are not yet known. According to a Polish pronouncement, however, it is supposed to include a list of projects with 19 items referring to projects of considerable note, which should offer good prospects for German firms to contribute to the future Polish requirements for investment goods.

Restrictions Are Being Further Reduced

An indication of the FRG government's interest in expanding German-Polish economic relations is its most recent agreement to extend insurance for up to DM 500 million, a Hermes surety, for export credits for delivery-related goods. By means of this the Polish People's Republic obtains better

opportunities to satisfy urgent requirements, otherwise delayed, and to make use of intermediate and long-term payments.

Moreover, at the beginning of this year the FRG took a further remarkable step to ease restrictions in imports from the Polish People's Republic. Half of the remaining quantitative restrictions in the artisan area were tentatively liberalized by means of so-called test certificates, for one year to begin with, and to be definitively removed after four or five years.

In addition, discussions conducted recently between representatives of the Polish and FRG governments at the highest level show the interest of both sides in further extending trade between the two countries and in bringing it to the level customary between industrialized nations.

5586

CSO: 3103

IFO INSTITUTE ANALYZES TRADE WITH EAST BLOC

DW301046 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 30-31 May 80 p 3

[Munich correspondent's report signed GW.]

[Text] Munich--The Federal Republic's trade with the East in past years was characterized by consolidation efforts of the state trading countries. After all, they succeeded in cutting down considerably on the trade exchange deficit by switching to a more moderate rate of expansion and the partial curtailment of imports from the Federal Republic.

The IFO Institute expects that because of the world political crisis situation and because of economic factors, such as, for example, the consequences of the recent oil price increase, East-West trade exchange will not experience a lasting stimulation within the foreseeable future.

Only the chances for trade with the People's Republic of China are considered to be relatively positive over the long term. The German economy in the past 2 years managed to clearly increase its exports beyond the boom years of 1974-75 with only two state trading countries, namely the People's Republic of China and Hungary.

With the exception of the People's Republic of China, all state trading countries have decreased their deficits vis-a-vis the Federal Republic in past years. For the first time in many years the USSR even managed to achieve a surplus by profiting from the world market price increase for oil.

The significance of state trading countries in such a way has lost some of its importance as sales markets for German products. Their share decreased from 8 percent in 1975 to merely 6 percent last year. Particularly the USSR and Poland have lost significance, while the importance of China and Hungary has increased.

On the import side, however, the share of state trading countries has been increasing, namely, from 4.7 percent in 1975 to 5.5 percent last year.

In 1979 exports from the Federal Republic to state trading countries increased nominally by 7 percent, but stripped of inflation costs only a small increase took place. Exports to Eastern Europe in reality have even decreased, because the nominal increase amounted to only 3 percent. Exports to Romania were most expansive, showing 12 percent on the plus side, followed by Czechoslovakia with 9 percent and the Soviet Union with 5 percent. Exports to Poland, however, have decreased for the fifth year, this time by 7 percent. Exports to Hungary were just a bit below the level of the preceding year after having gone up for 3 years running. The expansion of exports to the People's Republic of China was far more than average although the increase of 37 percent was only half as strong as the year before which had 68 percent. The share of machine exports of overall German exports to China increased by more than 30 percent.

Although the position of the Federal Republic with regard to machine exports to the USSR was very good up to 1977, this export share clearly decreased in 1978 and 1979. Last year a decrease of machine exports to the USSR of 20 percent was registered up to late September.

What has a decelerating effect on German business with the East is the growth weakness in Eastern Europe and the world political crisis situation. After all, the envisaged growth targets have not been attained by a number of states. In most East European countries a 5-year plan period is expiring in which a shortage of energy, a low rate of labor productivity and friction losses in restructuring the economy have a growth-impeding effect.

The aggravation of the energy problem since the last oil price hike will change little in these negative tendencies in the foreseeable future, IFO predicts. Consequently the targets of the new 5-year plans are tangibly lower than those of the expiring plan period. Besides, the goods exchange with the USSR since the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops has been threatened by the worsening of the political climate between East and the West.

To date, however, nothing can be felt of a disturbance in the economic relations with the USSR. On the contrary, the contacts between the German economy and representatives of the Soviet Union in the past few months of this year have been especially intensive. After all, 1981 marks the beginning of a new 5-year plan period, and especially after the mitigation of the extreme goods exchange imbalance the German economy has great chances of being more strongly considered in the placement of orders than it was during the past plan period.

The most recent aggravation of the world political crisis situation, the Damocles sword of a trade embargo, however, call into question the expansion of Eastern trade with the USSR. Time will tell whether the Federal Government will resist a further urging of an embargo by the American side.

IPO stresses that the interlocking of some branches and even of some individual companies with the USSR is greater than their share of 2.2 percent in the overall FRG exports. Thus in 1978 roughly 13 percent of the German steel tube exports, 15 percent of the sheet metal exports, and well over 11 percent of the German machine tool exports were sold to the USSR.

About 50,000 jobs are tied to the exports to the Soviet Union which concentrate on just a few branches and even companies. In view of the abating inland boom, the danger to these jobs as a result of a delivery halt would entail great problems.

An expansion of German exports to China in the long run will be possible only if the German market also absorbs Chinese products, IPO stresses. Trade with China cannot be a one-way street, because the People's Republic of China, too, will endeavor to keep its trade in balance on a long-term basis.

Last year the Soviet economy saw a low in economic growth. The increase in production slowed down to 3.4 percent (in 1978: 4.8 percent), while the annual plan had provided for 5.7 percent. IPO is rather skeptical about the prospects for fulfilling the plan targets for 1980. At best industrial production will probably be 26 percent, instead of the planned 36 percent, above the level of 1975.

CSO: 3103

APEL GIVES VIEWS ON FRG AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 25 Apr 80 p 25

[Article: "The Aircraft Industry Must Reduce Costs. Defense Minister Apel Gives No Business Guarantee"]

[Text] Hannover (own report)--The German aircraft and space industry must not become a permanent public charge. It must have the goal of surviving by its own strength. Here all possibilities for increased efficiency must be exploited. The federal government will in this way limit itself to supplying flank protection. "It cannot give sale or business guarantees."

This was stressed by Federal Defense Minister Hans Apel at the inauguration of the Hannover 1980 Aircraft Exhibition (ILA 80). Everywhere it was noted with attention that the defense minister appeared officially on this occasion.

It is clear to everyone that neither public assumption of risk nor government enterprise participation can permanently insure orders or increased business. "In the long term no enterprise can be kept alive against the market." Apel stressed the necessity for a healthy industrial structure. Here the merger of the Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm and Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke [United Aeronautical Works] groups of firms remains an essential demand of the federal government. Bonn takes the position that a solution is near through which, by way of a regionally balanced system of plants, a permanent assurance of jobs is possible. Negotiations for a positive completion should be conducted without delay. In the long term the merger can have only one purpose, namely, to strengthen the national foundation for the large community tasks in Europe, i.e. an intermediate step toward a comprehensive European cooperative solution. The minister recalled in this connection the successes of European partnerships for Airbus, Panavia, and Euromissile.

Not To Aspire to Autarky

Apel referred to the American advance in important technical areas and concluded that this should not lead the other partners to aspire to autarky by way of competitive technological races. Much more, in each country the preponderant abilities should form a basis for cooperation in which each partner contributes his best abilities.

The speaker reminded the industry also of the necessity for a balanced structure between military and civil aircraft construction. The German aircraft and space industry, 55 percent dependent on military orders, must attain a broader risk distribution by strengthening its civil leg. The federal defense department cannot extend a business guarantee. As an example Apel referred to the market success of the European airbus. It is now on the threshold of production quantities which lead to the hope of later economical production. Here it is shown that the consumer-oriented concept of a project is critical for success in the aircraft and space industry as well.

Apel expressed skepticism toward a liberalization of export policy for armament goods. Export markets require additional capacity, but this would mean increasing problems. Moreover, he asked: "Which countries would be in a position to pay the current price of approximately DM 67 million for the Tornado system?"

Approximately 350 firms from 16 countries are represented at the aircraft exhibition, which continues until 1 May at the Hannover/Langenhagen airport. More than 50 percent came from abroad. Among these, the United States with 56 and France with 53 firms are the leaders. Much attention is being given to the encompassing program. Pressing questions concerning aircraft and space are being treated at six branch meetings and symposia. Despite various flight programs, the center of gravity of ILA 80 is its function as a branch fair.

5586

CSO: 3103

USSR AMBASSADOR STRESSES MILITARY ARTICLES OF TREATY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 24 Apr 80 p 8

[Article: "Military Articles Especially Important"]

[Text] Unanimity between Finland and the Soviet Union with respect to the military articles as well as all other points of the YYA [Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Aid] Agreement is especially important under conditions in which an attempt is being made to speculate with respect to the relations of these two countries. This was emphasized by Soviet Ambassador to Finland V. M. Sobolev in a speech on Wednesday at the Paasikivi Society.

"When the points were appended to the 1948 agreement according to which both parties obligated themselves to fight against any military aggression directed at Finland or at the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, it also provided a firm guarantee for the inviolability of the northwest borders of the Soviet Union and Finland's security, and the agreement in its entirety also became an important factor for guaranteeing peace and security in northern Europe as well as throughout all of Europe," stated Sobolev.

He also emphasized that the leaders of the Soviet Union have on several occasions actively supported President Urho Kekkonen's initiatives concerning a nuclear-free Nordic area. In Soviet statements it has been emphasized that our country is prepared to join with other nuclear countries as a guarantor of such a nuclear-free zone inasmuch as the participating states want it, noted Sobolev.

10 576

CSO: 3107

GORAN VON BONSDORFF PROPOSES DEMILITARIZATION OF NORDIC CAP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 May 80 p 2

[Article by Goran von Bonsdorff: "Arctic Cap as an International Zone of Peace"]

[Text] The writer, Goran von Bonsdorff, occupies the Swedish-Language Chair in the political science faculty of the University of Helsinki. In addition to his research work, Prof. von Bonsdorff is active as chairman of the Finnish Peace League and he has actively participated in the activities of Finland's UN League as well as in other international peace work and research.

In striving for a peaceful world order it is particularly essential to develop methods which continuously and gradually lead to partial goals within the framework of a unified total plan. Generally speaking, these procedures can be divided into two main groups, functional and territorial.

A functional solution means latching on to special problems, which are by nature global, such as, for example, management of the world's energy or air traffic between various parts of the world. A territorial solution for its part presupposes that the premise is a limited area of the world, whose various problems are treated simultaneously. The results of these actions can thus be either a functional or a territorial integration, frequently a kind of combination of both.

Over a longer period of time it is certainly justified to say that the functional point of view is more important than the territorial since the most important problems of mankind are by nature to the greatest degree global, and this trait is becoming stronger from year to year. On the other hand, it is clear that in the present situation territorial solutions can be a beneficial tool to mankind, especially when one takes the inequality of development in various parts of the world into consideration.

In this connection it is important to emphasize that this kind of a solution is not in conflict with the total global interests of mankind, but it is more likely to be a beneficial example or at least it can offer a stimulus to the promotion of peace in a broader sense.

New Communities

Security communities and nuclear-free zones represent examples of these kinds of solutions. What is meant by a territorial security community is a group of two or more states, which makes up a unified area and in the framework of which the use of force in the conduct of relations between states is highly unlikely. The precondition for this is not only good and confidential relations between the governments concerned, but also a developed network of communications between the various institutions and organizations of the countries concerned as well as close personal relations between their residents.

If such security communities are created in various parts of the world and they are continually expanded by the realization of similar relations with neighboring countries, it would be possible to imagine that gradually more than half of the world's surface would be covered by security communities. In this kind of a situation it could be considered a peaceful place when one considers that the use of force is generally most normal between neighbors.

The next phase of development would be the consolidation of various security communities, and when they together cover more than 90 percent of the earth's surface, practically speaking one could consider that a lasting peace has been achieved.

Compared with security communities nuclear-free zones have a more limited goal. They concern weapons technology and, in addition to this, a particular form of weapons technology, albeit one of central importance when one takes the continuing existence of mankind into consideration. It does not always have to be a question of a territorial measure in the strict sense of the word since an individual state can declare itself to be a nuclear-free zone.

Nuclear-free zones also definitely have a global importance since it is not sufficient that the states concerned declare themselves to be nuclear free, but it is also necessary that the countries with nuclear weapons recognize this situation and promise for their parts not to use nuclear weapons against them. Also nuclear weapons must not be stored in or transported over the territories of nuclear-free zones. Here the question of international guarantees is thus of central importance contrary to the situation with respect to security communities.

CSCE Documents

Those 35 states which signed the document on security and cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975 make up a territorial community of a unique kind. It is not a question of a security community since the possibility of war does exist between the states of some of the area, nor is it a question of a nuclear-free zone. Instead, one can say that the principles of cooperation between technically developed states are inclined to be accomplished by means of the continuing international process of the CSCE

As a consequence, the area's states are more dependent on each other. They need a tighter network of cooperation such as organizations for dealing with common interests within the framework of mutual understanding or harmony. Also states do not need the leadership of economically and militarily strong countries or foreign intervention in internal and national affairs.

Within the framework of general territorial cooperation there are also smaller territorial units in Europe such as the so-called subregional units, the EEC, CEMA, the Benelux countries, the Baltic countries, and the Mediterranean countries. These communities can be significant when new principles are put into use or new problems are solved, for example, economic cooperation, cultural exchange, or environmental protection. In various relevant areas a state can belong to various territorial suborganizations, which of itself promotes a unification of the area as a totality.

Peace From the North

An area to which increasing attention has been given in recent times is the Nordic Cap, in other words, that part of the world which is located on the north side of the Arctic Circle. It is not a question of a European area since the Nordic Cap is divided between three parts of the world, Europe, Asia, and America. However, the issue is clearly a part of the CSCE process in that all of the seven countries with territory in the Nordic Cap area are a party to the Helsinki accords.

Therefore, it can be considered natural that these states would also gradually increase cooperation in the Nordic area and adopt measures which would increase confidence at the political and military level.

It then becomes a question of whether it is realistic to think that peace could come from the north, in other words, from areas north of the Arctic Circle and thus simultaneously spread south through the three continents. The concept is not completely Utopian if one takes into consideration certain traits that are characteristic for the area.

The population of the area is relatively small, and the indigenous residents such as the Eskimos and the Lapps are not particularly involved in the ideological and economic conflicts of the developed, industrialized society. To the contrary, they want to retain their culture and traditional lifestyles.

The other problem groups are relatively few and they concern exploitation of natural resources, environmental protection, transportation, and scientific research. The strategic importance of the area has increased, but, on the other hand, a reduction of the military arms level of the area would soon increase security for both superpowers and for the smaller states as well as improve the international atmosphere. Although an increase in military activities has been observed to a certain degree, it is of not of such a magnitude that it would make a corresponding reduction of arms impossible.

If indeed the Arctic Cap becomes an area which inspires mankind to new efforts on behalf of peace, it will require more than just certain references to suitable points of cooperation. It will also need a clearly defined ideological goal which would arouse the attention of the whole international community. In this sense the Arctic Cap could be declared as an international zone of peace. This would mean an area in which countries would obligate themselves to a gradual reduction of military activity and simultaneously increase cooperation in various areas. In order to accomplish this goal, it would be expedient to establish an international commission, which would be responsible for compiling reports on the development of cooperation to the UN as well as the CSCE.

An initiative for declaring the Arctic Cap a nuclear-free zone was already made in 1978 by Theresa Pederson, a representative of Alaskan Eskimos, at a special disarmament session of the UN General Assembly. In this same connection it was emphasized that no other population group on the face of the earth, except for the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have suffered the effects of radioactive pollution to the same degree as the indigenous population of the Arctic Cap.

The Role of the North

In the present situation the initiative for declaring the Arctic Cap a zone of peace could perhaps more suitably come from the Nordic countries, maybe in cooperation with Canada. Relations between the leading superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are presently so strained that an intermediary would be needed in order to open the door for negotiations to be conducted in a positive spirit.

On the other hand, the foreign policy leaders of the countries in question are presumably wise enough to comprehend that it is extremely important to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible since the alternatives over a longer interval of time is a collective and complete catastrophe. Therefore, an initiative taken by smaller states could have greater chances for success than what one might assume at first hand.

The answer to the question whether peace can come from the north is that peace can come very well from the north presuming that the issue is thoroughly prepared and the proposals are formed in such a way as to take into consideration the interests of the whole world community. On the other hand, it must naturally be added that peace is something positive, regardless of its origin, and that opportunities for making a positive contribution exist in many areas and in connection with many problems. Work on behalf of a policy of peace is extremely valuable, but there is no form of work on behalf of peace that can be accomplished alone.

VALMET BEGINS SERIES PRODUCTION OF VINKA TRAINER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 18 Apr 80 p 15

[Article: "Vinka Production Beginning"]

[Text] The first Vinka training aircraft, which was produced at Valmet's Kuorevesi Plant, flew a presentation flight on Thursday in Kuorevesi. This aircraft is the first of a series of 30 aircraft ordered by the Air Force. Vinka production is a year and a half behind the original schedule.

In addition to the Vinka, the Air Force is receiving two Fokker F-27 aircraft. The Air Force intends to buy or lease the Fokkers from Iceland. The Fokker will replace the two DC-3's or the Dakota being used as transport planes by the Air Force. The Air Force has seven Dakotas. Finnair has already previously purchased two Fokkers.

In addition to technical problems, a destructive fire last December also delayed the production of the Vinka training aircraft. Only two aircraft frames as well as portions of two other aircraft were salvaged from the fire in the assembly hall. The fire also destroyed tools, frameworks, and parts of wings belonging to the Vinka as well as the Hawk.

Valmet representatives did not disclose the extent of the damage caused by the fire in December until Thursday. Heikki Mantyla, director of the defense equipment group, estimated the damage to be 15-17 million markkas.

Even though the Vinka is already under series production, the development of the aircraft continues. Air Force Chief of Staff, Col. Kari Korttila, stated that the Vinka's speed and the stationary spoilers have disappointed the Air Force, otherwise it is completely satisfied with the aircraft. The Vinka is replacing the Saab Sapphire, but because of delays, the Air Force will continue to use the Sapphires.

Originally the Air Force was to put the whole Vinka-series into operation in 1981, but now Vinka Project Chief Pekka Kaipio believes the last aircraft will not be ready for delivery until the beginning of 1982. The fire caused a 9-month work stoppage and even though Vinka parts are now being manufactured in two shifts at the plant, it is expected that there will be a several month pause in the final assembly work in the fall.

Several Versions of the Aircraft

The Vinka is the first test aircraft of domestic production since the 1950's and, therefore, the Air Force has adopted an understanding attitude toward the delays. Kaipio states that in the manufacture of the Vinka it has been a question of reviving a dying domestic industry and a new production. The domestic production level of the Vinka is 75 percent.

At least three versions of the aircraft can be manufactured; the general version could be applied, among other things, for use as a float plane and for crop dusting with a 500-kilo load. In the specialized version the Vinka could be adapted for crop dusting and fertilizers at low speeds, a fast version would require new wings and retractable spoilers. This type could even use a 300-horsepower engine.

Valmet has already marketed the Vinka abroad, but no precise negotiations have yet been conducted. When the Vinka is placed in air shows on the continent, Director Juhani Mäkinen of the Kuorevesi Plant also believes that marketing possibilities will also improve. The most recent negotiations were held with India, the Near East countries and South America, among other places, have been mentioned as export countries.

The Finnish aircraft industry is already involved in export transactions. Mäkinen states that Valmet is involved in projects of various foreign aircraft plants. This involvement deals with the planning and manufacture of electronic systems.

Hawk Production in Progress

The partial manufacture of the Hawk training aircraft ordered from England has been in progress at Kuorevesi for a couple months already. The assembly of 46 aircraft is Valmet's next challenge. The first domestically assembled Hawk should be in the air in April 1981.

"The Hawk's rudders, flaps, and brakes will be made at Kuorevesi," states Section Chief Erkki Haapanen. According to Haapanen we are slightly behind schedule in this partial production, but he does not believe that it will affect the actual assembly work.

In addition to Kuorevesi, the Kajaani Corporation is making the electronic system for the Hawk. Valmet's Linnavuori Plant is assembling the aircraft's engine as well as manufacturing the jet pipes.

Valmet has invested 22 million markkas into the assembly of the Hawk at Kuorevesi. A new large assembly hall has been constructed for the purpose of this assembly work, a numerically controlled work center and milling machines have been procured. Because of the Hawk project, the number of workers at the plant will increase to approximately 650.

Valmet intends to continue its cooperation with British Aerospace even after the Hawks have been delivered to the Air Force in 1985. The British have promised partial production for Kuorevesi. For future partial production Valmet has invested in surface and heat treatment machinery.

Another place which interests Valmet is the Soviet Union. A group of aircraft experts from both countries is to assemble this month in Finland and visit the plant at Kuorevesi. Heikki Mantyla, the Finnish chairman of the group, states that the Russians are interested in airport lighting systems, Finnish maintenance work, and aircraft electronics. According to Mantyla cooperation at least initially will concentrate on civil aviation.

10576

CSD: 3107

AIR FORCE BUYS PIPERS WHILE AWAITING VINKA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 May 80 p 3

[Article: "Air Force to Receive Four Piper Aircraft"]

[Text] The Air Force is to receive four Piper Arrow aircraft. On Wednesday the Council of State authorized the Air Force to make a 1.7 million markka purchase from the Kar-Air Corporation.

The chief reason for the purchase of these aircraft is the delay in the delivery of the Vinka training aircraft. For this reason all the Saab-Sapphire aircraft of the Air Force are needed for the aerial warfare school at Kauhava. Their transfer to Kauhava is causing a deficit of aircraft used in joint flight training.

The Piper Arrow IV was developed for use by the Air Force from the Piper II aircraft. They have the same engine and the same structure.

The Piper Arrow IV is equipped with a 4-cylinder, 200-horsepower piston engine, weighs 1,200 kilos, and the wing span is 10 meters. The engine's speed is 250 kilometers per hour.

The funds for these new aircraft have been included in the first supplementary budget for the current year.

10576

CSD: 3107

BRIEFS

NEW BORDER PATROL BOATS--The border patrol is acquiring new border patrol boats. The first light metal boats will be put into use in the spring of 1982. After an experimental period it will be determined whether all the Koskelo class boats will be replaced with this new model. Of the nine border patrol boats in the border patrol system eight are of the Koskelo class. They were built in the years 1955-1960. They are scheduled to be removed from service toward the end of the 1980's. The new boats would displace only half the amount of water that the Koskelo class boats do. Their purchasing and operational expenditures as well as crew needs are less than for the Koskelo class boats. The length of the new boats is 26.8 m., width 5.2 m., displacement 50 tons, and their speed is more than 20 knots. When the boat to be acquired is ready in 1982 one of the Koskelo class boats will be turned over as a training vessel for the border patrol school and will replace the completely obsolete Ecker boat currently being used. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 30 Apr 80 p 2] 10576

CSO: 3107

PCF'S RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROCOMMUNIST MOVEMENT EXPLORED

Paris LE MONDE in France 10 Apr 80 pp 1, 10

[Article by Lilly Marcou, National Political Science Foundation researcher: "Is the PCF Still Eurocommunist?"]

[Text] The French Communist Party (PCF) has consummated its break with the Eurocommunist direction, which it had seemed to have taken, by approving the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, rejecting all efforts to find a "third way" between the power politics of the United States and the Soviet Union and turning down the idea of a "Eurogauche" [Euroleft].

The "meeting" of the European communist parties, which was held in Paris on 28 and 29 April by the PCF and the Polish Communist Party, despite what Mr Marchais says, (LE MONDE, 9 April), bears witness to a schism within the European communist movement.

Lilly Marcou, a researcher for the National Political Science Foundation, poses some questions about the scope of the Eurocommunism which was espoused, by the PCF not long ago.

When the PCF quite tardily joined the Eurocommunist movement, when, by means of its most recent congresses and its position taking in international organizations--French-Italian summit in Rome in November 1975; French-British summit in Paris in May 1976; Berlinger-Marchais meeting in Paris in June 1976; conference of European communist parties in Berlin in June 1976; French-Italian-Spanish summit in Madrid in March 1977--it made itself an integral part of the evolution toward Eurocommunism; and everything pointed to a real change's having taken place within it. The long march of the PCF toward Eurocommunism was a zigzag course punctuated by advances, fallbacks, and standstills without, however, calling into question the change process undertaken.

From the meeting of the Central Committee of Argenteuil in 1966--the first meeting of the party devoted to the intellectuals--to the 22d congress in 1976, including the Champigny manifesto in 1968, everything indicated,

at least at the level of proclamations, but with strong presumptions, a real risorgimento [resurgence] of the PCF. Similarly, at the international level, the condemnation of the intervention in Prague of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, the refusal to talk with the Soviets in Berlin, during the Pan-European conference of communist parties, the withdrawal of the French delegation from LA REVUE INTERNATIONALE in Prague at the end of 1977, the punctual and circumscribed but systematic criticisms when the rights of man and individual freedoms were threatened in "real socialism" countries, showed that the PCF, in its own manner and style, had been able to make the necessary change of direction to join the parties which openly declared themselves to be Eurocommunist in the difference-of-opinion sector.

Of course, that was a change of direction made tardily, one that was recognized and given some thought, but a change of direction all the same, expressed as usual with spirit and determination and without looking backward (the PCF has one characteristic: the party leaders may have "acted tardily"; however, the party never has a past; i.e., it has never made a mistake).

Eurocommunism is a complex phenomenon which is to be found at several levels and is materialized in efforts to forge political lines: a new conception of alliances, a new relationship with the USSR and other socialist countries, a new conception of the future of the international labor movement, democratization of the internal structures of the party itself. At least that is what the leaders of the Eurocommunist parties proclaim.

Now then, what is the position of the PCF vis-a-vis these new orientations? One cannot fail to note an ambiguous and fluctuating policy, depending upon the levels of its operation.

Despite the unitary euphoria of the years 1972-1974, the PCF has demonstrated in its difficult and conflictive relations with the Socialist Party that it did not accept the concept of alliances of the Eurocommunist kind defined by the final document of the conference of communist parties of European capitalist countries (Brussels, January 1974). This conference was supposed to ratify a new kind of alliances which departed from the Leninist principle of "fellow travelers" [compagnons de route] to proclaim durable alliances "today for the development of democracy and the transformation of society," "tomorrow for the building of socialism."

At another level, that of relations with the USSR, the French Communist Party has never gone so far in criticism of a few abuses of "real socialism" as the Italian and Spanish communist parties. However, the days when L'HUMANITE published idyllic reports about life in the USSR and when the party took as its own all the actions of the Soviet camp seemed a thing of the past.

Finally, at the level of the world communist movement, noteworthy developments were also observed. In Berlin, in 1976, Georges Marchais was quite

determined to demand the search for new structures, to reject any "common strategy for all parties," every common document alleged to express the general line and to reject for the future any international and even European conference of the communist parties as a hindrance to the struggle. Similarly, in December 1977, Jean Kanap said that the PCF should not continue to support "everything that the Soviet Union does, and everything done in the Soviet Union."

However, internal events in French society and the impact of the international crisis were to harshly test the PCF's "Eurocommunism." At the French level, the fracturing of the union of the left in September 1977, its setback in the legislative elections in March 1978, the internal opposition which broke out on the very day after this setback, were the first obstacles in the party's Eurocommunist path. At the international level, the explosion of wars in the Third World, the crumbling of the alliances of the left in southern Europe, the rise of a resurgent right, led the party to make choices in which Eurocommunism seemed relegated to research seminars for intellectuals.

Of course, reference to the term is constant and ever present in the party's discussions; however, the political choices and behavior over the last 2 years--and that in a progressive manner--pose and repose a capital question about the future of the PCF's Eurocommunism. Issuing for the benefit of the 400 intellectuals at Vitry the famous formula of the "overall positive balance sheet" of the socialist countries' experiment--a formula taken up by the 22d Congress--the leaders of the PCF exhibited an initial distancing vis-a-vis the radical, critical spirit of the Eurocommunist initiative with respect to these experiments. Santiago Carrillo's book, "Eurocommunism and the State," and the draft thesis of the 15th Congress of the Italian Communist Party take positions diametrically opposed to this "positive balance sheet."

Questions

The positions taken without nuance with respect to Soviet foreign policy in Asia reflect an additional distancing vis-a-vis the essential credo of Eurocommunism. In 15 or 20 years, the impartial historian will understand or perhaps explain the major reasons which led one of the most prudent diplomacies in the world to intervene in Afghanistan and the paradox of seeing the Soviets militarily occupy a country in which they had been practically at home, omnipresent and all-powerful for 10 years, apparently unbeknownst to everyone, capitalists and communists, present not only in the form of third parties but directly in the economy, state and ideology of this country.

However, we might now ask why the PCF has become a more ardent partisan than Gromyko, more ardent than Castro in particular, who would not offer his good offices, if the war called for it, a man who for 3 years has chaired the conference of the nonaligned countries and who has a strategic plan in his head. Soviet intervention dashed this plan to pieces (the

rallying of the nonaligned countries to the socialism of the USSR), a plan which was feasible but which is now almost impossible to carry out. On top of all that, why does L'HUMANITE offer its readers idyllic reports* of life which is taking up again in a country in the midst of a civil war, in a tribal and therefore prefeudal country which is rejecting the "socialist" transplant and which by a 95 percent margin is refusing to accept the Soviet occupation force?

The same question with regard to alliances: we are witnessing a resumption of the old notorious practices, painfully paid for by the labor movement, which consist in systematically assimilating the most reactionary socialists on the right. In this manner, the party is becoming increasingly removed from the new profile of the labor movement sketched by Eurocommunism which has a tendency to plaster over the 1919 crack and to resume the dialog with Social Democracy and with all the parties of the left in the world. Faithful to themselves, the precursors of Eurocommunism, the Italian communists since the start of the 1960's have not ceased advocating the formation of a broad front which would embrace the political and social forces of the left which are of different persuasions.

The taking into consideration of difference and divergence is the keystone of Eurocommunism, and the French communists have emphasized this many times. However, they have also sought the necessary convergence which has led certain communist parties to define themselves in common. Then, how are we to understand the state of anxiety [crispation] of the leadership with respect to the Berlinguer-Mitterrand meeting which should rather have been welcomed, if we adhere to Eurocommunist logic, as a healthy beginning for the unity of the left in Europe vis-a-vis the rise of the right?

Finally, one last element, and not the least, is the democratization of the internal structures of the party itself. Although the ninth congress of the Spanish Communist Party and the 15th congress of the Italian Communist Party illustrated the beginning of overtures toward real democratic meetings in which debates would take place, in which the congress would no longer resemble a mass, the internal reality of the PCF is quite something else. The manner in which the leadership of the PCF took into consideration internal criticism, particularly that of Louis Althusser, who better than anyone else had brought into question the rigidity of the structures based on "vertical" and compartmentalized operations, the "Piszbin affair," the boycotting of the petition "For Unity in Struggles," all of the interventions against which the party leadership interposed an "iron-clad contempt" and insults (Althusser described by Paul Laurent as the number one enemy), the alienation of the intellectuals and above all of the workers in the opposition, all of these bring into question the march of the party toward Eurocommunism.

* Of particularly the reports by Martine Monod in L'HUMANITE on 24, 26 and 27 March 1980.

Henri Fiezbin's book, which is a fundamental document which historians henceforth will have to take into account in the study of the PCF, lifts the veil from what meetings of the Central Committee are like and from the psychological and institutional impossibility of the party's introducing criticism into its thinking and works and renouncing the unanimity of days gone by.

The PCF has changed verbally since it recognized its "tardiness" with respect to the 1956 events; the days of orders, slogans, tactics engaged in by an Internationale or any organization whatever of world communism apparently is a thing of the past; decisions are made in Paris and not in Moscow. However, the party's latest political actions call into question, at least provisionally, the achievements of the 1974-1977 period, all the political and theoretical work of Jean Kanapa, who in party history will remain the promoter of Eurocommunism. A Eurocommunism which for the moment is quite shaky. Are we to believe that it existed only in the minds of journalists who invented the word and in the minds of the PCF's leaders who took it up? I do not think so. The leaders may have a double thought in mind: say one thing and do another. Today, when all of the issues have been clouded, that is not of great importance. What counts is what the ordinary workers and also the best activists of the PCF want; i.e., unity in the struggles. That is something which for the moment the PCF leadership refuses to recognize. However, that is the real future of Eurocommunism.

8143

CSO: 3100

UDF DEPUTY GRANET INTERVIEWED ON PARTY DEFENSE REPORT

Paris LE POINT in French 12 May 80 p 73

[Interview with Paul Granet, UDF Deputy from the Aube: "No Dragging in Atlanticism"]

[Text] Former Deputy Secretary General of National Defense, member of the New Social Contract [Nouveau Contrat Social], Paul Granet, 49 years old, has refused to cosign the draft UDF report on defense, which should be made public in about 10 days (see LE POINT No 394). He explains to LE POINT his reasons.

[Paul Granet] This UDF report can only annoy every responsible political leader who is attached, as I am, to the continuity of French defense policy. For the most part it is in effect the work of people who have always considered that the way of safeguarding France is Atlanticism. And they have profited from a certain hardening of the international situation to return to their old nightmares. Now I say that what we are seeing is not at all a return to the merciless clash between two blocs, but exactly the reverse: the coming of a multipolar world. There would therefore be nothing going more in the wrong direction than in reinventing today good old Atlanticism.

[LE POINT] However, this is the inclination of certain of your UDF friends?

[Answer] In this report, unfortunately, yes! Not only do they develop an analysis which is essentially Atlanticist, but with a certain masochism, they explain, in substance, that we other French up to now have been bad partners in the Atlantic Alliance and that it is urgent that we give pledges to "dissipate the ambiguities," as the UDF report says! "There will be no progress in the political construction of Europe," it is written there, "as long as our partners are not fully convinced of our solidarity." You could not say in a better way that we have to become the quiet children of the Atlantic class!

[Question] Apart from this Atlanticist outlook, what do you oppose in the UDF analysis?

[Answer] I would make three points. First, the insistence placed on the notion of "subversion." That seems to me to have some disturbing smells. Then--and it is more serious--the description made of France only in the European context. Do they wish to renounce the world role of our country? The third prickly point: the statement according to which the defense of Europe is not conceivable without the United States. As there will be no Europe without defense, this is as much as to say that there will never be a really independent Europe! I read, moreover, in the report a breathtaking phrase: "We remain convinced of American solidarity, without which the defense of Europe would be illusory." How can one proclaim himself in 1980 convinced in advance of American solidarity? Do they forget--to cite only one fact--the SALT III negotiations, whose principle point the Americans have accepted and which could only tend to the neutralization of Europe?

[Question] Don't technological developments lead unavoidably to the modification of strategy?

[Answer] That is certain, and in this respect the UDF report has the merit of posing real problems which the Gaullists have a tendency to hide. France cannot finesse the revolution which the miniaturization of nuclear weapons herself with the neutron bomb and miniaturized nuclear weapons. But this type of weapons must rest on continental France [L'Hexagone], under sole French control. There should be no question of allowing ourselves to be dragged in, by this angle, to the mechanics of automatic intervention among the NATO forces in case of conflict in Europe.

[Question] Does the UDF report announce a change of French military policy?

[Answer] The statements of the President and of Yvon Bourges [Minister of Defense] have no ambiguity about them. There is therefore no reason to think so. But let the UDF be on guard: by leaving the bridle around the neck to dangerous Atlanticists, it could, in the long term, place in question the reelection of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1981. Dragging in Atlanticism could, in effect, cement an objective alliance--and who knows? Perhaps subjective as well--between a nationalist Left and a party of Gaullists. It would be a major risk.

5170

CSO: 3100

NEW 'EUROPEAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT' VIEWS EUROPEAN SECURITY

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Apr 80 p 8

[Article: "A Report on the European Independence Movement: Survival, Development, Identity"]

[Text] The European Independence Movement [MIE], which includes members of all factions in the government majority*, recalls all of its positions in a new orientation report prepared by Mr Jean-Claude Empereur, member of its directing bureau, and defining the "three levels of European independence": insuring its survival, mastering its development, affirming its identity.

--Defense: "The security of Europe," states the MIE, "is in question. The worsening of the balance of forces between Eastern Europe and Western Europe and the further, lessened credibility of the American 'umbrella' must lead us to reconsider the problems of European security. Who does not see the mortal dangers which neutralization or even 'Finlandization' of all or part of Western Europe conceals? But who does not also see the perils of 'NATO-ization,' whose concept is today experiencing a certain revival?

"For a long time France has made the military choices which reflect an exact analysis of the technical and political facts: nuclear dissuasion is the least costly and the most sure of all possible defenses; it affirms, by itself, this will to independence which is the very source of a spirit of defense.

"Our European partners have not gone that far. The best thing we can do in the circumstances is always reinforce the credibility of our dissuasive force. The time will come when it will be accepted by all for what it is: the core of European independence and security. This evolution of minds demands that we keep in close contact with our European partners. Let us be ourselves, but available."

*The directory of the European Independence Movement is composed as follows: Olivier Guichard, President; Alain Ravaignes, Delegate General; Aymar Achille-Fould, Roger Chinaud, Michel Cointat, Andre Fanton, Pierre Messmer, Maurice Schumann, Claude Trabuc, Andre Bettencourt, Members.

With regard to energy, "Europe is, overall and for the long term, a dependent area. It is therefore necessary for it to undertake a communal energy policy." For the MIE its three essential components are: priority to the nuclear sector; the development of large electrical generators [surgenerateurs] being a "major imperative"; the revitalization of programs concerning new forms of energy, notably solar energy or the use of biogas, and the creation of a European agency: in short, a European program for the economy of energy.

--Development: After having considered that, "with the creation of the SME [European Monetary System], the European Economic Community has started off on the right path," and that a "European monetary organization could make its weight felt in favor of reform of the international monetary system, which, in reality, is the real problem," the MIE considers industrial policy more closely. "Europe must be active in the high technology industries: aerospace, nuclear components, bio-industry, etc.," and, "must establish 'multinational' firms of European origin. It is surprising and a little disquieting to find that 20 years of the Common market have not yet permitted this. However, nothing is more in conformity with its role, for the diversity of the temperments and habits of its people could be put to profitable use to organize 'management' in the European style...."

The MIE advocates significant development of European "agro-food" power and a revitalization of the Community Agricultural Policy.

--Culture: The MIE wishes to see rapid progress towards a European system of education. It also wishes to see a common reflection on the contents of education and creation of a permanent study center; development of European multi-lingualism, "the only means of safeguarding diversity but also of protecting itself from the invasion of a lingua franca, which can be the vehicle for technical and commercial matters but is not the bearer of any culture"; a policy for the equivalence of diplomas; "a European presence, as such, in the educational programs and a reorientation in this sense of the study of history and geography, but also of law, economics, technology, the arts, and literature"; an increase in the intra-European mobility of students, which should "attain the level of at least 10 percent in the new few years."

The technological explosion, moreover, makes unavoidable, according to the MIE, the examination of all of the problems posed by the existence of audiovisual monopolies, wherever they exist, and the "blockages" which they provoke.

5170
CSO: 3100

NUMBER, GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN OF FRENCH POLITICAL REFUGEES

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Apr 80 p 21

[Article: "142,808 Political Refugees"]

[Text] As of 31 December 1979 142,808 foreigners benefitted from the status of political refugee in France:

--Europe: Albanians, 490; Armenians, 9,893; Bulgarians, 843; Hungarians, 5,709; Poles, 15,981; Rumanians, 3,839; Czechoslovaks, 2,009; Balts, 1,067; Georgians, 310; Russians, 10,245; Ukrainians, 3,227; Yugoslavs, 7,705; Spaniards, 23,540; Portuguese, 282; Others, 845. Total for Europe: 85,985.

--Asia: Afghans, 31; Bangladeshi, 8; Burmese, 4; Butanese, 3; Cambodians, 16,594; Chinese, 824; Korean, 7; Formosan, 1; Indian, 3; Indonesian, 13; Iraqi, 42; Iranian, 35; Israeli, 7; Jordanian, 1; Lao, 13,354; Lebanese, 2; Malaysian, 1; Pakistani, 12; Filipino, 9; Sri-Lankan, 27; Syrian, 93; Tibetan, 16; Turkish, 410; Vietnam, 16,072; Yemen, 2. Total for Asia: 47,571.

--Africa: South Africa, 22; Algeria, 83; Angola, 158; Benin, 52; Burundi, 37; Cameroons, 17; Central Africa, 32; Comores, 3; Congo, 89; Egypt, 1,350; Ethiopia, 315; Ghana, 142; Guinea-Bissau, 39; Equatorial Guinea, 2; Guinea, 250; Libya, 4; Mali, 14; Madagascar, 9; Morocco, 223; Mozambique, 1; Nigeria, 25; Niger, 1; Uganda, 30; Rhodesia, 5; Rwanda, 19; Senegal, 2; Somalia, 1; Sierra Leone, 2; Sudan, 4; Tanzania, 6; Chad, 5; Togo, 38; Tunisia, 73; Zaire, 583. Total for Africa: 3,636.

--Americas: Argentina, 605; Bolivia, 152; Brazil, 240; Chile, 3,231; Colombia, 27; Cuba, 39; Dominican Republic, 31; Ecuador, 21; Guatemala, 4; Haiti, 604; Honduras, 1; Mexico, 3; Nicaragua, 7; Paraguay, 21; Peru, 46; El Salvador, 2; Uruguay, 581. Total for the Americas: 5,616.

5170

CSO: 3100

CORSIKAN-FRENCH RELATIONS, MINORITY RIGHTS ISSUES

Paris ESPRIT in French Mar 80 pp 116-120

[Article by Paul Thibaud]

[Text] A press conference of the Committee in Defense of Minority Rights. This does not concern a minority outside of France such as the Kurds, the Hungarians of Transylvania or the Armenians in whom the committee has been interested up to the present. This time a study is being presented on a "continental"* ethnic group in Corsica. The Corsican militants form the majority of the population. And if we subtract them from the rest of the immigrants who attend the committee sessions because of the problems of the minority whose cause they espouse, you perceive that compared to the numbers of French people "properly called," not tax paying aliens, not members of a minority, but "completely normal" as Coluche would say, that doesn't leave very many people.

A (disagreeable) impression: the Corsicans are crying out, the Corsicans are making a lot of noise...but hardly anyone listens. Obviously the radio, the television, the daily papers give thorough coverage to the "serious incidents," but does that put any wheels in motion? Before that message can get through to hearts and minds it runs into a zone of impermeability, as percolating water may run across a bed of hardpan. (A zone of impermeability, but what is it made of?) Would it be possible that a considerable part of what the information media deal with is presented like that, because it is only decent to relate it in this way, "cover" the story as they call it, in other words to cover oneself, to put oneself in order (so that you can oppose the people who garble their lines or television's rough drafts), would it be possible that there is thus in the news a large measure of convenient verbiage, not at all meant to be really reduced? The commotion about Corsica would thus be presented so as not to be heard, a noise as if it were chewed into pieces at its point of origin, a purring, the appearance

*Marc Caillon: The Corsicans, published by the group for Minority Rights. Twelve francs plus shipping expenses, GDM, 12, rue Honore Chevalier, 75006 Paris.

of a commotion if it could be stated that way. In addition to all the news trumpeted for a few days over the Ajaccio business, what really remains clear for me in my memory other than the sporting and diplomatic performances of the Gendarmerie's intervention group, those good Frenchmen who were able to suppress those Corsican trouble-makers? In a complicated skein of episodes and people my memory (or those who have fed it) has selected what there was that was most reassuring, which was of a nature to absorb the shock. The courageous and intelligent forces of public order, obtaining the surrender of rebels whose actions do not go as far as their words....

Decidedly in Corsica things are not going very well. However, here is the catch: an attorney informs us that 3 weeks after the events there are more than 100 Corsican political prisoners in French prisons (in the Paris region in fact, in other words 1,000 kilometers from their families): 100 political prisoners for an island population of Corsican origin which amounts to 110,000 or 120,000 persons: calculate the proportion and apply it to all of France. That would come to 30,000 political prisoners. That is what we should have remembered rather than the fine way that the commander of the GIGN [National Gendarmerie Intervention Group] has of talking.

An ethnologist now must be primarily a historian. Corsica is the only part of French territory which was attached to it when, under the leadership of Pascal Paoli, it was perhaps in the process of constituting itself as a nation state*. Not only was the union with France a constraint for many Corsicans but it checked the most positive development of a history which up to then had jolted from one oppression to another. Marc Caisson makes the remark that Corsica is much more united to the French state than with the French nation. Thanks to the complicity of "continental" administrations Corsica for a long time has been able to combine the promotion (abroad) of the original talents of the country and the conservation of a traditional society in its isolation with its family and clan values. Mr Caisson even adds that the French state receives from many Corsicans the same kind of fidelity as the clan chief and this in exchange for the same kind of protection. The transfer has been facilitated and reinforced by the infiltrations of Corsican clans in the apparatus of the French state. At present the autonomists describe this equilibrium as a simple product of an oppression, which has been engaged in maintaining the backwardness of the island. It is not clear whether this compromise may have satisfied many Corsicans. In any case it has been dead since French society (promoters, French Algerians, technocrats, mixed corporations...) brutally disembarked in Corsica to develop tourism and colonize the coast. That was when the Corsicans realized what a state of powerlessness they found themselves in for taking into their own hands a country which other people were revolutionizing. At the same time they discovered a state which was not the state of the police, the customs officials and the teachers, a modernizing state which no longer protected Corsica, which "increased it in value", without considering their wishes.

*On the past of this problem as on the whole of it, see the excellent work by Micel Labro, *The Corsican Question*, Editions Entente.

This history of disillusionment doubtlessly explains in large part why Corsican claims, claims for the active mastery of their environment, claims for Corsicans to develop Corsica themselves, have so quickly taken an atomistic coloration or even an independence-minded one; it is also for many people in the behavior style of the Corsican militants: a relationship of defiance and at the same time a relationship of dependence. The French state is being asked for everything, it is being asked for example to guarantee the honesty of elections in Corsica, which in the very first place is however the business of the Corsicans, the only ones who can guarantee the mobilization of the militants at the proper place. The same state is being held perpetually in defiance by an intemperate and ostentatious handling of explosives and weapons. A kind of action which immediately arouses the defiance of the majority of the French who believe that they are not concerned by these affairs of Corsicans and police. Perhaps that is the reason for our impermeability to the news that comes out of Corsica.

The urgency and specific nature of Corsican problems are undeniable. However, if their solution is advancing so slowly it is because up to now everything is happening between the Corsican militants and the power of the state; perhaps it would be time to interest French society. That demands a little more attention from the "continentals" and from the Corsican militants some rather different modes of expression.

12116

CSO: 3100

DEFENSE CHOICES SEEN PLAGUING UDF EXPERTS

Paris LE POINT in French 14 Apr 80 p 57

[Article by Dominique de Montvalon: "A UDF Cactus"]

[Text] What kind of defense for France? On this topic, Giscardian experts were discussing the question freely for 18 months. The outcome is embarrassing the general staff of the UDF [French Democratic Union].

A document of about 75 pages is now burning the fingers of the Giscardian administration that would probably give a lot for it to never have existed. The issue is a draft White paper on defense drawn up following 18 months of meetings that were turbulent at times, of the 48 members of the UDF's committee on defense.

"Nothing revolutionary or explosive, I assure you," comments--diplomatically--Centrist Deputy Jean Marie Daillet, the chairman of this working group. Yet this is the same Jean Marie Daillet who, at the last UDF congress in Orleans, felt compelled to proclaim at the rostrum: "Jean Lecanuet and Michel Pinton, I give you good news: we have finished our job!" A way of fixing the date lest, clearly, the dossier in question be pilfered.

Some moreover do not bother themselves with circumlocutions: "This dossier," they whisper, "is made of dynamite." Consequently UDF's general staff--while waiting to debate it, apparently in about two weeks--discreetly referred the firebrand to the Elysee Palace. The President's verdict has not yet come down.

However, a year and a half ago, when a working group was established, there was no indication of such storms. Each person vowed discretion. People quickly agreed on the pace of one meeting per week. More importantly: an artful balance seemed to have been established between Europeans openly pro-Atlantic (for example, Jacques Mallet, one of the CDS [expansion unknown] spokesmen), zealous advocates of European defense (for example, Pascal Fontaine, coauthor of "Euroshima"), and Giscardians loyal to the fundamental points of the Gaullist military legacy (in the image of Herve de Charette, the assistant general secretary of the Republican Party). To boot, the "Daillet Committee" made lots of room for general officers of

the reserve staff--like Admiral Joybert, former chief of the Navy general staff, or General Grigaut, former Air Force of staff--who seemed to be able to serve, if necessary, as connecting links.

But, on a topic like this, how can one avoid friction and strong feeling? "We all stripped," one of the participants says with humor. The first difficulties pitted "presidentialists" and "parliamentarians" against each other. The former maintained that the logic of the Fifth Republic's institutions forbade an alliance of the President's followers from going too far in drawing up a new ideology under the danger of seeming to tie his hands. To which the second ones retorted: "If you want to revive army boots, then we're leaving...."

But it was the brusque deterioration of the international climate--at the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980--that made the "Daillet Committee" wink for good. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan, while, in return, the Americans hardened their tone and appealed to their allies. Giscard's France, however, chose prudence. It even took some time to outright condemn the Kabul blow. It did not take anything else to unleash the indignation of the VGE (expansion unknown)'s most pro-Atlantic supporters and to arouse the apprehension of some others.

In this atmosphere, Michel Poniatowski became the "black sheep" of all those who were disturbed by certain aspects of Giscardian diplomacy. Of course he was not a member of the UDF's defense committee, but his speeches, which while claiming to go beyond a traditional East-West analysis, brought Russians and Americans back to back, and created anxiety within these confines. "Ponia is a bad Debra," a coward, embittered, and a Centrist.

While this was going on, the "Daillet committee" accused six of its members of polishing up the final document that it had been asked for one and a half years earlier. These six include: diplomat Jean Laloy; Gen Thiry, former director of the nuclear experimentation centers; and former MRP [Popular Republican Movement] minister Andre Monteil--yes, the same person who, during the last Giscardian congress in Orleans, to the fury of the UDF's general staff, delivered a ringing pro-Israel speech, misconstruing Giscard's recently taken policy stands.

Impelled by a breeze rather Atlantist, the draft White paper continues hence to be kept secret. Nevertheless, two of its basic orientations can be extricated:

--First, the UDF committee, while claiming to reject "nuclear war" in Europe, wants the traditional forces to be equipped with scaled-down nuclear tactical weapons.

--Then, without arguing for France's return to the integrated military organization of the Atlantic Alliance, it speaks out in favor of a better coordination of France's and NATO's relations. "We want more obvious and effective relations," says one of the participants.

In short, here is a pretty firecracker lit under VGE's progress. Proof of this paradox: it is his own followers that Giscard is disturbing or dividing the most of his diplomacy--tinged, it is true, each day by a little more Gaullism.

PRESS SPECULATES ON MARCHAIS' RELATIONSHIP WITH PCF INTELLECTUALS

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Feb 80 p 9

[Synopsis of press reaction, commentary on 9-10 Feb PCF National Council meeting in Bobigny on intellectuals, by J.-Y. L.]

[Text] In LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, Jean Daniel asks: "Marchais' relationship with 'his' intellectuals? Who's still upset over it?" In his opinion, the question deserves an answer. This has not prevented several weeklies from being "upset," starting with the one which he edits and in which Georges Mamy wrote, concerning the PCF [French Communist Party] National Council meeting of 9-10 February in Bobigny: "Marchais has declared closed all discussions which persist, as a result of events, in reemerging. He has even resorted, no doubt so that it will be well understood that nothing more would be tolerated, to the classical procedure of radicalizing the views which it is important to discredit."

Georges Mamy is referring to the two "bans" pronounced in Bobigny by the general secretary of the Communist Party: "In the name of the 22nd and 23rd Congresses," Mr Georges Marchais said, "an all-round reconciliation with social democracy cannot be advocated ... A break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cannot be sought."

In TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN, Antoine Spire, an intellectual critical of the PCF, also called attention to this passage from the closing speech delivered by Mr Marchais and was amazed at his analysis. He writes: "Isn't it possible to disapprove of the intervention of Soviet troops in Afghanistan without necessarily advocating a break between the PCF and the Communist Party of the USSR? Isn't it possible to criticize the Soviet Union's big-power politics and simultaneously acknowledge the role which it still plays in favor of peace? Isn't it possible to hope that basically, through conflicts, unity will be achieved daily without necessarily advocating all-inclusive action with the Socialist Party [PS]? Georges Marchais considers these alternative proposals to be incompatible. He wants communists to choose sides. Judging from the reactions which this National Council meeting has caused within the PCF, however, it seems that this attitude is not shared by all communists."

According to Andre Lesueur in VALEURS ACTUELLES, it has at least dispelled "the last illusions of opposing intellectuals who were able to believe in the initial promises made in December 1978 at the previous meeting in Vitry. Subjected to severe criticism following the left's election defeat, Mr Marchais then admitted the need to 'study criticism, correct mistakes and overcome the inadequacies of our activity.' This humility vanished in Bobigny."

Andre Lesueur stresses the PCF's "revolutionary" character, which Mr Marchais has been trying to affirm in his statements for weeks. "Mr Marchais must be taken seriously if we want to understand his return to revolution," the weekly publication states.

So much seriousness amuses J.-M. Masson, who appears to have hardly any doubts when he states in ROUGE, the Revolutionary Communist League's weekly, as a basic truth: "Everyone is well aware that Georges Marchais and the PCF's leadership are not 'revolutionary.' The Trissotins of the middle class press are almost the only ones to utter cries of horror when they hear Marchais talk about 'revolution.' Because after properly reading the Marchais report which closed the National Council meeting in Bobigny, anyone would have to be blind not to understand that the PCF is still loyal to its policy of class collaboration and to the policy of the French People's Union."

He continues: "Are Marchais and the PCF therefore 'revolutionary'? Or on the other hand, are they the staunchest supporters today of chauvinism among the working class, of the 'dialog' with the Catholic hierarchy in the plan of the French People's Union, and finally of parliamentarianism, in the form of actual support for the institutions of the Fifth Republic?"

After deriding the fears of the "middle class press," J.-M. Masson reaches the same conclusion as VALEURS ACTUELLES: "It is certain that the Bobigny 'debate' will result in new reasons for discontent among many party intellectuals and militants."

The Bobigny National Council meeting, however, will probably not add any fuel to the study by L'EXPRESS on the PCF's "rejects." At least in the case of intellectuals. For they are no longer being shown the door. They are protesting from within, as Branko Lazitch notes: "History is moving faster: formerly in the USSR, dissidents could not speak out; today, the government can no longer keep them quiet. Formerly in the PCF, the opposition was banned without being able to defend itself; today, sometimes it pleads its case without being banned automatically."

On The Inside

This is true of the best known opponents. What is it like for the others, intellectuals or otherwise? Michel Labro and Jacques Roure, who have looked into the cases of "ex-" communist militants, write in L'EXPRESS: "France's leading party is neither the PS, nor the RPR [Rally for the Republic], nor the PC: it is the party of 'ex-' members, of communists banned or demoted

in the process of the proletarian adventure ... Tens of thousands of communists from every rank leave the party each year. Quietly. They join during the enthusiasm of a strike, a celebration, a conflict. They are militant for a certain time. And then they leave, for personal reasons or because militant life seems too demanding. The Communist Party leaves behind between 50,000 and 70,000 militants every year."

All of these analyses concerning the behavior of opposing intellectuals and Mr Georges Marchais' retort to the PCF National Council are denounced by FRANCE NOUVELLE, the PCF's principal weekly publication. On 16 February, its editorial staff published its last issue after 35 years in existence. "One page is thus being turned, but another is opening ... To all our readers, we will not say goodbye, but till we meet again ... The death of a newspaper is usually a sad event. This is not the case with FRANCE NOUVELLE," the staff points out. As of 7 March, FRANCE NOUVELLE and LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE will be replaced by REVOLUTION.

"Most commentators are no longer trying either to report on the policy of communists or to understand that policy, if only from a critical standpoint, but solely to oppose it and by every possible means," Gilbert Wasserman wrote in the last issue. "Thus they all wish to reduce the Bobigny proceedings to some admonition of communist intellectuals. Besides the distortional character of these assertions, it is striking to note that in general these commentators examine the Communist Party's actions and gestures only according to their own political view of policy."

CHARLIE-HEBDO, which ridicules the news every week, published a photograph of Mr Georges Marchais speaking into a microphone: "As an intellectual brought up on the complete works of Zorro, er ... no, of Zig and Puce, I will imitate for you Big Teddy Bear in Afghanistan ..." A nasty portrayal whose deliberate "distortional character" is quite obvious.

11915

CSO: 3100

STATUS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH QATAR

Overview of Relations

Paris LE MONDE in French 2-3 Mar 80 p 6

[Article by P. B.]

[Text] Of all the [Persian] Gulf emirates, Qatar is both the most franco-philic and the one with which bilateral cooperation is most active. This development is particularly notable since France was totally unknown in this British private hunting ground and since it remained so until 1967 when General de Gaulle adopted a position on the Israeli-Arab conflict and Palestinian rights which contrasted sharply with that of other Western capitals, where it caused a scandal at the time.

The French breakthrough began only after Qatar acquired independence, however, and largely due to the effort of Sheik Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani to keep his distance from London and to diversify his country's relations. Diplomatic relations between Paris and Doha were also opened just a few days before the emir, then prime minister and crown prince, came to power on 22 February 1972.

Several signs, which are not misleading, illustrate the strong and trusting nature of this understanding, which can be described as cordial. Since his official visit to Paris 5 years ago, the emir has vacationed in France every year and has hired a private tutor to give French lessons to members of his family. A supporter of the European-Arab dialog from the start, he does not conceal how much he appreciates the efforts made by Paris within the European Community to gain acceptance of his views. Nor is it an accident that the Qatari Government has asked France to represent its interests in Cairo following the break in diplomatic relations as a result of President Sadat signing the Camp David accords.

Second Customer and Fourth Supplier

The economic breakthrough is also good, although it would have been better if French manufacturers and businessmen were more often represented by qualified professionals and had local agents instead of waiting for the embassy's

commercial attache to inform them of invitations for bids. For example, the FRG, Qatar's second-largest supplier, has no commercial attache in its diplomatic mission, with manufacturers themselves managing their own affairs and opting for direct contact, preferable to middlemen in the Orient. This being the case, France is the emirate's second-largest customer with F 2.35 billion in oil imports or 4 million metric tons (18 percent of the Qatari market) and its fourth-largest supplier after Japan, the FRG and Great Britain, and before the United States, with some F 700 million in comparison to only F 45 million in 1973. That represents about 15 percent of the market (French exports in 1979 rose 160 percent over the previous year), whereas in the rest of the area France is far behind its competitors and covers only about 5 percent of the market. The deficit is apparently offset to an unknown extent by arms sales (see Jacques Isnard's article opposite).

The pride of bilateral cooperation concerns petrochemicals and has led to the first joint industrial investment with an Arab country. Thus 60 percent of the Dunkerque petrochemical complex, COPENOR (Northern Petrochemical Company), is to be financed by CDF-Chimie [expansion unknown] and 40 percent by QGPC (Qatar General Petroleum Corporation), whereas in Qatar the two companies respectively hold 16 and 84 percent of the capital allocated for constructing the QAPCO [Qatar Petrochemical Company Limited] complex.

Two Very Promising Sectors: Gas and Solar Energy

The principal contracts snapped up by French companies since 1975 mainly concern electrical installations (F 360 million), desalinization of seawater (SIDEM [International Desalinization Company], F 250 million), port installations (F 240 million), prefabricated structures (ARCOMAT [expansion unknown], F 170 million) and telephones (CIT-ALCATEL [expansion unknown], F 25 million). TECHNIP [expansion unknown], which is in partnership with QAPCO, is interested in the refinery planned for Oum Said, with a capacity of 50,000 barrels/day. If it obtains the contract, this would enable it to link up with another extremely ambitious but more distant project, a gas liquefaction plant whose development would require investments of approximately \$3 to 4 billion.

Also with regard to the future, the immediate main projects are concerned with light industry, which is still in the embryonic stage. Following up a study assigned to SERETE [expansion unknown], the Qataris are planning to gradually establish 18 processing industries in the areas of paint, plastics, telecommunications, agriculture, etc. One of the emir's advisers, Mr Kamal Saleh, is scheduled to visit France this summer to conduct studies and make contacts, accompanied by about 10 Qatari contractors.

Bilateral cooperation could also develop in a promising sector in which France is a leader, that of solar energy, which could lead to the signing of a preliminary agreement. The agricultural sector, although limited, is promising; the emirate wants the country to be self-sufficient in food by 1982 or by 1985 at the latest. Such a goal simultaneously presupposes the development of new agricultural techniques, an increase in cattle and sheep breeding, the expansion and improvement of poultry production, which

already exists in Oum-Jarn in the north but leaves something to be desired, and the construction of two seawater desalinization plants to replenish the water table.

It is in the cultural area that the breakthrough has been slowest, due to environment and tradition and compulsory instruction in English. French could be introduced as an elective among certain secondary school subjects, while a French department could be established at the university, where five to six professors are already giving courses. Several notable figures are also learning our language at the French Institute and the emir's youngest son attends Doha's French School, which accepts 210 students (including 110 French students) from 14 different nations. It is obvious, however, that it is the exchange of technology and the acceptance of trainee technicians which will foster the spread of our language. Conversely, a French archeological mission led by Prof Jacques Tixier (see his article, page 7) is helping to shed light on the young nation's ancient and recent past.

Security in the Gulf and the Palestinian Problem

Economic and cultural relations will be brought up during Mr Giscard d'Estaing's visit, of course, but political topics will dominate the discussions, particularly concerning major international issues. The subject which the Qataris will take up first is that of security in the gulf, tied to a solution of the Palestinian problem. Although they avoid saying so publicly, they have not understood why Mr Yasser Arafat has not been received in Paris, although that seemed practically settled.

They apparently hope that the chief of state will enlighten them regarding his intentions and will reassure them concerning his plans. Indeed, as the Qataris explain, France, which opened the way to the Arab-European dialog by adopting positions considered courageous at the time in regard to both the Israeli-Arab conflict and the future of the Palestinians, cannot logically stay in the background today and allow itself to be outdistanced by other European capitals.

"The Arabs," Information Minister 'Isa al-Kuwari told us, "have made enormous concessions to Israel. They have reduced their demands to a minimum. Their leaders cannot go beyond the present point without being rejected or even overthrown by their peoples. The Arabs have implicitly recognized Israel, but the Israeli Government has not even made the necessary gestures which would have made it possible for that recognition to be formalized."

Extremely disappointed by the attitude of the United States, like all the other [Persian] Gulf states, Qatar has reacted very negatively to President Carter's recent statements rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state and any dialog with the PLO. The Qataris ask: "If the United States is perplexed over the Israeli-Arab conflict because it has a problem of domestic politics due to the Jewish electorate's vote, why doesn't Europe, whose interests are substantial in the area, take a step which could help the American President to withstand domestic pressures and, in any event,

would help to solve a problem which threatens stability in the area and world peace?" This is also a question which they will not fail to ask their visitor, in one form or another.

Relations between industrialized countries and developing countries, or in other words the North-South dialog, whose results are considered ridiculous and appalling, will also be raised by Doha insofar as the Qataris believe that too many successive failures will be dangerous for the very future of humanity. The idea of a "trilog" has been received sympathetically but skeptically, at least in the current stage. Like many other Arab capitals, the Qataris fear that such a project, far from making it possible to overcome the present obstacles to European-Arab, Arab-African and European-African dialogs, would ultimately be premature. They believe that a "trilog" will be productive and serve as a crowning achievement for these three dialogs to the extent that each has made progress in its own sector.

Cooperation in Petrochemical Industry

Paris LE MONDE in French 2-3 Mar 80 p 9

[Excerpt] On 4 March, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing starts a 2-day visit to Qatar, a small oil-producing state located on a peninsula in the very heart of the Arabian Gulf. The visit of the French president, an outstanding European statesman and leader, is a great honor for the Qataris and a personal success for their leader, his highness the emir, Sheik Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani. It marks the culmination of several years of close cooperation between the two countries in many areas.

President Giscard d'Estaing is repaying his highness Sheik Khalifa's visit to France in 1975. At that time, his highness the emir stated: "To strengthen international cooperation and to achieve our self-development, two factors assuring peace, we in Qatar are eager to bring the highest level of development to our country. We have established relations of close cooperation with advanced industrial countries, with France in the forefront; thanks to France, we are extending to those countries the means of cooperation which we possess and in return are obtaining from them the means of development which we lack. In practice, the economic and financial agreement concluded between our two governments on 16 December 1974 represents a significant positive step toward assuring the public welfare which we both seek."

This positive cooperation between a developing country and a developed country has taken on a unique character of its own, the best of example of which is the joint Qatari-French petrochemical project.

Wanting to make the best possible use of its considerable natural gas reserves and derivative products, Qatar has decided to establish its own petrochemical industry, the first of its kind to be planned in the gulf. Following

the equitable increase in oil market prices in 1973, Qatar possessed the financial resources needed for such a project, but it had neither the technology nor skilled labor. To solve the problem, Qatar concluded an agreement with CDF-Chimie.

Under the terms of this agreement, two petrochemical plants were to be installed. Qatar owns 40 percent of the stock in the first plant in Dunkerque, which began production in May 1979. The second plant, located in the industrial city of Oum Said and being developed by Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO), presently under construction, it will go into service in the near future. Qatar General Petroleum Corporation owns 84 percent of the QAPCO plant, with 16 percent owned by CDF-Chimie.

Cooperation with Mutual Advantages

France, which is one of the main purchasers of Qatari petroleum, has benefited from this agreement with an important investment by the Qatari Government. Qatar has in turn secured a long-term commitment from the French company, which will provide its technological and commercial expertise. Qatari personnel are receiving training and are acquiring experience at the Dunkerque plant to prepare for opening the Oum Said plant; they are also acquiring valuable commercial knowledge. At the same time, France's participation in Qatar's development program assures it of continued relations and favored customer status in a tighter and tighter oil market.

The two nations have thus managed to demonstrate a way in which advanced and developing countries can work together for their mutual advantage.

If the petrochemical project represents the main symbol of Qatari-French relations, it does not constitute the only area of common interest by any means. In recent years, France has secured an increasing percentage of the market of valuable goods exported to Qatar, from perfumes to foodstuffs and automotive vehicles.

French companies in association with Qatari guarantors have also played a prominent role in Qatar's development projects, in electrical engineering, civil engineering and in many other areas.

Economic and financial cooperation between Qatar and France is also based on the solid understanding which has been established politically, culturally and socially. At the time of his 1975 visit to France, his highness the emir particularly stressed the position of Paris in favor of the Arab cause for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. In recent years, France has played an increasingly larger role among European nations in trying to find an equitable solution to the Palestinian problem, which is still at the heart of the Middle East crisis. And the Arab nation, including Qatar, was quick to recognize the importance of the French position.

In the world context, Qatar has warmly welcomed the French Government's initiatives to promote a positive dialog between Arab oil-producing countries and European nations. Convinced that discussion and cooperation are the best

means of achieving a new international economic order, like many developing countries Qatar has been dismayed by the failure of the so-called North-South dialog. President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Qatar and to brother countries therefore raises great hopes in this regard.

During his stay in Qatar--itself an example of a developing oil-producing country--the French president will have the opportunity to determine for himself the emergent progress and renaissance. Because it produces hydrocarbons and because it is an active member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, like other member nations Qatar suffers from the false ideas of the Western press.

11915

CSO: 3100

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT ON BAHRAIN POLITICAL PRISONERS

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Mar 80 p 3

[Text] At the time of President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Bahrain, the French division of Amnesty International called attention to the situation of human rights in that country. This is the text which it made public in Paris:

"In Bahrain, 14 prisoners have now been adopted by Amnesty and most are being held without trial. Some persons arrested in June 1974, following a labor dispute at the Bahrain Aluminum Company, are still in prison, without having been tried or convicted. Other prisoners have been held since August 1975 (the date of the dissolution of the National Assembly) or since November 1976, when there was a new wave of arrests following the murder of the editor of a rightist newspaper.

"The 14 prisoners adopted by Amnesty International are being held in the Safra prison. Among them are two prisoners placed in the charge of the French division of Amnesty International. They are: Jassin Seyadi, 32 years old, arrested on 23 August 1975, and Abdel Ahmed Abdelrahman, president of the Aluminum Workers Union, arrested in May 1976. Bahraini authorities recently released a certain number of prisoners, two of whom were adopted by Amnesty International: Ibrahim Mohammad Bashmi (placed in the charge of the French division) and Youssef Ajaji.

"The extended confinement without trial of the persons still being held (14 of whom have been adopted by Amnesty International) is contrary to the basic human rights recognized by the Bahraini Constitution, whose Article 20 stipulates that anyone shall be presumed innocent until his possible guilt is determined during a fair trial. Amnesty International demands that the persons being held in Bahrain for the offense of expressing their opinions be released unconditionally."

11915

CSO: 3100

PCF'S BRUHAT SUPPORTS FISZBIN'S CONTROVERSIAL BOOK

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Apr 80 p 12

[Article by Jean Bruhat, PCF historian]

[Text] What is being called l'affair Fiszbin, quite wrongly in my opinion, has already been discussed in this newspaper. Perhaps it would be worthwhile for a member of the French Communist Party (PCF) (such is my case) to take part in the debate. I joined the Communist Party in 1925. Here we are in 1980. In the absence of other qualities, of which I would not know how to take advantage, I do have long experience as a rank and file activist, without particular responsibilities, but experience which I lived all the same.

I became acquainted with "mouths are opening" when this expression was launched by Maurice Thorez in 1931, and I remember how that expression, because it represented a change in policy, contributed to the unblocking of a situation. It created the conditions for a dual integration: integration of the communist party into the national reality and also integration into this group on the left which, in spite of appearances, clumsiness and misadventures, is the majority in France. The situation today is quite different from what it was in 1931. However, Fiszbin is right in saying that it is necessary to cry out once again: "Let the mouths open!" evidently meaning something other than what was suitably said in 1931.*

As far as this book is concerned, one would be wrong in thinking that we should consider it a work solely devoted to the conflict of the communist federation of Paris with the "center" of the party. Of course, the decisions of the "center" resulted in the dismantling of the former Parisian communist leadership; and the book contains documents which L'HUMANITE refused to publish, thus leaving the communists ignorant of the conflict, its origins and its content (if only letters addressed by Fiszbin to Georges Marchais). However, in our historian's jargon we might say: that is "factual" history.

*"Les Bouches S'Ouvrent," by Henri Fiszbin, rasset, edit.

In my opinion, the work goes beyond that and, for this reason, marks a milestone in the history of the French Communist Party. And it is this "goes beyond that" which I wish to briefly underscore. What are we to understand by it? The French Communist Party has (once again) reached a watershed in its history. It must simultaneously remain itself and change. Remain itself? Essentially as a "tribunicien" party; i.e., as the party which resolutely and without shilly-shallying defends the demands of the people.

We cannot deny that the communist cadres are basically of popular origin and particularly of labor origin. On this point, no party can stand up to comparison. The role of activist communists is decisive (devotion and competence) in all sectors in which they are active. These are achievements which Fiszbin does not reexamine--perhaps because as a former lathe operator, who became an official, he himself is the personification of this characteristic kind of communist activist.

However, his book asks questions of the communists (and of all those who are following the activities and thinking of the communists with interest). The interrogation deals basically with two questions. Fiszbin is not satisfied with asking these questions: he proposes answers.*

First question: in the practice of communism, is it necessary to maintain "secrecy"? No. This practice "poisons the atmosphere in the party." "These are customs inherited from another age." Fiszbin does not say so. However, I take the liberty of adding: this liking for secrecy is linked to the periods of inequality and was maintained at a time when such conditions no longer existed (at least in certain countries). That was very true, in days gone by, of relations between the communist parties and the Communist Internationale. Many activists (I do not wish to mention any names, but everyone knows whom I mean) died carrying with them to their graves secrets which perhaps will remain eternally secrets. I doubly regret this, as a historian and as a communist.

Second question; which is tied to the first question, of course: does the idea that people have of a communist party mean that one should keep silent about discussions which take place inside this party (oh yes, there are such discussions!)? When a change of orientation becomes necessary, why not speak out and refrain from saying that no changes are being made when as a matter of fact changes are taking place? By such a practise, one loses all the political benefits of change. Fiszbin is right in saying that we too quickly assimilate the "party spirit" and "refusal to make any critical judgment." He cites an example which is close to his heart: that of the March 1978 elections. How can we imagine that the communists were not disappointed? Also, the popular masses which placed confidence in them? How is it possible not to answer the questions which arise out

*L'HUMANITE on 31 March published a resolution of the federal committee of Paris on Henri Fiszbin's book. I read this text with the greatest attention. It did not change the overall opinion which I expressed on this book.

of such disappointment? How is it possible to be content with always saying exclusively that it is "the fault of others?"

In reality, such an event gives rise to a triple question. A question about the past (how and why did such a setback take place?). A question about the present (is there something wrong with communist tactics and strategy?). A question about the future (what prospects can be envisaged?).

Fiszbin breaks the silence which is "the worst thing for the communists," since it can cause doubts about the determination to follow the very clear progress of these last few years on the way to a more democratic life and route. "This progress was a victory of the party over itself, over its past, its sluggishness, the pressures exercised on it from without and within, which make it ever fearful to stop being itself, if it changes." This is Fiszbin's reasoning. On certain points, we may not share his opinions. It matters little. That is not the main thing. The significant, new fact which is fraught with a promising future is that, finally, a communist activist, a party official (that is our wording) is asking questions not only of himself, his itinerary but of his party and the fact that he is doing so publicly. Let not the anticommunists be scornful! It is by agreeing to criticize itself that the communist party will strengthen itself and will increase its influence. Fiszbin's initiative is in the interests of the communist party. This is a pioneer book, a trailblazing book. However, is not the role of pioneer, the role of trailblazer, to open a route which others will of necessity follow and with greater assurance?

8143

(SO: 3100

POWDER METALLURGY PROBLEMS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS DESCRIBED

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 27 Mar 80 pp 108-110

[Article by Dominique Benasteau]

[Text] With its 300,000 tons of worldwide production a year, ferrous powder metallurgy seems quite insignificant compared with steel metallurgy: less than a thousandth. But its annual rate of growth is twice, or even three times that of steel metallurgy. So the classic trio is beginning to cluster around this tiny powder metallurgy industry: the manufacturers, users, and government. The producers want to produce--as much as possible. The users are demanding the best possible performances at the best prices. And the government wants to see raw materials, energy, and currency being saved.

In Almost All Cases, Imports Are Favored

In certain areas (carbides, refractory metals, or non-miscible metals), powder metallurgy is coming to be recognized as the only practical course. But this is not true for mechanical parts. Forge, foundry, machining--the entire standard range of working by deformation or by removal of material is trying to develop these very parts. To tell the truth, the enthusiasm of potential clients for powder metallurgy, at least in France, has so far not appeared to match the level of the qualities that the powder metallurgists tend to attribute to their products.

For mechanical parts, including bearings, France, with its 7,800 tons a year, is in third position in West Europe, behind the Federal Republic of Germany with 15,000 tons a year and Great Britain with its 9,000 tons. It closely precedes Italy with 6,600 tons, and accounts for only a very small percentage

of the world's annual production, which is estimated, depending on the source used, at between 260,000 and 290,000 tons. So in France the powder metallurgy industry seems to need some encouragement, if it is to grow. The government is concerned about this, and the DEMP [Delegation for Saving Raw Materials] has appointed Professor Accary to evaluate the potential of powder metallurgy--as far as saving materials and energy as well are concerned. "It was necessary to determine more precisely the domain of efficiency of powder metallurgy," commented Professor Accary. "All of its procedures feature losses reduced to a minimum in all phases, because of the absence of heating to high temperatures, and because of a short production cycle." Such arguments should have ensured a rapid and positive conclusion. But in actuality, Mr Antonielli, from the DEMP, points out some shadows on this optimistic picture. "Almost all powders are imported."

That alone, the importing of ferrous powders for sintering, accounts for 24 million francs in currency. "The same situation holds true for equipment," said Mr Antonielli; "the equipment is essentially all of foreign origin. Moreover, furnaces and presses share another point in common: very poor energy performances." But on the other hand, this equipment, which can be highly automated, saves significant amounts of labor. This argument is by no means entirely positive (the lowering of the cost price, naturally sought by both producers and users, is here obtained at the expense of a quantitative and qualitative deterioration of the job market). "Another point to which we are particularly sensitive," said Mr Antonielli, "is the presence of alloys in most of the powders, especially of copper." This element, which can damage ferrous metals, even at a low content, just because of its presence, prevents any recovery of a certain number of parts.

Despite these apparently negative points, powder metallurgy is not doomed--far from it. These conditions are most often temporary. Efficiency can always be improved or one alloy can be replaced by another, which is not harmful. But before encouraging such changes, the DEMP still wanted to be sure of a definitely positive response to this question: do sintered parts have a lower energy content than similar parts produced by conventional technologies, or not?

Three parts were selected in order to provide elements of an answer to this question. The essential criterion: real production by sintering, and by another procedure. In this way, the balance sheet to be drawn up will have a basis that will be both experimental and believable. In the three cases,

the use of the powder metallurgy process lightens the part itself. Actually, the material also changes, and sintering requires the use of copper, nickel, and molybdenum alloy powders. So is the gain in iron compensated by the added expense for alloys? In fact, only 30 percent of the parts now produced are made with such sophisticated powders. In the majority of cases, they are also lighter (40 grams, on the average), depending on the field involved). The uncertainty increases still more when we consider that the present breakthrough in powder metallurgy is happening with larger parts, those in greater demand, and which thus require more elaborate alloys.

Comparison of the Energy Content of Three Parts Tested

		Standard Version	Sintered Version
	Procedure	Material/ weight	Material/ weight
Part 1: crossbar for casing of an- nular-shaped high pressure pump (h and $\phi \approx 2$ cm)	Cutting	half hard steel 10 g	pre-alloyed iron powder (Cu 1.5%, Ni 1.75%, Mo 0.5%) 8 g
Part 2: similar to part 1, but larger size	Machining	half hard steel 140 g	pre-alloyed iron powder (Cu 1.5%, Ni 1.75%, Mo 0.5%) 120 g
Part 3: reversing lever	smelting and machining	GS casting 150 g	pre-alloyed iron powder (Cu 1.5%, Ni 1.75%, Mo 0.5%) 122 g

A Fairly Positive Result

In the first phase, a comparison of the energy content of parts made by sintering, on one hand, and parts machined or cast and machined on the other hand, reveals hardly any

difference. Tripartite discussions between the DEMP, the CEREN [expansion unknown], which made the first evaluation, and industry should produce more precise values. But it already seems apparent that powder metallurgy has gained some points. In a case which is certainly unfavorable (alloyed powders, which are therefore more expensive and non-recoverable), obtaining a neutral result is on the whole positive. It would take very little to make this a highly positive result. Such as, according to Mr Clamen of the DEMP: "Being able to use powders or materials made in France, or even having equipment that is more efficient."

Untapped French Resources

At the DEMP they are apparently quite optimistic about the chances of powder metallurgy, which could very well reduce machine tools to the role of retightening part tolerances. And it could fairly easily come to replace conventional technologies in two out of three cases in the near future.

So what are the chances of such a program becoming a reality? Sweden is the main supplier of powders; it is favored by the purity of its iron ore. But France does not lack resources: its 60 percent iron ore from northern France is in fact almost pure oxide (Fe_2O_3). And if we look around a little, there are other sources as yet untapped: slag from steel mills, dusts from forges or even machining dusts, which are nothing but particles of this same iron oxide. Reduction is still an essential method for obtaining iron powder. Atomization of the cast metal is another interesting possibility in more than one way, for it provides a means of recycling wastes of various types. Crushing, whether in cryogenic conditions or not, is also used. The only limitation on all these procedures is their generous use of energy.

The operations of reduction, crushing, and atomization are always energy demanding, especially as it is often necessary to operate in a reductive condition to obtain good quality powders. And this entails an added expenditure of energy. The answer to this problem could be the development of a procedure more compatible with the present needs to reduce energy consumption.

In actuality, for a French industry that wants to get involved in powder manufacture, the essential obstacle to overcome will be the size of the market. Even with a volume of 10,000 tons,

France will, for at least some time to come, remain an insufficient market. All the specialists agree that a minimum production of 25,000 tons is needed to maintain a profitable industry. That means gaining not only the national market, but also part of the international market as well. In addition to iron powders, France could also expand its production of powders of some other elements. "Cobalt and tungsten could," believes Professor Accary, "help to compensate for other currency outflows."

Broad possibilities are also open in the field of equipment. The two technologies most frequently used, compression followed by sintering and hot compression, do not make use of excessively complex equipment, nor is it expensive--at least in comparison with forge equipment or with a machining center using digital controls.

A Matter of Size

Today's presses (with powers of 10 tons or even 10,000 tons) are suitable for parts limited in weight to several kilograms. Beyond that, or to obtain parts of more complex shapes, possibly not to be removed from casting, isostatic compaction is used. But this does not give tolerances as tight as the compression-sintering or hot compression methods, which easily hold tolerances at 1/100. And producing large parts depends on the availability of adequate enclosures. These areas must be resistant to the pressures that operate the compaction of the powder, but without being too expensive. This is a point that may still hold down the upper size limit for sintered parts for a long time to come.

From the point of view of shape, the financial burden is also a heavy one. With each shoulder, each level of the part, there is a corresponding piston. It withstands high forces during pressing and has to operate in excellent synchronization with nearby parts. This requires complex tools, which must be manufactured on a large scale if it is to be a profitable venture. Depending on the size of the parts, the desirable volume ranges from 10,000 for the largest to 50,000 for the smaller ones. The concept of mass production is less restrictive for the final operation, the sintering itself. This requires a furnace whose atmosphere must be non-oxidizing. In the case of ferrous metals, these are reductive atmosphere furnaces, but the operation is also done in a neutral gas or even in a vacuum for non-volatile metals. The current problem in France is not only to have a national manufacturer, but also to get new equipment! Two cases, but the same obligation.

A Reasonable Investment

For the sinterers that are already established--there are only three in France, while there are nine in the Federal Republic of Germany, a dozen in Great Britain, and 14 in Italy--unfortunately, the existing equipment does not readily lend itself to any major improvements. For a press or furnace, good efficiency is a matter of design, and compensating for poor design is often more expensive than effective. As for new manufacturers--those who would like to diversify a conventional production of mechanical parts--while the investment is heavy, it is not excessive. In any case, their entry in the field is ardently desired by the present users of sintered parts.

It is a tradition of the industry that an order is never given only to a single supplier. At the present time, because of the small number of French industries in this field, this precautionary measure too often leads to a search for a foreign manufacturer. If the number of French sinterers were to increase, this would help to bring these orders home and bring about greater competitiveness. And from a sort of snowballing effect, the number of parts produced could only increase. That would mean a market of a more reasonable size for French powders. This pump, we can see, is just ready and waiting to be primed.

7679

CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

GREEN EUROPE--There were differences of view at the last cabinet meeting between President Giscard and Prime Minister Raymond Barre regarding agricultural Europe. The prime minister, "very irritated" by the British attitude, recommended that France fix unilaterally, and at once, an increase in agricultural prices. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 12 May 80 p 69] 5170

COMMUNIST PARTY: LESS ZEAL--The leaders of the numerous cells of the Communist Party of France [PCF], especially in the Paris and Lyons regions, are disturbed. At meetings of local cells absenteeism on the part of members and militants (noted for the last year and a half) is growing from month to month, especially among the young. A Central Committee meeting soon to be held is to begin discussion of the matter. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 12 May 80 p 69] 5170

REASONS FOR PONIATOWSKI TRIP--The sudden visit of Michel Poniatowski to Warsaw on 25 April reportedly had the purpose, among other things, of transmitting to Leonid Brezhnev, through the hands of the Polish president, Edward Gierek, a message of appeasement, after the tense conversations between Andrei Gromyko and Jean Francois-Poncet in Paris. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 12 May 80 p 69] 5170

TERRORISM: SECURITY POLICE FOR MINISTERS--Following recent assassination attempts by the terrorist group, Direct Action [Action Directe], members of the government and high political personalities have demanded increased protection. Henceforth, 43 front doors will be placed under permanent surveillance by members of the CRS [Compagnies Republicaines de Securite]. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 12 May 80 p 69] 5170

CSO: 3100

PAPANDREOU SAYS TIME FOR POLITICAL CHANGE HAS COME

AT281347 Athens TA NEA in Greek 28, 29 May 80

[28 May 80, p 3]

[Second of three installments of an exclusive interview with PASOK Chairman Andreas Papandreou by TA NEA contributor N. Andonopoulos: "The Time Has Come for the Change Which Did Not Take Place in 1974"]

[Excerpts] TA NEA: Mr Chairman. At every opportunity you stress that the time has come for the road toward change to open and of course you believe this. However, on what do you base your conviction? Do you believe that the general conditions have changed to allow PASOK and democratic and progressive forces to assume power?

Papandreou: Indeed, the possibility now looms in the horizon for a democratic course toward change and I believe that a source toward national independence, democratization of the state and socialism is now possible. The reasons for my conviction are basically three and I will expound on them: It is the new atmosphere which has been formed among the armed forces in the wake of the 7-year dictatorship, it is the people's profound disappointment with the policy new democracy has followed since the dictatorship's fall--the policy of "bridges" for the reconstruction of the state of the right--and in addition it is the change in the international stage: the ability of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of other states has now diminished.

Of course, the PASOK factor is also a decisive one. Not so much for its slogans--because other democratic and progressive forces have more or less corresponding slogans and goals--as for the fact that in such a small period PASOK was able to develop such a broad popular base. This indicates that very many taboos and situations have been overcome which used to place obstacles before Greece's course for a change.

Therefore, if one summarizes the basic reasons explaining this development one will see that the 7-year dictatorship played a very significant role.

It was the last card of the Americans and of the Greek establishment in confronting the popular movement, the representative of which before the dictatorship principally was the center union.

TA NEA: You spoke about the new atmosphere that was formed among the armed forces after the dictatorship and said that you consider this as one of the factors which create possibilities for the opening of the road toward change....

Papandreou: Basically I believe that the "experiment" of the dictatorship cost the establishment very much. Why, what happened? The armed forces essentially were trapped by their leadership and the 7-year dictatorship proved to the armed forces--this is of immense significance--that the leadership of 21 April, the dictatorship's organs wrought the incredible plunder of public finances, the treason of Cyprus, the bloodshed of the polytechnic.

I believe that all these things have finally and irrevocably made it impossible for the armed forces to be trapped again into supporting some new coup.

The dictatorship itself was a great blow to the entire concept formed by the right that the armed forces would police the country so the United States and the Greek establishment might follow their policies unencumbered.

Consequently, I believe that this experience among the broad masses of the Greek armed forces--and despite the fact that a purge was not made--I do not know for how long but in any case until well after my time, will not permit any prospective Papadhopoulos or American from the Pentagon to use them for suppressing a popular movement and policing the country.

Actually, especially after the treason of Cyprus and the deteriorating situation with Turkey, the eyes of the entire armed forces are turned toward the country's defense which is the true role of the armed forces.

TA NEA: This is the first reason. You said the second reason is the people's disappointment with the policy followed since the dictatorship's fall....

Papandreou: Yes, it concerns the policy of the Karamanlis government thus far. It is clear that the dictatorship did not fall because of a popular movement, because of a revolution. The transition to parliamentary life was a peaceful transition--a "bridge"--which did not entail a purge. There are basic openings toward democracy but the great hopes of the people for a national course making obsolete the old standards of the right in power did not come true. The policy which was followed and which the new leadership of new democracy has inherited was and is Atlanticism, and one-sided austerity. Many times we have spoken about this policy which concerns trade unionism, local administration, access to information media, all the violations of the substance of a democratic regime and the policy toward the United States and the Alliance about which I spoke recently in the chamber and need not speak again. That is, the thing which has not come

about is a nationally proud policy which will serve national interests within a course toward independence--a long-term course--a policy of more equitable distribution of the national income which at last will not support big capital, large foreign and local companies and monopolies.

All these things and very many other things, the unbelievable plight in which education finds itself, antipopular laws, antiterrorist laws, law 330 and so forth lead to the end of an era--the era of transition--and with the end of the era comes the end of all hope of the Greek people that within this framework it is possible for the country to prosper and advance.

The feeling has become consolidated among the Greek people that the great change is needed, the great change which would have taken place beginning in 1974 had this "bridge" not existed.

The supports of the right are shrinking rapidly, actually at an impressive rate.

TA NEA: Now you come to the role of PASOK in the change,...

Papandreou: Yes, we must talk about this too. PASOK is not the only agent for change but it is the principal one because the great masses of the people have moved within its framework. It is a reality that this new framework created by PASOK has given a clear alternative solution for the change to the great popular masses.

Indeed, this period--and perhaps this is a PASOK contribution--essentially has politically legalized the term socialism for our people as it has made it quite clear that the course toward change requires not mere reforms but radical changes both in our relations with the rest of the world and in the need for an economic and social policy which will serve the interest of the broad masses of the Greek people and at the same time democratize the state. That is, it concerns a course in which every citizen by himself and through the organizations which represent his interests will actively participate in formulating the country's development.

TA NEA: Previously you mentioned the changes which are taking place on the international stage. How do you mean this?

Papandreou: Truly, this is one more factor which makes me believe that prospects are favorable--at this point I am speaking about developments in Greece because prospects for the international stage are not the same.

It is clear that a gradual reduction is taking place in the ability of the United States and the Pentagon to intervene successfully in the internal affairs of the countries which are linked with them through alliances or even are their satellites.

A new reality is beginning to become apparent. This is Europe, which has begun to escape from the immediate control of the United States and is formulating new possibilities, of course, within certain frameworks, for shaping another separate policy.

TA NEA: Previously you said that how much one will do depends on how long one will stay in power. Of course, this is a reply to claims about "a one-party system."

Papandreu: It has been stated many times that PASOK is a one-party system in the sense that when it assumes power it will remain there.

PASOK is not a one-party system. It believes in the alternation of parties in power. It sincerely believes in democracy, not in its present limited sense. We speak about a direct democracy, about the people's participation in decisions through their organizations. Therefore, who can make accusations against us?

[29 May 80, p 5]

[Third and last installment of an exclusive interview with PASOK Chairman Andreas Papandreu by TA NEA contributor N. Andonopoulos: "Greece Was the First Vietnam"]

[Excerpts] Papandreu: Greece's political-military dependence on the United States was one of the first on an international scale. We are the first Vietnam in the sense that the Americans came here to deal with a revolutionary movement and at the same time to completely conquer the state machine. We were the first to endure this, actually to an impressive extent.

It is well known that Greek ministers were not able to issue decisions without the joint signature of the mission's Americans--this was happening into the late sixties. Even in the government of the Center Union a representative of the Americans, of the World Bank, was stationed at the Ministry of Commerce to pass judgment mainly on imports, the balance of payments, etc. He was Westenby, the "last of the Mohicans"!

Consequently, Greece demonstrates strongly the phenomenon not of economic dependence but also of political dependence. Thus the issue of Greece's independence as a country has two aspects: the economic and the political aspects--of course, there is also the cultural issue but at this moment these two are the basic issues.

TA NEA: Does the same form of dependence exist now? That is, do you believe that the United States can currently impose its viewpoint as in the past?

Papandreu: This is a basic question. My view is that the United States has suffered an erosion which does not have to do exclusively with Greece, it is the extension of a more general erosion of their mechanisms on an international scale. They have passed through terrible defeats.

This great power was not able to win the war in Vietnam, and also was not able to impose its will on the African area as it would have liked.

I do not claim that the U.S. factor does not still play a decisive role. We speak about a slackening which in fact is not tolerated by the United States. There is reaction. McCloskey does not dictate everything, but it is clear that he has powers that no other ambassador in Greece has.

The weakening of the U.S. role in Greece perhaps has one other "special aspect." It is the fact that the United States has supported Turkey to such an extent that it has posed, not only to the people but also to the state machine, a great dilemma: If you are a patriot you cannot be that [presumably meaning you cannot be dependent on the Americans]. This is a very significant fact.

TA NEA: Would a greater Greek attachment to Western Europe lessen even more the dependence on the United States?

Papandreou: My answer to this is the following: Had you asked me this 18 months ago I would have rejected it absolutely. I do not reject it any more but I do not reject it as absolutely as it appears. Because of the policy followed by the United States, because of the dangers this policy is building up, because of the economic measures the United States has taken which have caused indignation among the Europeans and because of the cold war stance of the Americans, Europe fears a world war but wants to maintain its economic relations with Eastern Europe while it confronts tough competition from the United States. Under these circumstances possibilities have indeed begun to appear within a strictly limited framework for the formulation of some separate foreign policy. However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Western European countries have escaped from U.S. influence. Recently they were forced to make a number of decisions on Iran. How did they make them? Did they want to? They were forced by the Americans. This is proof that they are still controlled, but not to the extent that they were in the past.

TA NEA: Mr Chairman, what will the supports of a new PASOK foreign policy be?

Papandreou: It is clear, of course, that they will not be NATO! After all, we did not know yet what the government itself will decide about the Alliance's military wing! I have said this before in the chamber but I think it is worth repeating: We owe the coup of 1965 to NATO, the royal coup, we owe to NATO the 7 years of the dictatorship, the "de facto" partition of Cyprus, the formidable arming of Turkey, the siding and strengthening of Turkey's aggressive designs against our national area.

These are the things the Alliance has "offered" to us: It has not offered the slightest of what constitutes protection from an "ally." What kind of an alliance is this and how can we entrust our fate to it?

Another important issue is the EEC. Our position is crystal clear: we believe that accession to the EEC is wrong. We believe that instead of accession we should seek a special agreement that will protect our interests and will make possible a responsible plan covering both our commercial policy and the movement of capital--investments in Greece, etc. We have made it clear that we shall participate in all organs of the Common Market and the European Parliament in order to protect Greek interests and even contribute to developments in the European area which we consider positive for us. Finally we have promised the Greek people that when we assume power we shall demand a referendum. We consider this basic because we believe that the people should be asked about such a basic choice which will bind the future of our country for many years.

These are our positions on the critical EEC issue but at this point we should add something else that in my opinion is very significant. At this moment inside its ranks there is a questioning of the course of the EEC as there are possibilities to use escape clauses for the re-examination and reformulation of certain aspects of the accession agreement which is considered by the socialists of the European Parliament as negative for Greece --they said so clearly when they came to Athens.

What are the basic choices of PASOK foreign policy?

Undoubtedly, we shall advance on a policy that will be genuinely nonaligned. Not only shall we associate with the nonaligned area but we shall maintain and develop economic relations both with the Western and the Eastern countries of Europe.

We shall follow a strong Balkan policy in the sense that we shall develop our bilateral relations but will also proceed into multilateral cooperation not only on political, economic, commercial, cultural issues but also on the problem of Balkan disarmament.

Of course we shall also follow a policy of cooperation with the Arab area, where PASOK has great support as it also has in the Mediterranean area.

For us this cooperation will not only solve problems of oil and raw materials but will afford us the possibility of charting a specific policy so that we may proceed with the exploration of a new technology which will serve the needs of the area and protect our independence.

I sincerely believe that there are many supports for a new, independent policy. Already PASOK is following a clear foreign policy of bilateral relations with all democratic, progressive forces, deciding in each country which is the force that is closer to PASOK goals.

This does not mean that we identify ourselves with the internal program of every party which corresponds to the structure of its country. It is not

our business to judge this. It is the business of the people concerned. However, wherever there are common fronts, as on international developments, disarmament, peace, detente, we shall support and contribute to them.

Our position is to participate in every cooperation and alliance--of course not military alliances--that will not deny to the Greek people the right to separate their position. This is a very basic criterion for us. We may join a form of Mediterranean cooperation but to the extent that we can withdraw when we see that it does not suit us. We must always consider what is to our interest as a nation and as a people.

CSO: 4908

PRIVATE ACCOUNT BANK DEPOSITS IMPROVE SLIGHTLY

Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 15 May 80 p 3

[Text] Private account deposits with Banks were down by Drashmae 18,798,000,000 on last year's figure for the same time of year. However, the drop, this year, was seen in the first three months while a substantial improvement was seen in April when they picked up by Drs 10,168,000,000. Much now depends on what happens during this current month of May because, if the upward trend continues with indications that it has come to stay, it will not take long to offset this Drs 18,798,000,000 deficit. In such a case, commercial Banks will again accumulate what is termed "healthy money" with which to finance the economy, instead of resorting to the mint, through the Bank of Greece. (Editor's comment: Readers should not be unduly impressed by the April upsurge because Easter fell early this year, wage and salary earners drawing their bonuses in the early part of that month. This theory is supported by statistics which show that deposits were growing by Drs 900,000,000 a day from the 1st to the 10th of April, by 500,000,000 a day from the 11th to the 20th and tailed off to 300,000,000 a day from the 21st to the 30th of April.) However, an increase in the daily rate of deposits of not more than Drs 200,000,000 a day for the rest of 1980 will suffice to achieve all targets set for this year's monetary programme. This is a rate of increase so modest that it cannot be excluded, especially if the promise to raise interest rates paid by Banks is carried out by the new administration which has taken over.

Banknote circulation, so far this year, has a healthier look, largely perhaps because imports by the private sector during the first quarter were appreciably lower than they were last year, as was the case with exports also, on account of the prolonged bank-clerks strike, which slowed down the entire economy. On the 30th of April, 1980, banknote circulation was given as Drs 182,399,000,000, compared with Drs 161,348,000,000 on the same date in 1979. This means that Greek banknote circulation up to the 30th of April, had been increasing at 13 percent, i.e., almost on target. In 1979, the increase had been 16.8 percent and in 1978, 26.1 percent. There is, in consequence, clear restraint in the offer of money and this can be regarded as a positive move in the right direction.

From the 1st of January to the 30th of April, 1980, banknote circulation actually shrank by Drs 6,736,000,000 or 3.6 percent whereas during the same four months in 1979 the decrease had been Drs 2,492,000,000 or 1.5 percent only while in 1978 it had grown by 4.2 percent or Drs 5,561,000,000. In April this year Bank financing of the private sector remained stagnant. Under such circumstances, the rate of increase in private account deposits with Banks is of obvious importance and, if adequate, can play an important part in fending off any need to apply an even tighter credit squeeze.

CSO: 4920

LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE DELEGATION VISIT REPORTED

Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 15 May 80 p 4

[Text] At a press conference on May 9th, Earl Jellicoe reviewed the talks held by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry mission in Athens and Thessaloniki, last week. As the Greek Government resigned on the third day of the visit, it was impossible for outgoing ministers to assume any commitments binding upon their successors. Consequently, the whole exercise assumed more the form of a general review of the sectors of the Greek economy in which the British side could be interested in principle. These concerned major projects already frequently reported such as the proposed new Athens main airport, the final study for the Athens "metro" (about to be put out to tender shortly), modernization of the State Railways (for which Transmark of British Railways is already carrying out a Drs 90,000,000 study), the 700 MW coal-fired power station, probably on Makronissos Island (for which the Public Power Corporation has already been instructed to enter into negotiations with the appropriate British quarters), a line in which British technology is regarded as very advanced, the Greek nuclear energy programme, telecommunications, a new submarine telegraphic cable from Greece to Cyprus, city sewage treatment, the proposed petrochemicals and polyethylene complex at Mossolonghi, a lead and zinc smelter for the proposed new mining and smelting complex in Northern Greece (80 percent Hellenic Industrial Development Bank and 20 percent Bodossakis Institute) in which Rio Tinto Zinc Ltd would participate, offshore oil prospecting in the Ionian Sea and supplies of air defense systems, tanks, the HS 748 transport and reconnaissance plane and even possibilities of participation in the Greek armaments industry.

Such Greek ministers and other officials as were interviewed were stated to have shown special interest in possibilities of British help in business administration and in management training. This, in fact, would be to a large extent an attempt at re-training a section of the Greek Civil Service because most if not all the major projects listed above are State-owned or State-controlled.

In a more general sense, the mission looked into opportunities for increasing reciprocal trade with special emphasis on exports of Greek horticultural products to the British market, given necessary improvements in quality sorting, refrigeration, packaging and marketing.

(Editor's comment: In this connection it should be remembered that whereas there may be no limit to the additional quantities it might pay the British market to buy from Greece, this can only apply for the remainder of 1980. From 1st January, 1981, the intricate system of agreed corrective tariffs on several leading Greek agricultural exports comes into force to protect similar Italian and southern French products over a transitional period of several years. This in the short-term, cannot but place limitations on what can be shipped to the British market, even if it was fully prepared to take it.)

OSO: 4920

STATUS OF TRADE WITH IRAQ REPORTED

Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 8 May 80 p 9

[Text] As time wears on, Iraq is showing growing interest in the founding of an alumina plant in Greece whence the product could be shipped to Iraq for processing into aluminium in plant to be constructed for this purpose. In all probability, Greek alumina could be traded for Iraqi oil. Negotiations are also opening concerning a possible joint venture in a fruit juices factory whose products would be exported to Iraq. Finally, there was talk of Greece providing oil refining facilities for Iraqi oil in Greece, to be exported subsequently in the form of finished petroleum products, for joint account. There are to be fresh Greek-Iraqi meetings on ministerial level in Baghdad towards the end of this month.

During the April 12th-15th talks in Baghdad, the two delegations got down to drafting specific lists of goods each was interested in supplying to the other. The Greek side asked Iraq to step up purchases of:

Leaf tobacco, tomatopaste, canned fruit, fruit pulp and juices, wines and spirits (odd to press for this when a Moslem country is concerned), seed oils, ready-made clothing in general, cotton yarn, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, plastic products, tyres and inner tubes, motor vehicles (more particularly the locally-built open run-about cars on Citroen and Fiat chassis), cement and cement products, cables and wires, sheet iron and other iron and steel products, tin, agricultural machinery and tools, electric household appliances, sanitaryware, motors and pumps, refractory materials, metal and wooden furniture and lighting equipment.

The Iraqi side offered, in addition to oil, dates, date syrup, sulphur, chemical fertilizer, sheep and goatskins, textiles including woollen blankets, fluorescent lamps, sponge iron, dry cell batteries and some cosmetics. The Iraqi side did not omit to add on that occasion that a pre-requisite for any serious development in reciprocal trade would have to be (i) faithful execution of contract, (ii) efficient servicing in Iraq of Greek durable consumer goods and machinery and (iii) shipment of Greece's exports by reliable forwarding agents because of a number of thefts at sea which had occurred in the past at the expense of Greece's

reputation. Items (i) and (ii) above should receive due attention. Item (iii) has more or less solved itself because regular shipping lines are now taking over traffic from Greece to the various Red Sea and Arabian Gulf ports in place of the motley assortment of vessels, by no means all Greek, which were available in the early days of the expansion of the Middle Eastern markets.

CSO: 4920

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ON COTTON PRODUCTION PUBLISHED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 3 May 80 pp 9-15

[Article by Elias Mantouvalos, Agriculturalist-Statistician Director-General of Greek Cotton Organization]

[Text]

Greece has the privilege of being the first European country to cultivate cotton and the only one combining high production with a technologically developed cotton textile industry.

Cotton fibres in ancient times were a noble and sacred offer to Gods. On the Acropolis a lantern with a pure cotton wick burnt before the statue of Pallas Athena and Ergani Athena. In Justinian Legislation the word "cotton" is first referred to in order to include the product in the list of dutiable items. During the Turkish domination of Greece cotton cultivation developed in Pyrgos, Levadia, Ambelakia, Serres. Cotton was exported to Venice, Genoa, Trieste, France, etc.

At Ambelakia, the first cooperative in Europe with vertical organisation of production-manufacture disposal, red yarns of incomparable quality were manufactured. These were superior in quality and competed successfully with the products of the cotton mills and dyeing factories of Manchester. The climate of Greece and the artistry of its workers combined to create products unique in inspiration and perfection.

Cotton is a dynamic cultivation which offers a high net income to the farmer, guarantees the best quality of secondary production and ranks first among foreign exchange bearing agricultural products from the point of view of the total imported foreign exchange savings. Greece covers 78 percent of cotton cultivation of W. Europe, whilst its average production (130,00 tons) is only 9.8 percent (1,411,000 tons) of cotton consumption in W. Europe.

The quality of Greek cotton is favored by ecological conditions. Is well accepted in foreign markets and is equal to that of Adana of California and Eastern African countries. Available data on production and consumption indicates that there is no problem of marketing in foreign and local markets. Problems of cotton culti-

vation derive from organic and organisational weaknesses in the structure of the cultivated areas of 80 percent of cotton farms, and to face these weaknesses the promulgation of basic legislative and agro-technical measures are required. This is imperative especially if we take into consideration that the programmed development of secondary production is closely connected with the fine quality of domestic raw material.

Trend and prospects in cotton

Production of ginned cotton from 97,500 tons in 1961 has risen to an average of 130,000 tons. Cotton cultivating area from 1950 to 1963 almost tripled and reached 2.4 million stremas, and since 1964 it has remained at the level of 1.4 million stremas. Restriction of cultivated area and weakness to return to the pre-1964 levels is due to various unfavourable factors (economic technical etc.) which were not promptly confronted.

Reduction of cotton cultivation in 1978 and 1979 appears exclusively in traditional cotton farms, employing increased labor force (7.2 wages per strema, mainly women) yielding low economic returns as compared with more competitive cultivations.

According to the relevant time series analysis of 1973-1979, it should be noted that wages of women working in cotton fields near industrially developing areas such as Thessaloniki displayed a faster rate of increase than that of men workers. The drop in the rate of cotton cultivation is also more marked in this area than any other area in the country, particularly in the traditional type of cultivation. Undoubtedly wages paid is the main fact, or, but not the only one (variety, etc.).

At Karditsa wage readjustment for women working in cotton farms displays a lower rate of increase than that of men, and the annual rate of decrease

of traditional cotton farms is lower than that of Macedonia. A typical characteristic is the rate of change of mechanical cotton picking during 1977-1980 in central Greece (4.4%) and Macedonia (8.1%) as compared with Thessaly (15.3%). Cotton group farms numbered 420 in 1979 and with successful planning they constitute the best solution in meeting the demand of the cotton plant and the peculiarities of its product. They also provide answers for problems posed by the weaknesses of small and extensively divided properties, and allow for technological modernisation, organised movement, and programmed ginning.

Cotton group farms are clearly advantageous from the point of view of intellectual activity which upgrades the product and contributes to the establishment of cotton farms. Cotton group farming compared to traditional farming presents a 400%

increase of labor work productivity, 388% in net returns and 25-40% reduction of costs. Despite these positive comparative facts, there has been no significant decline in the cultivation of other crops, wheat and corn, for example, in areas of group farming. An analysis of the relations of net returns and cotton production by *strema* and competitive cultivations, particularly examination of the flexibility of these relations, draws very interesting conclusions. These conclusions are particularly encouraging in the expansion of cotton and the inability of wheat and corn to compete with it, provided that group cotton farming is promoted and the returns of the improved by importing proper varieties. Further expansion of mechanical cultivation is also essential. The improvement of net proceeds acquired by cotton group farms (Chart 1) by increasing the average *strema* yield from 250 to 300 kilos (i.e. at levels in commonly cotton observed cultivation at the time of normal climatic conditions), may be offset by the increase of the *strema* yield by the prevailing average production:

- a) of the traditional cotton cultivation by about 37%
- b) of irrigated wheat by 50.80%
- c) of corn by 26.36%

The above data indicates that the net returns of group cotton farms with a *strema* yield of 300 kilos amount to 6,000 drs attainable as follows:

- a) by traditionally cultivated cotton of an average *strema* yield of 450 kilos (a yield which rarely is achieved).
- b) by wheat of an average *strema* yield of 916 kilos (unrealistic)
- c) corn of an average yield of 1,240 kilos per *strema* (particularly high figure for ecological conditions even those of Thessaly and the Greek Mainland, known for their lack of sufficient water and canal irrigation system).

However, several procedures are necessary for improvement.

- a) Joint acquisition of machinery with proper specifications
- b) Jointly facing the cultivation procedures
- c) Jointly harvesting and often marketing of the product.

The above facts show that expansion of cotton production is basically connected primarily with a prompt response to the organisational weaknesses of the structure of the farms, and by an incomes policy favourable towards it. Therefore, the other factor which has decisively influenced the

development of cotton is the relation between the price of cotton products and that of competitive cultivations, mainly wheat and corn, i.e., the degree of protection given to income of cotton producers and that of corn and wheat producers, irrespective of whether the producers' income is formed by burdening the State Budget or the consumers.

At any rate, the subsidy of wheat and corn producers income is higher than that of the cotton producers — see table below:

The favourable treatment of wheat and corn against cotton had an upsetting effect in the relation between

Product	Int'l price in drs per kilo	Domestic price drs per kilo	Support against int'l price
Soft wheat	6.60	8.10	23%
Corn	4.60	7.90	70%
Raw cotton	25	30	20%

the price of cotton and corn which in Greece declined to 1:3.8 against 1.5 in international markets and created the conditions which led to lower cotton cultivation in favor of wheat and corn cultivation.

The security price announced for 1980 of 38 drs per kilo of cotton, box 5, had a positive result and a 15% increase in area cultivation over 1979 is anticipated, i.e. it will amount to 1,400,000 stremas. Favorable conditions are also created with our accession to EC and the application of Protocol 4 for cotton because it provides for the first 5 years protection of the producers' income up to a production amount of 193,000 tons of ginned cotton which is equivalent to the production of 1,900,000 stremas.

As mentioned above, the expansion of cultivation is directly connected with the principle of group farming. The Greek Cotton Board in this respect has introduced significant innovations referring to the agricultural-economic research and measures taken from the organisational and legislative point of view so that the Cotton Organisation becomes the basic agency of the organisational changes in the structure of cotton farms.

In view of the special interest to the Greek as well as to other country agricultures, the study of methods on group cultivations and the relevant conclusions are summarised below.

Study and conclusion of group cultivation

The sampling survey as well as other methods of studies of traditional cotton farms gives a picture of the existing structure and its weak points without making a feasible study of the problems, the solution of which gives access to durable structures. The linking adaptation of study techniques to the imperative targets of structural adaptations to economic and social conditions and the high level of technology existing in the last decade in cotton growing countries, was accomplished with


modern research methods of models or samples. This exploratory system (methodology) was first applied in Greek agriculture by the Cotton Board with results that establish it as feasible for the study of farm management. The importance of models in the cotton business study is exploratory and instructive. It is exploratory because it allows the study of structures and the facts which are not at present a reality. The Cotton Board investigated the structure and operations group cultivation (OKK) at a time when group cotton cultivation was unknown in our country. Group cultivation of different products in France, Spain, etc. constitute managerial shapes which if copied would have been a big failure, the responsibility for which would be not the collective activity but the lack of knowledge and imagination involved.

The study of models requires deep knowledge of a series of facts of an agro-technical content, and of econometrics. The creation of the Model is a particularly complex task. It is not a passive copy of the facts, but a creation of human intellect which separates the insignificant from the fundamental which become the "subjects" of the study.

The study of the Model gives to the researcher and the politician the instrument with which he influences consciously the organisational scheme, in such a manner as to change it in order to satisfy the planned (programmed) targets and the desired results. Group cotton farming is a powerful Model, which is dominated by prudent magnitudes that follow the theory of probability (climate, land production, losses or damages, degree of exploitation of farm machinery). The philosophy of the prudence dominates operational study of group cultivation.

For the rationalisation of Group cultivation the following areas were studied:

- The size of Group farm cultivation in relation to modern technological equipment, climate in various areas and the economic results pursued.
- The structure of group farms on the basis of the acreage of merged farms, the division into small areas and their vertical management.
- The problems of cooperation and administration taking into consideration the number and the relations of the collaborators, their education, the excess of work, preserved old machinery etc.



Cotton industry

The development of the Greek textile industry is favored by the economic characteristics of our period and presents favorable prospects of future development. However, it is necessary to face the problems arising from our accession to EC.

Of the 52 spinning mills, 18 are equipped with 10,000 spindles, 15 have 10,000 to 20,000 spindles, and the remaining 21 are equipped with over 20,000 spindles.

Allocation of productivity of these industries creates the need for the development of rational incentives together with modernization and new technological achievements. These increase labor efficiency and improve the quality so that products become more competitive.

Incentives must also be linked with the establishment of vertical units or with the development of cooperation between small/medium and medium size enterprises.

The industry will be greatly assisted by the establishment of a Technological Research Agency and undoubtedly by the establishment of High Schools and

University level schools for Executives of the Textile Industry. The Cotton Board (Greek Cotton Organization) with the modernization of its technological laboratories contributes to the work of the Textile Industry. As of this year total ginned cotton will be classified not only by length and class of the fibers as has been the case to date, but also by determining its resistance and thinness, properties relevant to the standardization of the industry.

For this purpose 4 centres of Classification Technology, completely modernized with trained personnel, will operate in Livadia, Larisa, Karditsa and Thessaloniki; and 10 laboratories at Trikala, Veria, Yannitsa, Serres, Komotini, Messolonghi, Pyrgos, Preveza and Arta.

The provisions of Law 197/1975, and the Presidential decree approved by the Minister of Agriculture re. "Organization", requires the practical cooperation of the industry with the Cotton Board.

Ready made clothing industry

Following the successful spinning of almost all Greek cotton and exporting yarns instead of the production of raw cotton, Greece must expand its targets by considerably increasing its textile production, particularly that of ready made clothes.

We shall add some ideas regarding the impetus which must be developed in order to neutralize the risks of reducing and downgrading the industry of ready-made clothes.

Modernization of the management of production, and adaptation to higher artistic and training levels is a necessity in view of our accession to EC and the serious dangers from Middle East countries and in general of developing countries. During the last three years imports of ready-made clothes increased by 80 percent in the USA, Canada and Japan and by 61 percent in EC countries. French and British reactions to imports of textiles and garments have been strong. Greece, as

is well known, is deprived of a tradition in high fashion and in general of a fashion which consistently represents Greek characteristics. The danger of remaining a country which manufactures clothing for other countries "on commission" is visible. However, there does exist the objective possibility of becoming the country of artistic creations, of marketing quality products with the trade mark "Made in Greece", ensuring financial and other broader benefits.

We note that Greek yarns No. 30 sell in the European markets at 405 c. per kilo against 311 cents of Turkey, 247.50 cents of Pakistan, 232.50 cents of Brazil, 218 c. of Korea, 304 cents of India, 292 cents of Formosa and 377 c. of Israel.

An absence of Greek cotton would have a noticeable effect on Greek industry, particularly at a period of severe competition and remodelling. It would also compel industries to make considerable mechanical adaptations for the fixing of prices of the imported product with repercussions on the production cost and on productivity, as well as on the quality of the products.

The programmed development of the Greek textile industry is particularly desirable to the national economy under the present conditions. It can be secured only by a corresponding expansion of primary production. The development of the cotton industry in Greece is particularly favoured by the drift of spinning mills from developed countries in the North to the South.

Under the existing conditions the vertical development of industrial production is an essential course. For example, cotton of a value of 100 drs. when spun acquires a value of 210 drs., made into fabric its value rises to 400 drs. from 800 to 1000 drs. when made into clothing. Also of interest is cotton seed and its products. Cotton seed production is behind the requirements of the Greek seed oil industry, the production of which amounts to about 30,000 tons of cotton seed oil and about 163,550 tons of cotton cake.

Raw material requirements of yarn

spinning mills are higher than the last 5 year average production of unspun cotton. In order to supply them and at the same time maintain the export trade of cotton, cultivation of at least 1.9 million stremas is required. In 1979-80 about 70,000 tons of American cotton will be imported.

The conclusions of the econometric study of the above basic objects which are briefly listed below are, I believe, important.

a) Size of Cotton Group farms From the econometric and ecological study of Greek conditions and machinery used, it has been ascertained that the size of Group farms may, according to area, fluctuate between 750 and 1000 or more stremas in order to determine the relation between the production factors. Establishment of group farms usually requires the merger of 6 farms

A. Contribution of cotton to the national economy - 1979-80

Value of cotton	100,000 X 83,000 = 8,300,000,000 drs
" of cotton seed	170,000 X 9,000 = 1,530,000,000 drs
added of cotton yarns	121,000 X 120,000 = 14,520,000,000 drs
" of " fabrics (textiles)	50,000 X 200,000 = 10,000,000,000 drs
" " of " garments, etc.	48,000 X 700,000 = 33,000,000,000 drs
Total 67,950,000,000 drs	

B. Future anticipated contribution to the National economy

Raw cotton	193,000 X 80,000 = 15,500,000,000 drs
Raw cotton seed	330,000 X 10,000 = 3,300,000,000 drs
Added value of yarn	180,000 X 120,000 = 19,200,000,000 drs
" " of textiles	150,000 X 200,000 = 30,000,000,000 drs
" " of clothes, etc.	146,000 X 600,000 = 87,000,000,000 drs
Total 155,000,000,000 drs	

of a total privately owned or leasing of over 750 stremas spread out in over 15 places. In France the establishment of group farms (not cotton) in the same area is achieved by the merger only of 2-4 enterprises in few places.


The problems arising from small lots in establishing group farms were deeply examined and successfully faced in Greece. The econometric analysis of "wastage" due to the movement of large machinery between the various land pieces of the group farm indicated the amount of loss allowed the successful establishment of the groups, which under the circumstances display 40 percent lower costs than other types of farms. A study of Models determined the minimum area and dimensions of each plot in order to include it in the group. Thus, the problem of the "adjacency" of the areas was transferred to the proper dimensions of the merged and/or bordering pieces.

In our country collaboration in group farms is usually organized along family lines. In France 85 percent of group farms are made up by the cooperation of father, children or brothers.

The number of co-workers in cotton group farms in Greece ranges from 6 to 26 persons. In France 80 percent of group farming involves 2 to 4 persons. Cooperation and administration of the group are basically affected by the above sizes. The establishment of group administration and distribution of responsibility is fundamentally an economic issue. Training of the asso-

ciates in modern technology by the Cotton Board, selection of modern machinery and equipment of high productivity and multiple use decrease the difficulties of cooperation. The explicit determination of the terms of cooperation helps assure efficiency. Delineation by the group of work needs, the opening of a bank account and bookkeeping and relative use of old machinery (mainly tractors) are among the responsibilities. The 1 to 2 year probational period of cooperation allowed by the Cotton Board before final establishment of a group farm proved necessary in view of the education, mentality and technical expertise of the Greek farmer. A fact that should be stressed is the development of harmonious cooperation at community le-

vels between the administrations of the various groups in handling machinery of greater efficiency than that required for the size of the group farm (sprayers, field preparing machinery, etc.). Training of associates in administrative subjects, regular supervision and directives by the Cotton Board allow collective administration, uniform management and effective control.



However in the ready made clothing production sector much serious work must be done. The establishment of a responsible staff agency is necessary, and there must be rational incentives and developmental policies to promote modernization of the management of production, export promotion, and the creation of Greek high quality products.


Seed oils

A sector which should promptly, preferably immediately, be adapted to technological innovations of our times and before our joining the EC is that of Seed Oils.


There are presently 35 seed oil plants in Greece using cotton seed as raw material. These units are generally low output - 12 to 150 tons per day, using old technological methods and an outdated management. They produce 12.5 oil, and 75 to 77% cotton cake, with 27% protein and 20 to 22% cellulose content. Modern seed oil factories with modern production methods yield 17.5% and 45% of cotton seed oil and cotton cake respectively of 41-50% protein content and 2-8% cellulose content. It is imperative to replace these seed units with a few modern units of 200-250 tons per day production of excellent quality.

This would have the following results:

- 1) Increase of cotton seed oil production (13,500 tons from the difference of efficiency)
- 2) Increase of added value
- 3) Production of 122,000 tons annually of cotton meal of high biological value and the saving of considerable amounts of foreign exchange.



A. SPINNING AND WEAVING OF COTTON, TEXTILE AND CLOTHING SECTOR GREECE
(in thousands of tons)



Greece is the only cotton growing country in the European Economic Community. Her cotton is a high-quality product for many reasons -- the favourable climate and suitable soil conditions of the Greek plains are two -- and the use of modern cultivation methods by growers, backed by the appropriate governmental measures have also been important.

The country's permanent Cotton policy is, naturally enough, to preserve and even improve the present high quality. The relevant Governmental services and Agricultural Cooperatives all work towards this end. The Hellenic Cotton Board, the Commodity Board for the product, has established the necessary classification, fibre testing and spinning laboratories both in Athens and in all the major cotton-growing districts. The Board carries out annual surveys and research programmes to evaluate all the factors contributing to the high quality of production, and helps in other necessary ways the trade and the Industry.

The quality of cotton depends to a great extent on its variety, and it is heavily influenced by such factors as climate, soil conditions, methods of harvesting (whether it is hand or machine-picked, for example), and in general by the cultural practices of the region in which it is cultivated.

All the varieties planted in Greece belong to the American Upland type (*Gossypium Hirsutum*). They are the 45 and the RU, developed in Greece by the cotton institute at Sindos and the Acala and Coker, imported from the USA. The predominant one is the 45 which is early, productive, and of good maturity.

Greek cotton is long (28-29mm), extra-white, strong and uniform. It is therefore particularly suitable for highquality yarns.

Greek spinners have always known the high quality and utility of indigenous cotton, and have previously used very little foreign cotton for mixing. This year, however, owing to the failure of the crop due to high rainfall during picking, they have been forced to import much more and they face many difficulties. One in particular is the stickiness of imported cotton, which has never been a problem with Greek material.

The basic characteristic of cotton is the staple length of the fibres according to which cotton is divided into groups in the following way.

Greek cotton, with a staple length of 28.2mm lies between the medium long and the long staple group.

Cotton is an Industrial raw material and its quality and utility are very complex, depending on several factors and characteristics. In

practice, these are divided into Classification, Fiber, and Spinning characteristics.

Classification is the traditional method used to appraise market value by sight and touch. This determines the grade and staple of cotton, features on which the commodity is still traded. For this reason the Hellenic Cotton Board helps the trade by classifying all cotton bale by bale.

The staple is determined with the help of USA standard samples. Most countries measure it in inches, but Greece measures in millimeters. Greek

Quality Characteristics of Greek and Similar Cottons

Classification	U.S.A. Calif.	U.S.S.R. —	Mexico Sin.Son.	Syria —	Turkey Cukurova	Greece —
Grade	M(5)	Pervyi	M(5)	O/X	STD I	SM(4)
Staple mm	27,8	31/32	27,0	27,8	—	27,8
Fiber test results						
Span length 2,5% mm	27,9	26,7	27,7	28,2	27,4	28,5
Uniformity %	45	48	42	46	46	47
Micronaire	4,2	4,8	4,4	4,1	4,2	4,1
Strength zero gauge	94	79	85	81	78	88
Non lint content	2,3	4,1	2,3	3,7	6,9	2,7
Color index	102	105	104	104	100	104
Processing test results						
Picker and card waste %	5,0	5,6	6,9	8,0	10,3	6,0
Skein strength 50s	44	39	33	40	38	47
Appearance "	86	92	80	97	88	111
Imperfections "	18	13	12	12	18	8

cotton is, in general, very uniform. Small fluctuations are mainly due to weather conditions and different methods of picking.

The GRADE is concerned with the factors of colour, leaf, and the preparation or appearance of the cotton. Groups are formed according to the colour of the cotton, and the groups themselves are subsequently classified and named, in the USA by a series of adjectives "Middling", "Good Ordinary", and so on .. and in Greece on a scale of 3 to 9. As the number increases the quality decreases.

The Greek crop is mostly white, grade 3, 4 or 5. When the weather is bad there are some coloured cottons of a lower grade. Mechanical picking also tends to lower the grade slightly. In 1979 about half the crop was machine-picked.

There has been a tendency towards less white, and a greater proportion of lower grades in recent years.

The percentage (for total crop) of the grades in the white group is shown in Chart 1




DIAGRAMME 1

A slight tendency towards lower grades is indicated.

Fiber Characteristics

The usual characteristics measured by instruments are -- Length and uniformity, firmness and maturity, colour and non lint content.

"Micronaire" is a mixture of fineness and maturity which is measured by airflow methods, and is a characteristic which, along with grade and staple, is frequently used in the trade for judging cotton. The Micronaire content is heavily influenced by the weather, and in Greece tends to be a little on the low side.

The average Micronaire content of Greek cotton in recent years is shown in Graph 2




DIAGRAMME 2

The other usual fiber characteristics are the Fibrograph length and uniformity, the strength at Zero gauge, the fineness as mg per tex and maturity ratio by the Shirley IIC maturity tester.

Spinning Characteristics

The Hellenic Cotton Board also carries out microspinning tests to appraise the spinning value of Greek cotton.

Greek Cotton on a World Basis

In 1971 the United States Department of Agriculture carried out tests on cotton from all over the world. The results in the medium to long staple group showed the Greek to be on average the best one. The results for the most important cottons were as under.

Description	Staple Length		Percentage of world production	
Short	under 13/16"	or	20,6 mm.	3%
Medium	13/16" - 1"	or	20,6 - 25,4 mm.	18
Medium long	1 1/32 - 1 3/32	or	26,2 - 27,8 mm.	60
Long	1 1/8 - 1 5/16	or	28,6 - 33,4 mm.	14
Extra long	1 3/8 and over	or	35 mm and over.	5
Total				100

Digital Fibrograph			Strength	Fineness	Maturity	Micro-
Crop length uniformity			Mpsi	mg/tex	Ratio	naire
1977						Index
<u>District</u>						
Macedonia	28,5	45%	80,8	180	0,81	3,8
Thessaly	28,8	45	85,1	184	0,83	4,0
E.C. Greece	28,2	46	85,9	184	0,86	4,1
W.C. Greece	28,4	45	82,9	180	0,82	3,8

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH CHINA--The trade mission from the People's Republic of China, previously reported, is taking its time over contacts with officials and private concerns and has been prolonging its stay in this country. The mission is empowered to conclude specific deals and this amply justifies the careful pace at which it is working. Mr. Chao-Ying-Fang, head of mission, said in conference with the Piraeus Chamber of Commerce last week that Chinese interest was concentrating on purchasing Greek steel tubing, raw and tanned skins and hides, aluminium products, flour, paper and plastic tubing. There was also interest in negotiating ship-repair contracts for Chinese vessels calling at Greek shipyards. In general, it has been recognized that reciprocal trade cannot be expected to expand at any worthwhile pace until China finds ways to purchase greater quantities of goods from Greece with which to restore a measure of balance to the present heavy trade deficit at Greece's expense. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 15 May 80 p 5]

TRADE WITH EAST GERMANY--The Director General of the Foreign Trade Department of the German People's Republic, Mr. Steyr, is due in Athens on the 16th of May to discuss renewal of the agreement for economic cooperation between the two countries on a new basis. This has become necessary because, on the 1st of January, 1981, Greece as a full EEC member-state, will have to discontinue all remaining bilateral barter trade (clearing) agreements. Greek exports to Eastern Germany in 1979 valued \$48,650,000 and imports from that country \$45,042,000. Over the 1975-1979 five-year period, trade nearly doubled in value, at current rates. Greece's exports to Eastern Germany are somewhat limited in variety, consisting mainly of raisins-currants, leaf tobacco, fruit juices, citrus fruit and hides and skins. [Text] [Athens HELLENEWS EXPRESS in English 15 May 80 p 5]

CSO: 4920

BASE OPPONENT VIGDIS FINNBOGADOTTIR IN PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 Apr 80 pp 10, 11

[Article by Thorsteinn Saemundsson: "From Keflavik to Bessastadur, Play in Seven Acts"]

[Text] A Glibness of Tongue

On Thursday, 27 March, the Newspaper VISIR published an interview with theater manager Vigdis Finnbogadottir, one of the candidates for the office of president of Iceland. The interview was noteworthy to a degree both on account of what it included and what it passed over in silence. At the beginning of the interview Vigdis Finnbogadottir expressed her view of the office of president in the following terms:

"I think that the president should be, first of all, a reflection of the kind of human being that the public considers itself to be, that is, an image that a large part of the public can feel comfortable with."

Many voters may, to be sure, feel comfortable in seeing the pleasing smile of Vigdis Finnbogadottir in their mirrors, in place of their own every day visages, but foresight must be mingled with this pleasure with regard to what is behind the smile and what the reflection portends. That notion, to be sure, occurred to the VISIR newsman, who asked Vigdis Finnbogadottir various questions, among them the question: "Have you been involved in politics?" Vigdis Finnbogadottir answered:

"I have never been a member of any political party and I am somewhat glad about that, the way things stand now. I find it all to prevalent among us that people are assigned to neat categories and little attention is paid to what a person really is."

It may be noticed that Vigdis Finnbogadottir failed to answer the newsman's question directly, and the conclusion might naturally be drawn that she has had little involvement in politics. Her answer cannot be understood any other way. Whether or not that can be considered a candid reply, worthy of one striving for the highest office in Iceland, is a question that the public can ponder after reading this article.

And there is much hidden in Vigdis Finnbogadottir's answer. When she says that the voter should look at "what a person really is" what she really means is that the voter should look at a candidate as they would an actor in a new play and judge him by his performance in the first act without regard to what has taken place previously. Later in the interview Vigdis Finnbogadottir expressed another point of view when she said:

"A proverb often comes to mind when I have to bite my lip to avoid saying what I really want to say without regard to the circumstances: the words you speak are your champions and the words unsaid your thralls."

With this we have arrived at the crux of the matter. What are the words and what are the actions which Vigdis Finnbogadottir has made her champions? The voters may ask this. I know only a little of the story, mostly what can be discovered easily here and there in public sources.

Protest March Adventure

THJODVILJINN reported on 9 May 1961, concerning a Keflavik March which took place on 7 May of that year, with 400 participants, according to the paper. THJODVILJINN printed, in connection with the march, the photo reproduced below with the caption: "Vigdis Finnbogadottir welcomed participants to the Keflavik March on behalf of the Union of War Base Opponents and then turned over the podium to Pal Bergthorsson. At the conclusion of his speech Vigdis Finnbogadottir led the march." It may be concluded from this that Vigdis Finnbogadottir was in charge of the march but her speech was not printed in the pages of THJODVILJINN and we cannot tell whether she thanked Pal Bergthorsson for his speech or criticized him for his questionable modes of expression. And that is unfortunate in view of what follows. The speech of Pal Bergthorsson was published, in its entirety, in THJODVILJINN. He said, among other things:

"It is the same slavish disposition that impels Gudmundr I. and Bjarni Ben. to raise their lamentation when aversion is felt for the stink at the Keflavik airfield. And I am not wrong in saying that sour faces have been seen on some Althing men of distinction which may indicate that they intend, someday, to fling themselves sorrowfully, but soberly, out of their blind isolation and eat crow out of fear that Iceland will exit that splendid fellowship, NATO."

There is an old saying, running as follows: tell me who you associate with and I will tell you who you are. Candidates for the office of president should think about this saying and likewise the voters.

A list of the members of the executive committee of the Reykjavik March of that year was published in THJODVILJINN on 3 June 1967. The list began with Arni Bjornason, M.A., and concluded with the writer Halldor Stefansson. Within it are many other well known names of the same sort. There also is the name of the candidate who has never been a member of any political party, Vigdis Finnbogadottir.

It Stands Written

It was stated in THJODVILJINN on 4 December 1973: "Prime Minister Olafur Johannesson was handed, on Saturday, a demand for the departure of the American army advanced by 60 well known Icelanders. The demand was announced at the Haekolabio Theater on 1 December at a student meeting. Professor Margret Gudnadottir announced the petition drive and the demand and the matter was advanced under the auspices of the Union of War Base Opponents. THJODVILJINN published the names of the signers and among them is the name of Vigdis Finnbogadottir, who expressed herself once again on the issue which her colleagues call the most political issue in Iceland.

On 28 June 1974, THJODVILJINN published still another statement to which Vigdis Finnbogadottir had lent her name. Under the rubric: "At What Price?" a group numbering 152 attacked the leadership of the petition organization Defense of the Nation for going to court on account of slander and vilification. It is said in the statement, among other things:

"To be sure it shall not be doubted, until otherwise indicated, that the supporters of Defense of the Nation need not lower themselves to talk to others about their wards, the American military force in Iceland, nor about its multifaceted importunities which reproduce themselves ceaselessly in the culture of Iceland. But whatever their position about those holding other views about the long stay of this army on Icelandic soil, and whatever the airs they choose to put on, they have no right to answer their opponents by seeking to take unfair advantage of their natural reactions in the very heat of the argument."

The quotation is given here on account of the conclusions to be drawn below. And the statement was, on the whole, so worded that it scarcely found publication anywhere but in THJODVILJINN and it was only after an official of the Icelandic State Radio was assured that there would be no legal problems with the statement that the State Radio dared to broadcast it in its original wording. No one need call in question the good intentions of the State Radio.

And what was it that Vigdis Finnbogadottir and her associates called "natural reactions...in the very heat of the argument?" Since details are all too quickly forgotten by those who did not actively participate, allow me to repeat some of the expressions appearing in print on the leadership of Defense of the Nation: the yankees' prostitutes, American booklickers, Amercian Icelanders, doggish host of screaming savages, gathering of barbarians, sleazy characters, reactionaries, Nixon dogs, watergaters, the filthy sons of the Independence Party, political freeloaders, doults, notorious speculators, the committee for national oppression, turn coasts, ill-omened host, ner-well-to-dos, air field mongers, moon-struck men who only arouse contempt and disgust in every decently civilized person, the worst reactionary and faciat garbage ever drug out of the gutter in Iceland.

At the same time it was asserted that the leadership of Defense of the Nation was guilty of behavior punishable by law in neighboring countries, that they were in the employ of a foreign power, that they were carrying out actions ordered by the famous watergate figures, as it was stated, that tax proceeds had been slipped to foreign parties and an Icelandic political party, and that these charges were real and could be proven in court. There followed insinuations of abuse of powers in public office and of kickbacks. All of this was part of a single campaign. It cannot be condemned if the leadership of Defense of the Nation replied in the same mould.

A Sermon

Four months later or, more specifically, on 21 October 1974, theater manager Vigdis Finnbogadóttir gave a presentation on current affairs over the State Radio. The presentation was well received and it was thought that the theater manager had spoken well and delivered her speech with an excellent, mild and sweet diction. Vigdis Finnbogadóttir paid special attention in her talk to vicious attacks in public exchanges in Iceland and said, among other things:

"Failure to maintain public exchanges at a high level is nothing more than a failure to see beyond oneself, a lack of consideration for others, a lack of understanding, a lack of respect for others as human beings with emotions and sensitivities just like one's own. It is a mystery to me how politicians and responsible persons in Iceland can sleep at night. They must be very hardened. But I ask: should not each of us see himself when he sets about saying that someone else is incompetent or wishes his country nothing but ill, whether they are on the right or the left..."

"Those who have taken positions of responsibility in the nation are continually under the closest scrutiny, as is proper. But those who find themselves called upon to comment upon their performances do it all too rarely with the dignity to be expected of them. More often than not that tells more about the mind, emotions and views of the critic than the object of his criticism..."

"There are, unfortunately, all too many ears that itch to hear something bad about others and it is unlikely that people go to such effort without hope of some success..."

"Criticism amongst ourselves would, in any case, be of more honor to us all if it were at a higher level, more positive, aroused more questions, promoted curiosity and prompted people to examine things on their own merits instead of tirelessly repeating catchwords and pandering endlessly to people's credibility. I am especially convinced that it is the positive that moves us to acts and the negative that destroys us. But since I speak as a theater manager I must note that my observations given above on unreasonable criticism and vicious attacks apply not only to politics but to other areas as well..." (End of quote)

To be sure these are pleasing words. But who would expect that the some speaking them would be only too ready to give her blessing to the greatest slander and vilification campaign in the history of the Icelandic press.

The Landlord

In 1976 Vigdís Finnbogadóttir was still theater manager with the Reykjavik Playhouse. That year she presented the play *Aeskuvinna* ("The Young Friends"), also called *Basradandinn* ("The Landlord"), by Svova Jakobadóttir. The play was first performed on 29 October. On 4 November Johann Hjalmarsson wrote a review of the play for *MORGUNBLADIÐ* which said, among other things: "The work is a political one. At the same time it touches on the oppression of women in our world and how a people becomes dependent through docility before foreign powers. Various contemporary events are worked in, for example, the Defense of the Land Petition...To me *Aeskuvinna* is nothing more than the Althing introduced into the playhouse, Althing delegate and writer in one. The players spoke their lines like they were the most sincere words of their hearts." A review of the play by Jonas Guðmundsson was published in *TÍMAN* on 30 November under the title: "To Revenge in the Playhouse Defeats in the Althing." Jonas Guðmundsson wrote, among other things: "I have been informed that parts of the play were created during the run, that is, in the playhouse itself. The Althing is, to some degree, like a play that is running. Certain elements are at hand there which change as things go on and assume final forms. And the situation of Althing delegates is like, for example, that of Svova Jakobadóttir, but one can scarcely revenge Althing defeats in the playhouse." Jonas Guðmundsson cut certain parts of the play, including the climax, when the young friends rape the "mountain woman," to pieces. In order that the readers, who might not have seen the play, gain a clear impression for the spirit of the work I quote the exact words:

Karl: We shall arouse her.

Karl S.: Yes, we shall arouse her.

Karl: We arouse her (speaks at first to the mountain woman and then to all three).

Karl S.: Damn! She's kicking.

Karl K.: And clawing (the woman cries out)

Karl: Holler you bitch (kisses her)! Hold her! (Karl S. and Karl K. hold her in such a way that her position reminds one of a crucifix while Karl appears to be making ready to rape her first).

Hei: (Appears in the doorway) What the hell is going on here? (He rushes to Karl and seizes him and screams at them until they come to their senses; the woman lays on the floor and they move heavily up stage and stand in a row before her with their hands on their balls). What a goddam pretty state of affairs! There she is on the floor and there you stand with hardons and your hands on your balls..."

The last word, which the writer of the play seems to relish especially, is borrowed from words spoken by one Thorarinn Eldjarn in connection with a cartoon of the leaders of Defense of the Land. The phrase was so interesting for THJODVILJINN that it was published in that paper not once but several times. Both the expression and the play belong, naturally, to what the theater manager calls "natural reactions." One cannot account for taste that it is remarkable that such things are pleasing to THJODVILJINN and to a theater manager.

The Path to Artistic Expression

It was reported in MORGUNBLADID on 16 November 1977, that the paper had received a news release and a statement signed by 78 persons. The news release began with these words:

"A fund has been established for the defense of free speech in Iceland. Contributions to the fund will guarantee the fullest freedom for the expression of views on the common good and unrestricted artistic expression...As is stated in the fund statement, the immediate cause for the establishment of the fund is the decision recently rendered by the Icelandic Supreme Court on expressions used in discussions of the military base issue..."

MORGUNBLADID published the names of the founders of the fund. Among them is to be found the name of the theater manager who gave her sermon on current events 3 years before, Vigdis Finnbogadottir. Now times have changed and so much is at stake that it is no longer thought adequate to support slanderers with words alone.

In volume 10 of the 1978 Althing digest mention is made of the election of seven persons to the Adjustment Committee for Artists' wages on 22 December of that year. First mentioned is theater manager Vigdis Finnbogadottir, nominated by the People's Alliance for their own reasons (presumably to assume the continuation of "unrestricted artistic expression"). Thus I am hardly to be criticized if I assign people to "neat categories," as the words of Vigdis Finnbogadottir were, quoted above. Others have already done it for me. (To be continued.)

11433

CSO: 8126/1197

FIRST ROUND RESULTS OF MILITARY ELECTIONS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 18 Apr 80 p 9

[Article by Aldo D'Alessio: "The 'Morale' of the Armed Forces"]

[Text] It seems to me that after the first round of elections the prophets of doom and pessimists have substantially been proven wrong. Commenting on the introduction of military representation, the former had predicted the "Portugalization" of the armed forces. The pessimists were convinced of the uselessness of the new units, which they considered at most only capable "of counting the pears and the apples" as the Hon Accame said. Even though the representative abilities and the "negotiation" effectiveness of the councils are still to be tested, we cannot underestimate, first of all, the high and in some cases very high percentage of voters. In the first round of elections involving the Cobas (Troops' Representatives Councils) (Troops' Councils) in 7 high commands (Coir (Intermediate Representatives Council)) out of 9 in the army, and of 3 out of 7 in the navy, and 2 out of 3 in the air force, and 2 out of 4 in the Carabinieri, and of all (4) of the Cobas of the Finance Guard, the lowest percentage of voters (76.2) was registered in the Navy, in the Naples Naval Division and in category C which includes volunteers (cadets in the academies, graduates and enlisted men, etc); the highest were in the Army Corps (the 3rd, 4th and 5th), all of which were between 98 and 100 percent.

Even if, as we have heard, there have been pressures by military authorities, this alone does not explain the near-plebiscite approach of the military through democratic procedures, with the choice of their own representatives which instead seems to denote an expectation and desire to participate and change. This beginning perhaps was not a triumph (but who could have conceived it thus in the contradictory reality of the armed forces and in the situation existing in the country?). Rather it was the beginning of an important process, worthy of the greatest attention despite the fact that weighing upon them were the negative decisions of government authorities, above all concerning the regulations of implementation.

The choice that led to singling out more than 25,000 candidates, the drafting of thousands of programs, the votes that permitted the election of several thousand members of the Cobas testified that the internal life of

the armed forces is changing and that there is a continued demonstration of a basic thrust in the direction of democracy in this orientation. It is a significant signal for a nation shaken by crises; it is an explicit appeal for parliament and political parties to take a firmer stand in regard to these problems. Let us consider the results of elections in the Finance Guards (the only complete ones, since they took place in a single round). There was a total of about 43,000 voters out of 45,000 eligible to vote (96 percent); 356 were elected, of which 88 in category A (officers), 91 in category B (noncommissioned officers), 139 in category C (training school graduates and enlisted men), 36 in category D (reserve officers), 2 in category E (draftees).

When the suitability of the implementation regulations is tested, it will be a matter of determining whether the figures indicated fully express the proportional representativeness of the various categories (at first sight the "volunteer" and "noncommissioned officer" groups seem to be underrepresented). But what is striking now is the relatively low number of blank returns (about 2000) compared with the signs of discontent which in the recent past seemed much more visible. I believe it would be correct to interpret this in the meaning not of a decrease in the problems reported, but of a wise decision by the military to commit themselves to constructive action for a change that cannot be postponed and that must soon produce some concrete results. I believe the entirely fortuitous coincidence of the presentation by the government of the report on the state of morale and discipline of the armed forces offers more than one reason for thought in this regard.

In general the impression is that there has been an accumulation of unresolved, difficult problems and that there persists an alarming difficulty among the officer corps to understand what is happening. Some examples are worth giving. Unlike the cadres of the Army and Navy, the morale of the Air Force officers is considered "seriously deteriorated," and it is not a general discontent over the lack of solution to economic problems but of something much deeper. However, after this alarming reference, no other explanation is offered, nor is an attempt made at a credible reconstruction of the affair of air traffic controllers, an expression which is among the most negative of the errors and uncertainties of the government and of the defense administration. Furthermore, critical attitudes are reported against the military hierarchy, the new generations of officers and noncommissioned officers, attributing to them the responsibility for the "long disappointing expectation of adequate legislative solutions" (in brief, blaming Parliament) and to the "contrivances engineered from outside the armed forces with various aims and with characteristics which at times assume the nature of a true exhortation to disobedience."

These are uncautious and superficial statements. To show up their falsity is enough to skim the list of legislative drafts presented by the government to the seventh and the present legislature to realize that regarding all basic problems (from recruiting to promotion, to housing, to pay)

defense proposals are lacking. Let us proceed. Although the introduction of the law of principles is considered positive, its scope is limited (but frankly we do not understand why) to merely the aspects of discipline, with particular reference to the introduction of the defender. Meanwhile, with a certain apprehension, reference is made to the "lowering of the formal and disciplinary tone" by effect of the regulations (which also descend from the law of principles) regarding the abolition of garrison restrictions and the use of off-duty civilian dress. Furthermore, the assessment of relationships between the armed forces and the nation are irritating. The text says these relations are "mainly based on a one-way collaboration which is expressed in help to the people during natural calamities" with a "counterpart that is represented by general expressions of agreement and praise and by the participation of groups of citizens in military ceremonies." Even Parliament is called to account in the debate on euromissiles which was supposed to have had the effect of hastening detachment from the armed forces, contributing to "a process of isolation based on a misunderstood sense of pacifism which places the armed forces themselves among the things to be rejected."

Even though--because of the widespread knowledge of the more mature and balanced convictions of the Defense Ministry--neither a prominent nor conclusive meaning can be attributed to the foregoing expressions, there remains the alarming fact that a government report on such a delicate matter denotes a lack of leadership which cannot fail to lead to negative consequences. The state of the armed forces, even aside from considerations of the text referred to, is nevertheless punctuated by crime reports and disciplinary infractions. The table shows the following: Convictions--desertion, 1,119 cases; failure to report for duty, 909; absence without leave, 141; self-inflicted injury, 73; absence from duty, 107. All these are military infractions. Undoubtedly, if projected to the 368,000 men representing the annual average force (1979) these statistics are negligible and yet constitute confirmation that a problem exists.

For this reason too we again emphasize the value and scope of representation as modern and democratic instruments of participation and leadership of the armed forces.

Table A. Cobar Elections, First Round (in percentages)

Intermediate Representative Councils	Categories of Personnel				
	A	B	C	D	E
Army (Comiliter (Military Territorial Command))					
--Fifth region NO (Novara)	95.6	97.4	100.0	97.8	93.1
--Eighth central region	95.6	97.7	100.0	98.2	97.9
--Tenth southern region	89.6	95.3	--	--	93.7
Eleventh region Sicily	98.3	98.4	100.0	97.3	97.2
Third Army Corps	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.6
Fourth Army Corps	100.0	100.0	--	99.9	99.8
Fifth Army Corps	98.8	96.4	100.0	98.4	97.3
Navy (departments)					
--Navy Sardinia	94.6	95.4	100.0	100.0	94.2
--Navy Naples	88.1	87.7	76.2	83.7	85.2
--Navy Taranto (department)	96.3	96.6	96.6	90.2	95.0
Air Force (regions)					
--First Air Force region (Milan)	95.6	96.5	97.0	99.1	94.3
--Second Air Force region (Rome)	92.1	94.1	99.2	97.1	89.5
Carabinieri (divisions)					
--First division (Milan)	94.8	94.3	93.4	100.0	91.3
--Third division (Naples)	97.1	93.5	96.8	100.0	91.7
Finance Guards	95.0	97.0	95.0	99.0	--

Note: A, officers; B, noncommissioned officers; C, volunteers;
D, reserve officers; E, draftees

Table B. Finance Guards: Results of Cobar Elections, 27 March 1980

Category	Eligible Voters	Votes Cast	Percent	Elected
A officers	1,284	1,229	95	88*
B noncommissioned officers	11,256	10,927	97	91
C volunteers	32,492	31,167	95	139
D reserve officers	100	99	99	36
E draftees	50	50	100	2
Totals	45,182	43,472	96	356

* 2 generals, 18 lieutenant colonels, 18 majors, 37 captains, 13 lieutenants

CLAIMS OF UNDISCLOSED PCI FUNDS; 'L'UNITA' ATTACK

'PCI Has Secret Funds'

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 18 May 80 pp 230-235

[Article by Luigi Bisignani: "Not Roubles But Good Deeds"]

[Text] Rome--Enrico Berlinguer has always made it a point of honor: The PCI must be the party with clean hands--surely a slogan which pays dividends in an Italy buried in scandals. This is why on the morning of Sunday, 27 April, on his return from China and exhausted by a 20-hour air journey, the PCI secretary general could not even pause for breath. A few moments before meeting with journalists in Fiumicino Airport's reception lounge, a party official brought him a file containing a brief press roundup. The PCI secretary general opened it and started. The following CORRIERE DELLA SERA headline stood out at the top of the page: "Donat Cattin: PCI Has Secret Funds."

The Christian Democratic Party (DC) deputy secretary had fired point blank at the communists 2 days previously in Brescia, accusing them surprisingly of being the party with dirty hands and of spending some 100 billion lire more than appears on its official budget of almost 60 billion lire. It was one way of opening the campaign for the 8 June regional elections in an atmosphere of red-hot polemic and head-on collision.

The PCI's reply was unusual and very effective. On Sunday 4 May L'UNITA published an interview with PCI administrator Franco Antelli, a man until then jealously guarded from publicity. The next day at the Botteghe Oscure [PCI headquarters], Armando Cossutta and Alessandro Natta, flanked by the chief of staff of the PCI mayors (Luigi Petroselli, Renato Zangheri and Maurizio Valenzi) thundered to journalists: "Our accounts are clean: There is no hidden financing."

But Donat Cattin has not acknowledged defeat. In his new DC deputy secretary's office on the second floor of the old Gesu Square headquarters, he is amassing letters, documents and reports from DC sections

from half of Italy. Inflamed by the charges which the preamble [reference to DC Congress majority] man showered on the communists, the Christian Democrats from the provinces, led by the ones from Modena, are stumbling over themselves to inundate him with evidence of PCI corruption and spending.

Is their effort wasted?

With over 11 million votes, 201 deputies and 109 senators, 800,000 members, 108 federations, 20 regional committees, 12,000 sections, 2,500 local administrators, dailies, weeklies, specialized magazines, a publishing house, 17 training and study centers, a youth federation, a women's movement, an army of at least 3,000 paid staff, thousands of rallies throughout Italy and millions of posters in the streets, the PCI business officially cost in 1978 (the latest budget is for 1979) 58.961 billion lire, 16 billion of which is from the state allowance and the rest from membership fees and subscriptions.

But official party accounts do not tell the full story. Just after public party financing was introduced, financial analyst Benito Covolan pointed out that the new law had serious financial shortcomings: "The parties are not obliged to reveal their assets and liabilities. Consequently nobody can know whether they own houses, land or even company stock." This implies that all parties have the opportunity to omit from their official accounts major entries under revenue and therefore also under expenditure, without committing any offense. Nevertheless, the communist leaders maintain that their figures are transparent and speak for themselves.

However, their real estate does not appear in their budget. Jesuit Priest Angelo Perego claimed, in an essay published a few years ago titled "Doctrine and Practice of the PCI," that they owned several buildings. In Rome alone, apart from the building in Via delle Botteghe Oscure, there are the buildings at: 21 Via A. Giulio Barrili; 15.17 and 21 Via Camillo de Lellis; 57 Via Quattro Venti; 14 Via F. Sprovieri; 35 Via Giovagnoli; 33 Via Sant'Orsola; 20 Via G. Dezza; 2 Via Marcello; 243 Via Nazionale; and 20 Via A. Nibby. This constitutes a considerable fortune, especially if you bear in mind that the PCI already owns--either directly or through strawmen--in other cities the buildings which house the party schools (Frattocchie, Faggeto Lario, Reggio Emilia, Bari, Lecce, Castellammare, Cascina and Rome). This is still insignificant, however, in comparison to the colossal sums not reflected in the official accounts and which stem from two enormous private preserves.

The first--private one--consists of trade with eastern bloc countries, with a turnover which exceeded 6 trillion lire in 1979. The second, shared not too uncomfortably with the socialists, is the National Cooperatives League, with its 15,000 firms, 2.5 million members, 258,000 employees and an annual turnover of about 10 billion lire a year--about the same as the national Italian oil company's.

In 1975, when the party finance law came into effect, Berlinguer dismantled the structure which steered Italian trade with the eastern bloc, built by Togliatti and long controlled by Armando Cossutta, and transferred the party's following financial jewels to the Cooperatives League, despite many internal wrangles: four brokerage companies for trade with the eastern bloc (Rest-Ital, Italimpex, Est Europa and Rarum) which had opened the doors of the East European markets to the major Italian industries and filled the Botteghe Oscure's coffers with substantial commissions.

But can it be said that by surrendering its four brokerage companies, which it regarded as the apple of its eye, the PCI has withdrawn from business?

For one thing, its surrender of the companies was not easy and did not take place overnight. Furthermore, the PCI has continued to receive percentages not listed in the revenue columns of its accounts. One example of this is a contract signed 15 January 1976 by Rest-Ital, foreign and Italian agencies, a Milan limited company at that time managed by Enzio Gemma, one of the PCI's big shots, with the Breda shipyard (manufacturing industry holding and financial company group). This contract envisaged Rest-Ital's cooperation "for relations with bodies and organizations in the USSR aimed at promoting and securing orders from Breda." It also extended to the other communist countries and guaranteed an elastic 1 percent, "subject to adjustment either way depending on the demands of future individual negotiations."

Negotiations did indeed take place and were completed. It was Breda's supply to the USSR of ships worth over 100 billion lire which yielded the brokerage company a commission of about 2 billion lire. The first installment was paid on 15 June 1977 via the Italian Trade Bank in Mestre, with Breda's bank draft number 1453 (see insert on page 235) [insert shows Breda shipyard's draft for 107,373,860 lire payable to Rest-Ital, Milan, "Your fees on receipt of first installment for supplies to USSR"].

The PCI can rightly state that it was under no obligation to list its revenue from Rest-Ital in its budget, Rest-Ital being an entirely autonomous firm. But by the same token there is no doubt that it was a party company: this was stated explicitly by [PCI directorate member] Armando Cossutta at a meeting in Milan some years ago and is confirmed by the fact that negotiations for the firm's transfer to the Cooperatives League together with the three other import-export companies were conducted personally by [PCI directorate member] Gianni Cervetti.

When it sold its four pearls, however, the PCI was wise enough to remove their leading spirits. This is why the Cooperatives League which quietly took control of the companies, in Vincenzo Galetti's reign, and promised to pay 8 billion lire for them subsequently refused to confirm the price, in view of the protests from the socialist current ("the League is in danger of becoming the PCI's industrial participations and management company"). This dispute is still unresolved but is kept quiet for obvious reasons of political convenience.

Once the companies were closed down, operations on the exchange market with the eastern bloc were continued by business brokers who were long-time card-carrying members of the PCI. These are the big shots of Red finance, names which evoke gigantic operations such as the new legendary Piero Savoretti, managing director of Turin's NOVOSIDER and the brains behind the Agnelli-USSR marriage with the construction of the Togliattigrad plants--an investment worth hundreds of billions of lire. The difference from the past is that the communist financiers now work in the dark and act on their own behalf. This is the case with former Rest-Ital president Enzo Gemma, former Italturist president Giuseppe Stante and president of Milan's Interexpo Luigi Cemigio. All four speak perfect Russian and enjoy esteem and regard in Moscow and the other eastern bloc capitals.

The second preserve is the Cooperatives League, a body formed in 1893, suppressed by fascism and reformed during the resistance. The PCI denies any transfer of funds from the league to the party. Indeed, Guido Cappelloni, Antelli's predecessor as the communists' financial chief and now a deputy, explained a few years ago that "On one occasion, for instance, the party had to help a cooperative mill in Umbria, which was in a financial crisis." Without espousing this paradox, it is certain that the Botteghe Oscure is not lying. It fails to mention, however, the indirect benefits which the party receives from the league--benefits which are difficult to assess exactly, but which are easily intuitable. The league comprises proper companies of all kinds--industrial, commercial and financial--including some of considerable size: in the agricultural fields, Bologna's Italian Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, which boasts an annual turnover of about 400 billion lire; Ravenna's CMC (Cooperativa Muratori e Cementisti), with a 150 billion lire turnover and Reggio Emilia's CCPL (expansion unknown) with 120 billion lire; in the insurance field, Unipol, with a 130 billion lire turnover; in the trade field, the Coop Italia Consortium, with a 740 billion lire turnover; in the tourism field, Italturist, with a 20 billion lire annual turnover.

All these companies advertise in the communist press and, working in the delicate sector on tenders, can direct work to other cooperatives or companies approved by the PCI and invest in holding companies headed by strict communists (the largest of these, the Cooperatives Finance Trust, is headed by Cinzio Zambelli, a financier who has risen from the ranks and who is beginning to appear also on the boards of a number of banks).

The cooperatives also facilitate party organization at the local level. There is no other explanation for the fact that in Modena the PCI spends only 32 million lire a year on posters and yet manages to festoon the entire city, while the Christian Democrats spend 40 million lire and complain that their posters can barely be seen. The same applies to the fact that, still in Modena, the PCI spends only 405 million lire a year on its 400 peripheral sections: the fact is that many of them are housed in buildings owned by the cooperatives and pay no rent. The same applies to the L'UNITA festivals: the cooperatives' contribution to both subscriptions

and organization is in fact considered decisive. The Christian Democrats are carrying out checks on who pays the party officials' welfare contributions. It emerges that it is the cooperatives that pay them. This explains why 3,000 staff cost only 3 billion lire--that is, 1 million lire each--a year, including welfare contributions. In short, thanks to the cooperatives' services; the Botteghe Oscure makes big savings, compared to the other parties, in the fields of organization, press and the distribution and circulation of their publishing and editorial initiatives. None of this would be possible, however, unless it were based on a spirit of attachment to the party which makes voluntary service a lynchpin of PCI organization. Everyone knows that all PCI officials, from deputies and senators to journalists, allocate part of their monthly salaries to the party. The parliamentarians' contribution accounts for almost 3.5 billion lire a year, according to the party budget.

The Christian Democrats' campaign takes into account the fact that the PCI's presence on the brokerage market with the eastern bloc and the documentation of cash transfers from the Cooperatives League to the Botteghe Oscure is not easy to prove. This is why it is aiming to discredit the PCI's clean hands slogan with other methods.

The charges are still the same. The majority of contracts offered by PCI local bodies are granted to cooperative concerns or companies in some way linked with the party. They are often granted at very low prices designed to eliminate the competition but which are subsequently increased by means of revised prices following cost increases. Moreover, especially in Emilia, there are frequent cases of areas allocated for other uses which subsequently gain building approval through the use of skillful and compliant specialist studies.

But the evidence is sparse, fragmentary and isolated. At most, it can prove the corruption of the occasional official or second-rank manager, but certainly not the responsibility or involvement of the party apparatus.

For the time being Donat Cattin does not have anything very new on his desk, apart from the cases of real estate speculation repeatedly discussed at the rightwing press. And so the unedifying details of Casalecchio's Talon Park, Florence Airport and the resiting of the Galileo factory are reemerging. So too with the Modena incinerator, let out to contract in 1973 for 2.7 billion lire and still not completed, though about 8 billion lire has already been spent, and last, chronologically speaking, the Turin Communist Council's purchase of 100 locomotives at what is considered to be an excessive price.

The PCI's reaction to these charges is sharp. Communist Lower House floor leader Alessandro has thrown down the following challenge: "We are willing to undertake a dialogue on four decisive points: honesty, stability, the citizens' participation and interventions and results for better living conditions."

'L'UNITA' Charges

LD290829 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 13 May 80 p 2

[Unattributed commentary: "In Search of Moscow Gold"]

[Text] Sooner or later we will have to calculate the damage that L'ESPRESSO has done to our nation's literature; too many promising novelists have been lured away from consolidating their narrative gifts. Further evidence of this comes in the weekly's latest issue. It recounts that no sooner did Enrico Berlinguer set foot in Fiumicino Airport on his return from China than a party official handed him a file containing a press review. The PCI secretary general "opened it and started." What had happened? Some important international news? Not at all. "The head of the page prominently displayed the following CORRIERE DELLA SERA headline: 'Donat Cattin: PCI Has Secret Funds.'" And since Berlinguer has "always made a point of honor" of the party's honesty, the "PCI's response was unusual and very effective."

This is the first chapter of the novel. The old criteria of this literary genre are observed. At the start there can only be a sudden movement, a "start" from the protagonist. (It is unimportant that Donat Cattin was basically repeating entirely vague accusations and that the PCI had already replied to them at once as follows: If he is aware of any illegal activities, let him report them to the courts.)

The second chapter in the novel, however, breaks the rule of unity of time. Indeed, it recounts how "Donat-Cattin did not accept defeat." In his "new office of Christian Democratic Party [DC] deputy secretary on the second floor of the old Gesu Square headquarters, he is amassing letters, documents and reports from half the DC sections in Italy." The "Provincial Christian Democrats" are allegedly "falling over themselves to inundate him with evidence of corruption and PCI spending." This may be the case. But we hope that the novelist's intention was not to play a trick in dubious taste on the second protagonist by painting this improbable picture of him.

This suspicion is not unfounded. Because in fact when we come to the "news," it has to be admitted that there is no foreign financing of the PCI, that the PCI has no trading companies and all that can be said is that there are communist commercial operators (how shocking!) and that the PCI has relations with the Cooperatives League (what a discovery!). The conclusion is that possible cash transfers "are not easy to prove" and that it is even more difficult to document illegal activities or violations of the party finance law. So much so that "so as to discredit the PCI's clean hands slogan," the DC campaign has apparently decided to use "other arguments." But here too the "evidence" is "sparse, fragmentary and isolated: at most it can prove the corruption of the occasional second-rank official

or manager, but certainly not the responsibility or involvement of the party apparatus." This is the novel's epilogue. How difficult it is to find proof of corruption by the PCI, which after all governs in six of Italy's regions and in its major cities.

Is there, by chance, any other party necessitating such an exhausting search for evidence?

CSO: 3104

PCI BUFALINI'S EDITORIAL PAYS HOMAGE TO TITO

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 9 May 80 pp 1, 39

[Article by Paolo Bufalini: "Tito's Message"]

[Text] Homage to Tito, whether reverent and emotional, or inspired by recognition of his great merits, came to him at the time of his death from all the world's peoples and the most varied political parties. The fact that the representatives of fighters for freedom and peace, heads of state, the "big nations," gather around his bier—around the pained, proud and united people of Yugoslavia—is certainly an extraordinary event which makes everyone reflect. That is because the event is rich in historical significance and undoubtedly it constitutes today, in a period of serious and dangerous crisis for all of humanity, a solid reality, a starting point from which to move to reopen and travel the roads to peace, to justice, to emancipation and progress of all peoples.

This vast homage was directed to one who was—and this is striking if one thinks a moment—a Zagreb worker, a revolutionary, a communist (Tito was a true communist, by recognition of all, even by those who opposed him). It is addressed to a partisan, head of a long, powerful and heroic Yugoslav resistance, guide of a communist party which in his country achieved a democratic and socialist revolution and built a social and political system which, with original features and characteristics that were different from any other, is socialist. And it must also be considered that Yugoslavia is not a large country, a big power. And Yugoslavia emerged from a history beset with disruptive divisions and internal conflict, from ancient and serious backwardness in its vast regions, by devastation provoked by the Nazi and fascist invasion and by war. And it was located in the most sensitive nerve center, in the most difficult and tormented geographical and political position, of a Europe divided into two great areas of influence and into opposing blocs brought about by the cold war. This man, Tito, under these circumstances—guiding the communists and the peoples of Yugoslavia—carried out a function and acquired merits that now are being recognized.

Certainly, the almost unanimous chorus of respect and praise is joined by those who bitterly fought and even insulted Tito: Fascists, and visceral anticommunists, and various enemies of every socialist persuasion, etc. There are also those who in Italy tried to unleash foolish national hate against Tito and Yugoslavia and other political forces--beginning with the DC [Christian Democratic Party] which speculated on that nationalism in 1945 and 1946 and even later. And recently there were other forces at the time of the signing of the Osimo Treaty. And there are many today who are discovering that the border between western Europe and eastern Europe does not pass through Muggia, and that the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, the independence of Yugoslavia, are possessions that belong to all men of good will regardless of where they stand. But this increases the historical significance of the homage rendered to Tito.

The fact is that the Yugoslav communist revolutionary worker knew how to fight strenuously, with endless tenacity and consistency, with the ability of a statesman with sure intuition and great resources, achieving success for essential objectives of universal value: For the freedom and unity of the people of Yugoslavia, for the independence and full sovereignty of his country, for the emancipation of the workers from exploitation and from every form of subjection and alienation (and this quest shows above all the value of self-government), for justice and friendship among all people. Above all, Tito was the proclaimer of peace, promoter and builder of international detente, a fighter for peace.

Now, what must be recognized even by those who are not communist or do not share socialist views, is that in the path traveled by Tito and the League of Yugoslav Communists--despite some periods in a different direction (as in 1947), and even through defects and errors, contradictions, conflict, and even limitations and difficulties some of which still have not been overcome--among the objectives and values that we have recalled, there is a coherence, an organic unity. This is the most general and basic characteristic that brings Tito and the Yugoslav inspiration and experience close to that of Togliatti and of the Italian Communist Party.

Above all, there is a profound link between the Communist Party and the working class and the masses of their country, with historical traditions and national characteristics. This link is created and developed in the struggles for freedom, social justice, national independence and sovereignty, and civic progress.

This is why, the antifascist struggle and the resistance--in which the Yugoslav communist party, as in Italy, played the role of protagonist and at the same time the most coherently united force--contain the real roots of a national road to socialism.

In Yugoslavia--after the brief period referred to in which the communists showed they wanted to follow the Soviet model--from 1948 on, Tito and the

Yugoslav communists, reacting with firmness and courage, clarity of views, and despite the extreme harshness of the conditions under which they were working, condemned by the Cominform (which we Italian communists joined committing an error that Togliatti openly recognized), had the historical merit of affirming and achieving a road to and a form of socialism that was entirely original and new, defending and promoting the principle of full autonomy of every communist party in every socialist country, in respect for the Soviet Union and any other party or guide-state. This showed that even a country that was not large could take its own road to socialism without feeling that it must withdraw within itself in order to do this, but on the contrary feeling that it could and must open itself to the entire world, drawing on the worthwhile impulses that come from the most diverse situations and interpreting the profound contradictions of the present era.

Therefore, it was not by chance that Tito became the undisputed historical leader of the nonaligned nations. Awareness of Yugoslavia's international position as a crossroads between the two great contradictions of the contemporary world matured early in him: The contradiction between the East and the West, between capitalism and existing socialist systems; The contradiction between countries which, by different roads and with different characteristics, have achieved a high degree, or in any case a certain degree, of development and the nations which so far have been excluded and will continue to be excluded from development, if a shift is not made to a different use of resources (and therefore, in developed nations, a substantial change in consumption and quality of life).

Tito was able to speak to India and to Algeria, to Indonesia and to Egypt not only because he had behind him the prestige of a great warrior who had taken the lead for the liberation and independence of Yugoslavia and had known how to take his own road (self-government) to socialism, and to unite different peoples into a plurinational country. But he was also able to speak as a comrade and as the head of a people of the Third World because he made their problems his own without trying to impose solutions from the outside.

The nonaligned movement was born out of all of this. It contributed to overcoming a rigid plan (which then turned out to be inadequate and therefore subject to crises) of bipolarism, in order to integrate it with other necessary components and transform it into a new multifaceted and united order of international cooperation, based on the independence and sovereignty of every country, on development of all people and of peace, and thus advance the cause of detente. The movement of nonaligned nations was affirmed as a component and a phase of a new type of internationalism: That internationalism which even recently the PCI tried to contribute to through its own initiatives which Tito followed until his illness with great attention and interest.

Tito's universal message, which rises above all others, is that of the fighter for peace. This is closely linked to the choice of nonalignment. That choice cannot always and under every circumstance be imitated because of existing international ties and the traumatic effects that would be caused by their unilateral rupture. But it is a choice that offers precious lessons for all.

There is much discussion these days (the Christian Democratic Party discussed it recently), of the "global and indivisible" character of detente. If this means that in a world that has become increasingly smaller peace and detente in one area, like the development of tensions in another area of the world, cannot fail to influence all aspects of the international picture, we have no reason to disagree with it. But is this what the Christian Democratic Party means when it speaks of globality? Careful! The theory of globality could mean the refusal to function specifically in every case, remanding everything to the global and definitive solutions of all problems, instead of working to single out the causes of tensions and to open negotiations, even though partial, that are essential to the road to peace.

Here is the lesson of nonalignment that must be noted by Europe and by Atlantic Europe. If Tito undertook the trip to Cuba to avoid the "alignment of the nonaligned," it is necessary that Europe work to understand its own ties, and respect for agreements, not as a power delegated by a global policy of power, decided and conducted by others, but to understand them instead as coresponsibility and the search for autonomous initiative directed toward singling out the reasons for war: In a situation in which the catastrophic threat of a war has become increasingly closer and more dominant.

It is not enough to bow before Tito's corpse. It is important not to fall into the errors that he fought and to learn the messages.

The Yugoslav communists, and the Yugoslav peoples, proceed with confidence on the road marked under the guide of Tito and followed for more than 30 years. Tempered by this, even though they are faced by difficult and arduous tasks, we have no doubt that they will know how to continue to develop Tito's policy on the basis of the democratic and socialist regime of "self-government," of nonalignment, of national independence and sovereignty, and autonomy. But it is necessary that other peoples in governments, beginning with Italy, do not limit themselves to rendering homage to Tito, which we also value, but work effectively to adopt the substantial inspiration of his message: Full autonomy and initiative for a policy of detente and peace, of justice and liberation.

6034

CSO: 3104

CGIL'S LAMA ON LABOR COSTS, ABSENTEEISM, THE SOUTH

Rome AVANTI in Italian 20-21 Apr 80 pp 1, 23

[Interview with Luciano Lama, general secretary of the CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor] by Filippo Pepe: "Lama: If Anyone Gives Us an Argument, I Ask First What Side He Is On"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Labor costs, absenteeism, the South: our interview with the CGIL secretary. "There are mistaken and dangerous viewpoints within the union, but they are not and ought not to be in the majority. Whoever advocates a closed, members-only union is contributing to the breakup of society. We are opposed to false wages, which are really subsidies."

In a hypothetical trial of the unions, one of the main defendants would no doubt be Luciano Lama, the Roman communist who has been in the CGIL leadership for 10 years. The CGIL is the confederation with the most members enrolled. It seemed opportune to go and interview the CGIL general secretary, because he had to talk about the union's "mistakes" and its "sins" of omission.

[Question] The union has been reproached for following a policy that has driven labor costs higher than business's ability to pay. What do you think?

[Answer] It is not true that labor costs have exceeded business's ability to pay in the last 2 years. Or, rather, it is not true that the cost of production per unit product--which is the sole essential reference point for defining competitiveness in any industry--has increased because of labor costs. Indeed, productivity has grown more than wages in the last two years. Other costs have had a much greater effect on the cost of production. Let's get something straight: if our exports have grown so much in both 1978 and '79 despite heavy competition from the other industrialized countries, and if we have been able to sell more products even in developed countries, it means that the question is based on false premises. It is a straw man set up to draw fire to the union and attribute to it mistakes and responsibilities that belong to others.

[Question] The union is also being criticized for never having proposed concrete measures to deal with absenteeism, which is driving up the cost of labor per unit product. How do you answer that?

[Answer] Absenteeism is a fact throughout almost all the industrialized countries. It is growing even in Japan. Recently absenteeism has decreased in Italy to the general level of other countries. Nor is it true that the unions have not proposed concrete measures against this admittedly negative phenomenon. We have carried out a widespread campaign, and in certain particularly serious cases we have not opposed disciplinary measures that management felt necessary. And it has happened that judges have set aside complaints of work interrupted by prolonged and unjustified absences. The cases in question have obviously made it harder for the union to oppose unjustified work absences.

[Question] What measures is the union advocating for expanding employment in the South. Meetings have been held, strikes called, but haven't any realistic, concrete measures been proposed? Besides the Southern policy, youth employment has been a real "debacle" for the union, judging by the results. What do the confederations propose in place of the bankrupt law on youth employment? How does it plan to halt the rapid regression in the South?

[Answer] Increasing employment in the South is a top priority of the CGIL-CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions]-UIL [Italian Union of Labor] Federation. We did and do call for economic policy that concentrates the use of the country's resources in the South. It is not true that we have not made realistic proposals. The argument with big business over investment in the South, regional economic development platforms put forth by our organization in the southern provinces, indications of new sector policies for energy, transportation, electronics and agriculture demonstrate has not merely paid lip service to this problem but has sought to give realistic content to its own strategy. Some concrete results have been obtained, especially the construction of factories by big business because of the union movement's initiative and action. But it is obvious that only a general economic policy based on these priorities could yield more than modest, unsatisfactory results, and that is what we had to settle for. Any serious person considering the reconstruction of our economy plainly understands that the South's economic development, which contrasts with the spontaneous economic tendencies of the present system, cannot be achieved without a determined effort on the part of the parties in power to guide and coordinate with a clear, explicit program the behavior of social forces, and first of all those in the capital. During the "miracle," at a time when resources were abundant, development was concentrated in the North and gave rise to all the negative things we know about and did not spread to the South, and this did not happen by accident. Without planning and economic measures giving private capital new inducements and incentives for investing in the South, and without direct, massive infusion of public funds, the South will continue to fall behind, even though small zones of development may crop up here and there, which can only emphasize imbalances and inequalities worsened by the closer proximity of strident contrasts.

Also, the problem of youth employment, which is largely a Southern problem, can be solved only through a policy of planning that considers unemployed youth as an economic resource to be utilized. I don't believe in the usefulness of income assistance or para-assistance that is called wages when they are really subsidies paid to people who are not being enabled to work. This policy does in fact have many supporters, and I worry about not only the destruction of resources but also the moral consequences on young people, because a just aspiration to do real work is being destroyed, and there is being created a habitual lifestyle based on early parasitism. Youth ought to be employed in productive, socially useful labor. This brings us back to our starting point: unless there is a rational and, hence, programmed use of national resources to develop the South, there is no real hope for changing things, especially unemployed youth.

[Question] How do you think a valid image of the union can be refashioned in the 1980's? Yesterday, the union was in the opposition; today, it is being opposed by yesterday's activists.

[Answer] I do not think we have to give the union a new image in the 1980's. I rather think we ought to become more capable of adjusting our policies and the general policies of the country to the decisions made in the EUR [Universal Exposition of Rome], decisions that have been implemented as far as they concern us, but, as I have already said, they have not found the necessary correspondence in national economic policy. The difficulties we are encountering are due essentially to the inadequate results obtained in the field of employment. When somebody notes that the prescribed policy has not borne the fruit hoped for, it is easy to fall back on an illusory but concrete alternative: "Let's just look out for ourselves, us employed workers, and think about better wages and maybe a better contract and let other people look after themselves or at any rate not try to meet needs we cannot satisfy." This position is mistaken and dangerous; it exists within the union, but it is not in the majority and ought not to be. For this reason, our action should be poured increasingly into a tenacious struggle to change national economic policy by confirming the coherency of our union's actions in the light of this priority objective.

When you talk about the union crisis or division within the union, you should at least say which side you are on, whether you side with the "agitators" who are pushing for a purely corporative policy inspired by the interests of those presently employed, or whether you accept the necessity for a diverse economic policy inspired by the more general interests of the country and its development. I must say, frankly, that what I read sounds too often to me like the former rather than the latter. And whoever thinks like that, whoever cherishes the hope for union autonomism, whoever becomes the mouth-piece for corporative tendencies and fights the unifying role of the unified Federation, that person is contributing willy-nilly to the disintegration of our society. We are working to change the country and put it on the road to progress. Whoever is on the other side is also contributing to change, but for the worse.

[Question] Industry unions are showing a drop in membership. The last FILM [Federation of Metalworkers] general council showed a certain weariness within the union; 10 years of union work may go down the drain if something doesn't change. What do you think?

[Answer] The drop in membership does not affect the entire industrial sector but only a few categories, and the figures are very modest. In general, CGIL membership is growing. It grew to a total of 4,583,474 in 1979. This is the most members we have had since the 1948 breakup. I have already mentioned the union's difficulties and our need to play our part more fully as a great social force inspired by the country's need to change. We must make ourselves stronger and more able to assume a positive function in Italian society without flinching in the face of difficulty or bowing to pressures that would seem to make it turn inwards or give impetus to conservative tendencies. A great class organization need not rack its historical memory to realize that its path is strewn with obstacles and difficulties. Its very nature prevents it from giving up.

[Table follows on next page.]

8782

CSO: 3104

The Triple Union, Autonomous and Independent Workers
 Membership in the Triple union [CGIL-CISL-UIL]: raw data

year	union workers	CGIL	Pct	CISL	Pct	UIL	Pct	Total
1968	12,396,000	2,461,297	52.0	1,622,158	34.3	618,393	13.7	4,731,848
1972	12,988,000	3,214,827	51.5	2,184,729	35.0	842,912	13.5	6,242,018
1973	13,239,000	3,317,380	51.6	2,214,199	34.4	901,916	14.0	6,433,495
1974	13,620,000	3,830,175	52.7	2,472,701	34.0	965,051	13.3	7,267,927
1975	13,802,000	4,081,480	53.0	2,593,544	33.6	1,032,605	13.4	7,707,629
1976	13,955,000	4,316,699	52.4	2,809,802	34.2	1,104,888	13.4	8,245,399
1977	14,101,000	4,480,130	53.0	2,809,802	33.3	1,151,293	13.7	8,441,225
1978	14,469,000	4,427,399	52.3	2,810,000	33.2	1,216,000	14.3	8,453,399

The percentages reflect the proportion of the three central unions' membership in the Triple union.
 Source: ISTAT (Labor Statistics Annual), CGIL, CISL.

Additional figures are needed to complete the table. In 1978, the total work force was 20,263,000 (20,674,000 in 1979). The difference between the total and the number of dependent workers is made up of independent workers, which were about 1,967,000 in agriculture; 1,107,000 in industry (artisans, etc.); 2,720,000 in other activities (professions, business). In recent years several autonomous unions have also emerged with about 2 million members among them. Among the most prominent are FISAFS [expansion unknown] (railway workers), SNALS [expansion unknown] (schools), CISAS [expansion unknown] (service employees), DIRSTAT [expansion unknown] (government employees), ANPAC [expansion unknown] (pilots), and the doctors' union.

UIL'S BENVENUTO RELAUNCHES 'HISTORIC SHIFT' OF LABOR MOVEMENT

Rome AVANTI in Italian 20-21 Apr 80 pp 1, 23

[Article by Giorgio Benvenuti: "The Unions Face a Government Ready for Dialogue"]

[Text] For the first time in some years, the country is going to have a government with a parliamentary majority and a well-defined program. One of the main points of the program is the opening of a dialogue and a new relationship with the union movement. This is no small change when you consider the events of recent months and, more generally, the tendency that appeared in the time of a large majority seriously to underrate the unions' role and proposals. The affirmation of such an explicit (and, I would say, central) orientation in the new government's program is one of the most significant facts by which to gauge the new political phase that has started.

Obviously this does not involve any kind of equivalence between union and government policies, for no one overlooks the complex mediation that is always necessary to governing a country. But everyone must have serious plans and intentions. On the other hand, while it is true that the unified union is taking definite positions on some problems and making no less definite demands, it is also true that a debate has been reopened within the union. We do not hesitate to define the crisis as being a crisis of its traditional models and the prospects of recovery and development.

The new political phase that is opening will in fact coincide with an appraisal and reconsideration of the role and strategy of the union movement. There is nothing mechanical or automatic about these two facts, nor should anyone think there is any kind of acquiescence or collateralism in any part of the union movement. If a government does reopen talks with the union on the main issues of economic and social policy, the tactic should be to leave the field open to an initiative that is clearly formulated in terms of its content and purpose. And it would be good--we think, at least--if this happened before the new government commission draws up, as promised, a more general economic policy document.

The seriousness and depth of this meeting will not be helped any by the clamor over special issues that seem once again to revolve obsessively around the issue of the cost of labor, as though labor costs and the inflationary process were somehow taken for granted as a scientifically proved equivalent. Everyone will have to take his position between people and institutions, but we think there is only one way to avoid darkening this will to dialogue between the government and the social parties: give this dialogue a precise method and format. These are not nominalistic objections on our part, especially because we know that defensive and sometimes foolish decisions will be made.

The equation most important to us is the one tying the policy of recovery to that of economic development. This is not a new position, at least as far as we are concerned. We have always thought stabilization policies are necessary and sensible if administered and oriented toward growth, and we are aware that we have, in fact, often failed to match this orientation with adequate political demands. We well know that in the past the clever exponents of the "party of inflation" have maneuvered brilliantly in the wake of these contradictions.

But that is due to both the limited objectives of union action and the corporativization of economic policy, which has been the real consequence of these years of non-government. This is a danger that we have always warned against and seen emerge in the neoliberalist "revival" of Confindustria. We think of how they wanted to abandon small and medium industry, the crisis of the large industrial groups, of the deterioration of the productive fabric and the impoverishment of entrepreneurship in government participating agencies.

The corporativization of economic policy has also postponed in recent years any proposal for serious action on incomes and parasitism, on which social forces could and should have concentrated their energies; in all their different aspects, these forces cannot fail to be interested in the growth of industrial culture in our country. Along with the EUR [labor union headquarters] we have understood some of these truths but have not been able to take the initiative in responding to them to the extent and with the vigor we knew were necessary. Now we are faced with an even worse situation; we cannot pull aside, and we must assume our responsibilities.

We expect the government to be up to meeting this test. The debate and analysis of this crisis are not brand new, nor can anyone ignore them. On the issue of restructuring financial and productive recovery, common attitudes have grown up in recent years among the democratic forces, and there is even a law, though limited, that can be used effectively for true reform. Naturally it depends on the willingness of the new government whether it is possible to take a step forward; it also depends on the unions' not dragging their feet in making choices for which they will need courage and consistency. On the question of public function, the Giannini report offers a truly valuable starting point for discussing the reform of public administration.

A lot has been done in the area of taxes, but a lot can still be done to further social justice and achieve the principles of the correct use of a fundamental lever of economic policy.

In the background, the issue of income distribution should begin to be measured seriously, with planning decisions that the government should carry out diligently and foresightedly. Between these two poles lie the solutions to the great problems such as unemployment, the South, pensions, etc., on which rivers of words continue to run without seeming to be channeled by the river banks of good faith. Everybody pays lip service to objectives, but when it comes time to act, resistance hardens. To meet the test and challenge, the unions must have the courage to give consistency and teeth to its action. For this reason we insist that the unified Federation's proposal must be given more amplitude and not left static, which is what might happen to it under the logic of mediation at the top.

8782

CSO: 3104

EUROCOMMUNISTS, MOSCOW-ORIENTED COMMUNISTS WILL MEET IN BRUSSELS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 23 May 80 p 4

[Article: "Communists Undivided Go to Brussels"]

[Text] Rotterdam, 23 May -- Representatives of the Eurocommunist and Moscow-oriented communist parties from Western Europe will meet at a conference in Brussels, later this year.

This was announced yesterday by a spokesman for the Belgian Communist Party [KPB].

The initiative for such a meeting, which is characterized as an "exchange of opinions" on "the economic crisis in the capitalist countries" and on European integration, was taken at a meeting which was held in Copenhagen on 8 May last, and in which representatives of the parties of France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece and Belgium participated.

According to the KPB spokesman, there is no connection between the initiative for the conference in Brussels and the meeting of parties from Western and Eastern Europe, which was held in Paris last month. A number of parties, among which those from Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, boycotted the Paris summit. They were afraid of a return to the hegemony of Moscow over the communist movement, as it existed during the fifties.

The Belgian Communist Party sent observers to Paris, who expressed their objections to the meeting. The Netherlands CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands], which did not attend the Paris meeting at all, has not yet received an invitation to the meeting in Brussels. However, this morning a spokesman for the party did not see any major objections to Dutch participation.

The Russian party newspaper PRAVDA this morning contained an attack on the parties which boycotted the conference in Paris. Commentator I. Alexandrov accused the parties which stayed away of "setting the communist parties of the socialist and capitalist countries against each other" and of "not contributing to putting an end to the arms race." The thrust of the article

is that the parties in Western Europe must also support the foreign policy of the Soviet Union: "There is no third way for the representatives of the communist movement."

A representative of the Hungarian Communist Party, which is loyal to Moscow, denied last week that the Soviet party wants to reestablish Moscow as the center of European communism. "There is no center in the international communist movement; there is no need for a center," wrote Janos Berecz, head of the party's department of international affairs.

However, said the Hungarian, the principle of "democratic centralism" should be maintained within the international communist movement and the minority of the parties must accept the wish of the majority.

8463

CSO: 3105

DUTCH, HUNGARIAN COMMUNISTS DISCUSS POLITICAL, SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Brussels DE RODE VAAN in Dutch 15-22 May 80 p 20

[Report on meeting of Hungarian and Dutch communists in Amsterdam: "The Disadvantages of the One Party System"]

[Text] A study meeting on democracy and socialism was held recently in the Apollo Hotel in Amsterdam, organized by the scientific study bureau of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (IPSO [Institute for Political and Social Research]) and by the Institute for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Representatives from both institutes and co-workers from the universities of Budapest and Amsterdam contributed to an extremely interesting exchange of views. The foreign affairs editors of DE WAARHEID prepared the following report.

The round table discussion was introduced by IPSO President Jaap Wolff and by Sandor Lakos, director of the Hungarian institute. Spread over a period of 2 days, 4 themes were successively discussed: the meaning of the concept of democracy, democracy within the state and within the economy, variety of forms under various circumstances, and democracy and party democracy.

A full report will be prepared later by IPSO, but based on a first glance it could be said that a large part of the discussions centered on the disadvantages of the one party system and the variants on this which exist in Eastern Europe.

Concept of 'Democracy'

An important point of discussion was first of all whether democracy also represents a "value in and of itself," or whether it is significant only in terms of the class relationships of the relevant political system.

The IPSO representatives clearly chose the first position. For this reason, preference was also given not to "civil democracy" and "socialist democracy," but rather to "democracy under capitalist relationships" and "democracy under socialist relationships."

Even though this terminology was not used by the Hungarian speakers, it appeared that their interpretations went quite a way in the same direction.

Even in a socialist society, there will always be a question of pluralistic interests and they will have to strive for a political system which reflects these interests. The elimination of the postwar multiple party system is a matter about which large questions are currently being raised in Hungary. However, it is not possible to turn back the film of history and simply to start over again.

They are looking for new forms. Another question being considered is how the party, whose "leading role" is constitutionally determined, will further develop.

What was further explained on this subject on the Hungarian side, was the fact that in Hungary the party is developing more and more as a kind of "center of society." The various, often opposite, social interests are reflected within the party. They are also organized there, because representatives of the various interests are seated in all bodies of the party. The struggle with regard to weighing the various interests and the choice of possibilities takes place within the party.

A second development which is consciously being promoted is for all kinds of interest organizations (unions, farmers organizations, etcetera) to become more and more autonomous. To act more and more as "parties."

Unfinished Process

All this raised the question of whether the communist party is in the process of becoming more and more "state" and less and less political party, while the interest organizations are beginning to look increasingly like political parties and may possibly, in the future, be referred to as such.

The answers showed that none of this is an established fact yet. On the one hand there are tendencies toward a further blending of party and state, and on the other hand there is a striving to produce a separation between the party and the work of governing.

"It is an unfinished process. For the time being, we are trying to function as if we had a multiple party system, with freedom of opinion and conflicts of opinion and as democratic a system of decision making as possible," this is, in short, approximately the Hungarian viewpoint.

On the Dutch side, the conclusion was reached that the one party system has certainly proven its disadvantages. Events, such as those in 1956 (Hungary) and 1970 (Poland), have shown that for lack of normal opportunities for expression and structures for democratic change, from time to time enormous crises develop whereby changes are achieved solely through real explosions.

In the production process it has also been proven that a lack of democracy causes large scale indifference and passivity. This is actually one of the major stumbling blocks in the laborious striving for increased productivity in the socialist countries. What is taking place in Hungary is an attempt to draw out as much as possible the disadvantages of the one party system.

A great deal of discussion during the round table debate centered on the question of what is political and what is not political. Numerous problems, which are considered "political problems" in a country like the Netherlands (whether or not to have nuclear energy, housing for youth, emancipation of women, etcetera), were primarily handled as "technical" questions by the Hungarian discussion partners.

Feminism

This came rather clearly to the fore during the discussion on the position of women. On the Dutch side it was argued that up to now, socialism in Eastern Europe has not yet led to the liberation of women. The double standard for women still exists, even if a great deal has been done to make this more bearable.

Democracy should include the possibility for the expression of real differences, and this also includes sex differences. First of all, these differences must be recognized and this will necessitate an autonomous women's movement.

On the Hungarian side, they argued against this saying that the Communist Party in Hungary fights against culturally backward opinions -- also in man-woman relationships -- but that it does not see the problem of women as a separate problem within socialism.

Unfortunately, there was not enough time for an even more detailed discussion of these problems, including the relationship between Marxism and feminism.

This does not, however, alter the fact that even on this question the debate was enlightening and that the round table discussion was a large success, which certainly calls for a continuation.

8463
CSO: 3105

CHU LEADERSHIP SUPPORTS VAN AGT CANDIDACY

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 12 May 80 p 3

[Article: "CHU Leaders Support Candidacy of Van Agt"]

[Text] Rotterdam, 11 May -- The Party leadership of the Christian Historical Union [CHU] agrees with the candidacy of Prime Minister Van Agt as list head of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] for next year's elections.

At the Union council meeting of the CHU, which was held Saturday in Rotterdam, President L.M. van Leeuwen and Professor J.W. van Hult, parliamentary party president of the CDA, expressed their approval of Van Agt as list head.

President Van Leeuwen said that he had received the announcement of Van Agt's candidacy "with great pleasure." "It is a compliment for the CDA and for Dutch politics that Van Agt is willing once again to become a candidate for list head of our CDA," said the CHU president. Professor Van Hult said -- amid applause from the Union council -- that he is "very appreciative of the fact that Van Agt has made himself available again."

The parliamentary party leader of the CDA in the Senate also supported Van Agt's statement about possible government cooperation with the VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]. Without wishing to make administration policy the stake of the elections, he said that the CDA must not act "as if cooperation with the VVD is incidental."

Van Hult said that he finds cooperation with the Labor Party acceptable only under "sharply defined circumstances." Only last week, AR [Antirevolutionary Party] Minister J. de Koning said that he was in favor of cooperation with the Labor Party.

According to him, an administration with the socialists would have broader support. He also said that it should not be expected that the rank and file of the AR are more attached to a coalition with the VVD than with the Labor Party.

8463

CSO: 3105

DUTCH CONSIDER RECOLONIALIZATION OF NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 19 Apr 80 pp 50-52

[Article by Peter van der Schaft: "Should Antilles Become a Colony Again?"]

[Text] It is very likely that the Netherlands must revert to colonial measures in the Netherlands Antilles. There have been requests for a government commissioner for St. Maarten. The report of the Bakhuis commission, set up by the state government in Willemstad, gives a damning opinion on the government of this island. The Dutch parliamentary delegation which recently visited St. Maarten is hardly any more discriminating in its pronouncements. ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE went to St. Maarten for its own opinion.

St. Maarten, Monday--After discussions with the "viceroy of St. Maarten" Claude Wathey, accused in the report of the Bakhuis commission, and the leader of the growing opposition, Vance James, a temporary conclusion can be drawn: St. Maarten is being governed like a business which hasn't existed very long and which is experiencing a very rapid expansion. In such a company one looks primarily for results; procedures are worried about afterward. In that growth, serious mistakes have sometimes been made; the system of democratic rules of the game, modelled after the Dutch system, sometimes has thus gotten into tight straits. Also in the ruling Democratic Party of Claude Wathey, who is being blamed for all the bad conditions, it is recognized that things must finally be put in order.

The latter is extremely necessary. One of the conclusions of the Bakhuis commission is "that the governing apparatus in St. Maarten is not functioning properly." Causes: "The lack of an effective opposition and lack of (good) organization. The report states: "One (can) speak of continued financial mismanagement and improper government." Thus "public moneys and goods have been criminally abused for too long." The Bakhuis commission quotes 11 examples which supposedly show the mismanagement and abuse: unlawful enrichment of individuals (sometimes civil servants) at the expense of the community, and patronage. The samples the commission enumerates are perplexing to the Dutch mind, but a lot more examples ought to be found, according to rumors in St. Maarten.

The man in power, Claude Wathey, agrees that wholeheartedly: "That is precisely my objection to the report of the Bakhuis commission. Through the choice of errors which have been made, and which I don't deny, the report has acquired a political character. The members of the commission have let themselves be tempted to quote cases which are connected with my Democratic Party in one way or another, while other cases were not considered, including those in which relatives of the commission members are involved. Therefore I do not wish to defend myself against the accusations mentioned in the report. The report has been drawn up by the state government in Curaçao with political objectives. Although it had been ready for quite a while, publication was delayed until the elections in order thus to benefit the opposition."

Wathey, who was elected deputy (comparable to alderman) during the island council elections in 1979, does not exclude the possibility of errors having been made, but then only administrative and procedural errors. "We are a small island and have developed tourism without Curaçao's support. We have had to do everything ourselves. Curaçao was a hindrance rather than a support. In a period of 10 years we have been able to bring the island to great economic prosperity (which is also recognized by the Bakhuis commission); we've had to work hard for that. And from chipping come chips, as you say in the Netherlands. But there is no question of criminality. As a result of the report, two detectives came from Curaçao in order to investigate. In the findings, the public prosecutor has seen no cause for prosecution."

The administrative organization is a chaos. That is not only the finding of the Bakhuis commission, but of everyone on the island. Civil servants who do not come to work and still get their salary; even the case of a civil servant who had died quite a long time ago, but whose salary was faithfully cashed by relatives. The civil servants who do work don't do so in a very effective manner in general. The causes? According to Claude Wathey, an insufficient level of training and experience of the civil servants. The Bakhuis commission and Opposition Leader Vance James agree with that, but add to it: patronage, the typical Latin-American system of giving jobs to relations in order to buy votes through that.

Wathey doesn't deny that the system of patronage exists: "No one minds helping a good relation with an appointment; the SPM [Socialistic Peoples Movement] (the opposition party) does that too. SPM Leader Vance James: "Now, how can an opposition party appoint people to jobs? The biggest problem in patronage, however, is that insufficiently qualified people are appointed to too difficult posts, often in supervisory capacities. That has a demoralizing effect on the other civil servants and decreases the quality of the performance of the civil servant machinery."

Business people who are used to thinking in terms of administrative organization in the Western World encounter problems in St. Maarten. Wathey indeed seems to play a key role. ELSEVIER was told in various ways "If you

want something settled, you have to go to the pier early in the morning or late in the afternoon and talk with Claude." Deputy Wathey can indeed be found on a terrace on the pier in the capital, Philipsburg, practically every day. There he "holds office" for everyone. After many futile contacts with the administrative office, ELSEVIER also finally found Wathey on the pier. During the discussion, the neat gentlemen in suits were obvious among the tourists: they were waiting for Claude. It is extremely frustrating for sympathetic civil servants; it is crippling to the effectiveness of an official organization; it is a fast and effective way for business or for just anyone who simply wants to put a problem before "Claude." Deputy Claude Wathey indeed works in the manner of the authoritarian, autocratic businessman: short lines of communication, little consultation, rapid decisions: the profile of the director of St. Maarten, Ltd.

"It's the only way to do it," says Wathey; "if you don't make quick decisions with investors, they disappear immediately and invest their money elsewhere. In our area there are other islands with sun and beautiful beaches bordered by palm trees. Investors are not waiting for St. Maarten, but we are waiting for them. We need them; they bring prosperity to the people of St. Maarten."

The development of tourism has put Wathey in the right, at least on this point. The Caribbean Hotel Association speaks with appreciation of the accommodations and the facilities, which increase in step with tourist visits, about 12 percent per year.

The composers of the Bakhuis report note, not without envy, that St. Maarten has experienced the most rapid development of all the Dutch Antilles (the composers are all from Curaçao, where tourism has come to a dead end since the Willemstad riots). Wathey however does appear to go along with the conclusion of the commission that the development has led to an overheated economy. He says: "Perhaps it has all gone too fast. Now we will stop further development. We now have almost 2000 hotel rooms and apartments. We will complete the plans we have approved. Afterward we'll have to start consolidating." That sounds nice, but according to calculations of the Caribbean Hotel Association that means yet another 1439 rooms and apartments. Of those, the Dutch Westermeyer Group takes over 1000 units for its account.

It is remarkable that Wathey's critics also appreciate his energy and his devotion to the island. A Dutch crane operator, working on one of the hotel construction projects, vented his wrath at length on "conditions which would not occur in the Netherlands." He ended his tirade with: "But if Wathey were forced to leave, all of St. Maarten would collapse."

Similar words also come from opposition circles. Netherlanders, who in general vote more for the SPM, say: "He is everywhere. During the hurricane you saw Claude on the spot, while Vance James stayed behind his

microphone." Vance James himself, a businessman and director of one of the radio stations besides being the opposition leader: "The population talks about Claude. He is the political father figure who settles everything. When you have problems, you go to Claude; he'll settle it. It is the basis of patronage."

The lack of an effective opposition is one of the causes of the problems according to the Bakhuis commission. Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao each has its own island council (comparable to a municipal council). Because the three windward islands: St. Maarten, Saba and St. Eustatius are too small, these have a joint island council with 15 members, 5 for each of the islands. In the framework of decentralization, each of the islands has a branch within the island council which meets and makes decisions separately.

During the island council elections of 1979 the opposition formed a block of 10 seats altogether: the SPM with two seats in St. Maarten, the WIPM [Windward Islands Political Movement] with five on Saba and three on St. Eustatius. Thus the DP [Democratic Party] with three seats in St. Maarten and two seats in St. Eustatius apparently forms a minority. Apparently, since the really important decisions are made in the branch meetings. Wathey's DP has three seats in St. Maarten and Vance's SPM has two. The Bakhuis commission has advised the state government in Curaçao to change the island council arrangement in such a way that the (minority) opposition is in a better position to exercise its rights and to demand public meetings (now the majority is needed for that).

The SPM is a new phenomenon on the political horizon of St. Maarten. Its origin in 1979 shows parallels with D'66 [Democrats '66]: a small group of dissatisfied intellectuals who for quite a while had been thinking that things could be different, first as a debating club and in 1978 -- with the elections at hand -- as a real political party. Promptly 34 percent of the votes were acquired. According to Vance James those came primarily from people who worked outside of St. Maarten for a while . . . "and know how things can be done."

But with 34 percent of the votes the SPM still has a minority in the branch of the island council. Vance James' feeling of powerlessness is compensated for by a certain optimism: "There are more and more educated St. Maarten people who see that things can no longer go on like this and know that things can be done differently. We must show the state government in Curaçao and the Netherlands that we ourselves are capable of putting things in order. If that isn't done, then perhaps there should be a Dutch government commissioner. I don't exclude that possibility."

The sending of a government commissioner hangs as a threat over the relations between the Netherlands and the Antilles. Prime Minister Don Martina has rejected it in advance. The parliamentary delegation also, although sanctions were not excluded. PvdA [Labor Party] Delegation Member Knol wanted to block all development moneys for St. Maarten. That

punishment was answered with a smile by Claude Wathey: "We don't see much of that development money anyway. The projects for which we need the money get hung up in Willemstad."

Something has to happen; everyone agrees on that. But what? Claude Wathey is against a government commissioner: "Then we will have difficulties." He wants a new commission of investigation "not composed of Curaçao people, but of Dutch experts." This commission must repeat the work of the Bakhuis commission ("but then without ulterior political motives") and give a clear picture of where the shoe pinches. On the basis of the results of that investigation, he wants an adapted program for technical aid, especially in an administrative and organizational respect, in order to set the administrative apparatus on its feet with the aid of Dutch specialists.

However, whether there is interest in Willemstad in Wathey's suggestions, which are in fact directed against the Curaçao supremacy, is a good question.

In the coming weeks the Antilles parliament will have to study the situation in St. Maarten. The developments are closely followed in the [Dutch] second chamber. CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] specialist Piet van Zeil, the leader of the parliamentary delegation, puts the Antilles legislature under pressure: "If nothing has been done within a year, the chamber will insist on a government commissioner."

Will the Netherlands then get a real colony again? It is to be hoped that this desperate remedy is not needed. Reserve and relativization are essential on the Dutch side. In Latin America things happen to be completely different from what we are used to in the Netherlands.

8700
CSO: 3105

LIBERAL CONGRESS APPROVES PROGRAM, ELECTS LEADERS

'Greens' Look to Party

Oslo Aftenposten in Norwegian 26 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Einar Solvoll]

[Text] At around noon today, 250 members of the Liberal Party will be gathering at Gjevik in an apparently peaceful congress, which will last for more than 28 hours, including tonight's banquet and the night's sleep. It is unlike the old days of the Liberal Party, with congresses as if taken out of an Icelandic family saga [translator's note: the Sagas of Icelanders were written in the 13th century about Icelandic and Norwegian family feuds of the 9th and 10th centuries] in which everybody would be asking: "Who will be the next one?" But, then, even the Liberal Party has changed quite a lot since then.

From being the sanctuary of liberals, in which all those would gather together who would not vote for the socialists, nor for the conservatives, the party today is composed of voters and workers' representatives who are against certain aspects of the development, such as the Alta expansion, drilling in the north, prospecting and planning of energy-consuming ventures, etc. It is the 'Green Wave' or the 'Anti-Green Line' as it is now being called, which is allowed to prevail. One has put good old-fashioned village romanticism on paper, and, in between, one talks about a balanced economy and the 'triangle in Norwegian politics'--a philosophy which even the leaders admit has not caught on as well, even among their own members, as they first thought it would.

The membership is between 12,000 and 13,000, distributed on 350 local party groups. But, on the parliamentary level, the party has only two members--they are the party chairman and the parliamentary leader Hans Hammond Rosebach and Odd Einar Dørum--both with roots in central Norway.

The parliamentary leader especially has a strong sense of drama, created by the situation itself--into which the Liberals inadvertently arrive each time the Socialist Left Party refuses to support the Labor Party, and the non-socialist parties do not want to do it either. The Liberal Party is no 'bourgeois' party, they themselves maintain. They want to be called non-socialist and would like to cooperate with the center parties. Such an invitation to cooperate last year received positive support from the then New People's Party, while the Christian People's Party and the Center Party replied that the cooperation should rather take place on political issues in the Storting.

If we go back to the last time that the Liberal Party was gathered for a congress at Gjevik, this was 20 years ago. At the time, they had the big conflict on 'unification in the center.' After a prolonged debate, the Bent Reiselund fraction won with 104 votes against 83 votes on a proposal to work for a coalition government between the Liberal Party, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party. The minority, led by Helge Seip, advocated that this question be postponed until after the Storting election the following year--in 1961, when the Labor Party lost its clear majority, and the Socialist People's Party entered the arena.

Much has happened since then.

Against Civil Disobedience

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Einar Solvoll]

[Text] The Liberals warn against civil disobedience becoming a general form of activism on the part of groups which are in a position to advance their viewpoints through normal political channels, it says in a resolution which was adopted unanimously by the Liberal Party congress at Gjevik during the weekend. The congress, moreover, stressed that the basis for a democratic form of government is respect for majority decisions. But a majority which does not respect the right of existence of the minority does not belong in a democracy. The chairman trio, headed by Hans Hammond Rossbach, was re-elected unanimously. Some interest has started making itself felt in a few districts for a renewal of the leadership.

There was not much evidence of this interest in a renewal of the leadership at the congress, where the party chairman and the two deputy chairmen, Torstein Slungård and Berit Kveven, were re-elected unanimously. But the discussion on the question of leadership has been going on within the party for some time, also in several meetings of the election committee. It is the two deputy chairmen who are regarded as the most controversial ones in some quarters, not least among the younger ones who want leaders with initiative and vigor who can represent the Liberal Party as a more versatile

party. But at the congress, no alternative candidates were promoted.

The former leader of Young Liberals, Olav Ljøene, pointed out during the debate that the Liberals need a better leadership. This question may become topical once more already when the newly elected national leadership will have to elect its central party leadership in a short time--and, under any circumstances, there is reason to believe that the question will be reopened in connection with next year's congress in 1982.

The party chairman, Hans Hammond Rossbach, in his after-dinner speech after the banquet of the congress on Saturday night, drew attention to the fact that such a large number of party leaders have withdrawn, and that it puts a certain amount of strain on a person to be chairman of a political party.

In addition to the chairman trio, the following people were elected to national committee: Odd Einar Dørum, Viking Mestad, Kari Bjerke Andersen, Håkon M Pettersen, Kari Mørkved Romstad, Kari Mette Aaseth, Helge Hveen and Åshild Skulstad.

Several speakers dealt with the abortion issue, and Elisabeth Kolarud from Åkerhus received heavy applause when she stated that she advocated keeping the present abortion law during the next Storting period. Observers are of the opinion that the majority of Liberals today go in for abortion by choice, but the Liberals as a party want a year to think about it before deciding on the party's official position on the matter.

The congress unanimously adopted a resolution demanding a lower pace of oil production than proposed by the government. For this purpose, the Liberals are of the opinion that drilling north of the 62° parallel must be postponed, and that the production south of the 62° parallel must not be stepped up.

In a resolution on the housing policy, it says that Husbanken [the Home Bank] must be provided with funds in addition to those proposed in the government's economic program. The Liberals demand that the government at the earliest possible date present a housing policy program for the eighties.

Environmental and energy policy issues occupied the minds of most of those who participated in the debate at the congress, and the big 'scapegoat' was Oil and Energy Minister Bjartmar Gjerde. Also the Labor Party was subject to strong criticism on the part of many speakers on account of the energy policy.

Young Liberals criticized the parent party, among other things, on the school policy issue. One of the youth delegates said that even if the Liberal Party for the most part is composed of teachers, they have not managed to bring about a decent school policy. Party chairman Hans

Hammond Rosabach was criticized for his statement that students ought to choose for themselves whether they want to continue their schooling or start working. "We make enormous fools of ourselves when we appear at the schools and the students ask us what the Liberals think of the grading system in schools, and we have not got an answer," Hege Berg Nilsen said.

The environmental protection prize for 1980 of the Liberal Party was awarded to Architect Berent A. Moe. He was given the prize for 25 years of work to preserve old, traditional buildings and construction traditions in urban and rural environments. This includes, among other things, old buildings in Serlandet [translator's note: area along south coast and immediate inland districts].

Sidestepped on Abortion, Coalition

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Apr 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The congress of the Liberal Party felt a need to formulate its position on civil disobedience. Forces within the party are in extremely strong sympathy with the actionists at Alta, but it never came to any extensive debate. As far as we understand, it occurred behind the closed doors of the resolution committee. They then emerged with a resolution, the text of which conveyed something between a rejection of, and an expression of indifference to, actions which aim at preventing the implementation of measures legally adopted in political organs. Instead of embarking on any further interpretation, we shall here quote the delegate from Alta who got up on the speaker's platform to announce that he did not understand the text of the resolution.

On the whole, the congress became highly marked by a balancing act, or to put it more precisely: unpleasant questions and difficult issues remained largely untouched in the basket for incoming mail. Important questions in connection with the industrial policy, free trade and administration with new technology--which, supposedly, would belong among issues close to one's heart--the defense policy, the grading system in schools, abortion, co-operation among non-socialist parties. All of this and much more remained unresolved, despite strong wishes among the regular participants in the meeting.

The 'green' profile of the Liberal Party has had a certain power of attraction, not least among the younger groups of voters. It now seems, however, as if the enthusiasm is waning. They want the party to go a step further, beyond the point which consists in giving pro-environment testimony and taking a pro-resource stand on individual issues in specific areas. But the leadership in charge apparently is of the opinion that it is time to widen the engagement. One feels tempted to use an exclamation mark in brackets when the same leadership announces that the party is far too responsible to take a number of standpoints without sufficient background knowledge.

The political debate thus did not become especially rich in perspectives. What one will remember from this year's Gjevik meeting will possibly be some rather toothless compromise and some primitive form of scolding of Oil and Energy Minister Bjartmar Gjerde.

A few, but probably not many, Liberals would like to see some form of cooperation with the Labor Party, if the unhappy situation should arise that the Liberals would get into some kind of touch and go situation after the next election. There are not many people either who would dream of participating in a broad non-socialist government cooperation. A majority will probably be in sympathy with some form of center cooperation, even if, deep down, one would be realistic enough to appreciate that this is not logical in a government context. But one problem is that the other center parties want a considerably more restrictive abortion law than the one in force today. The feelings within the Liberal Party are definitely in the opposite direction. The congress of this year thus chose the simplest solution--to disregard both abortion and non-socialist cooperation issues. But, to the Liberal Party, it might become fateful if these and other vital questions are not soon clarified.

7:62

CSO: 3108

PCOE'S LISTER COMMENTS ON EUROCOMMUNISM'S FUTURE

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 11 May 80 p 71

[Interview with PCOE leader Enrique Lister in Madrid, by Gianni Corbi; date not given]

[Text] An unwritten rule governs relations between the Soviet Union and the constellation of small and large communist parties which gravitate around it in various ways. At a time when detente is predominant, the controversy of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] with communist parties which do not follow its orthodoxy to the letter is diminishing, tending to disappear and be camouflaged.

After America's rapprochement with China and especially after Afghanistan, the CPSU closed ranks (the Paris conference of communist parties is an example), and its appeal is answered by intellectuals and leaders who openly declare their solidarity with the USSR and their disagreement with the policy followed by the Eurocommunists. Thus, we see Nikis Theodorakis and Gabriel Garcia Marquez express attitudes of confidence in Brezhnev's anti-imperialist strategy. And in Italy we also see an influential former PCI leader like Giulio Carreto declare to UNITA that he considers the decision not to participate in the Paris meeting a mistake, or like Armando Cossuto who indicates that, if the PCI should break with Moscow, it might turn out to be "a pure and simple scission."

In Madrid we met Enrique Lister, one of the most prestigious heads of veteran communism, leader of a party (PCOE--Spanish Workers Communist Party) notoriously linked with a thousand threads to the USSR's policy. Enrique Lister, the most famous commander of the Spanish Civil War, does not deny this attachment in the least.

Question: What do you think of Berlinguer's trip to China and his meetings with Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng?

Answer: This trip does not astonish me in the least. An opportunist always tries to meet and come to an understanding with another opportunist.

Berlinguer is well aware that the Chinese pursue a policy of extreme nationalism and that, for them, there is no greater enemy than the USSR. It therefore follows that Berlinguer's and Pajetta's visit has a sickening anti-Soviet content and one of support for the nationalism of the Chinese leaders.

Question: In your opinion, would the CPSU do well to facilitate a change in the PCI's and PCE's directorates?

Answer: With regard to Spain, it will not be the CPSU which will overthrow the current PCE leaders. It is we who shall do that. The truth is that, all things considered, the Soviets are helping Carrillo. And that is regrettable.

Question: And yet, one week the Russian newspapers attack Carrillo, the next week not.

Answer: Sometimes, it is true. But who sees Gromyko when he comes to Madrid? Carrillo; certainly not I.

Question: With regard to the controversy between Marchais and Berlinguer, what is your thought? Who is right and who is wrong?

Answer: Marchais is certainly right. Berlinguer must deal with an inter-class electorate; he no longer believes in struggle but rather in conciliation among the classes. On the other hand, Marchais has a proletarian foundation and is continuing to think that only the path of revolution can change French society. These are two opposing lines, not likely to come to an agreement.

Question: But even Marchais has harshly criticized the USSR for its repressive policy toward dissidents.

Answer: Men are men; they have their failings. Then too, let us not forget that Marchais was one of the fathers of Eurocommunism. He has now acknowledged some of his mistakes and, especially, the contention that the leftist union has no future.

Question: It is useless to ask you what you think of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. You will not question the need to occupy Kabul.

Answer: Go ahead and ask me. As a matter of fact, like all true communists, I think that the Soviet Union, intervening in Afghanistan, did nothing more than its international duty. The first country which broke with imperialism and began to construct a socialist society could not do otherwise. To have done otherwise would have been to betray the essence of Leninism.

Question: In your opinion then, Berlinguer is not a communist?

Answer: It is certain that he is not. With him at the PCI's helm, socialism will never be achieved in Italy; or else, a caricature of socialism will be constructed. Berlinguer does not realize that the USSR's aid to Afghanistan is part of the class struggle on the international level. He does not understand that a planetary clash is underway between those who believe in socialism and those who want to perpetuate capitalism. This is the crux of the problem.

Question: Your party, aided and some say invented by the USSR, has had very little success in Spain.

Answer: These aids are imaginary. On the personal level relations with socialist countries are excellent; on the strictly official level they are almost nonexistent. However, I have just returned from a trip to Czechoslovakia where I was received with all honors. I could also have the pension of a Soviet army general (and also that of the Polish and Yugoslav armies), but I did not want them.

Question: Does the PCE have a future?

Answer: None at all. Paradoxically, I could add that there is no PCE; we have only the initials. This explains the proliferation of small parties with communist initials (there are 20 to 25 of them). This is Carrillo's work.

Question: How do you then explain that the PCE obtains 10 percent of the Spanish votes?

Answer: Through payment, through propaganda, through continuously winking at the government, the king, the socialists.

Question: But even the workers follow Carrillo. The labor committees, for example.

Answer: This is true to some extent. But the committees have lost the revolutionary prestige they once had. And now, many are beginning to consider them a kind of company union. The working class, true communists, are opening their eyes.

Thus, it is becoming clearer. An elementary and Manichean vision, the 1950's. And yet, there is every indication that Lister's position is no longer so isolated, antediluvian and strange as it might have appeared only a few months ago. Now that Brezhnev's followers throughout the world are being asked to show unconditional solidarity with the USSR, Enrique Lister's words are taking on a significance which is being attentively weighed.

8568

CSO: 3104

TROUBLES CONFRONT TURK-IS IN WAKE OF THY SETTLEMENT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 May 80 p 6

[Article by Ozer Ora]

[Text] The job action at Turkish Airlines (THY), which idled 6,000 workers for almost 3 months and involved both a strike and a lockout, has reached its end with what, from the standpoint of the union, is a "forced agreement."

The wage increases and rights obtained in the new contract did not satisfy the great majority of the workers, and a portion of them reacted strongly against it.

The workers, members of Hava-Is [Turkish Civil Aviation Workers Union] who had obtained large wage increases and increased rights after a strike of only a few days during the preceding period, had at first not even considered the possibility that, following a strike and lockout which lasted almost three months, monetary increases of only a little over half of what they had demanded would be accepted, and that rights already adopted in general principle would be foregone.

However, the chain of events which took place during THY's collective bargaining and the strike and lockout which followed gave a clue to the great difficulties which the Turkish working class — and, in particular, the unions affiliated with Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] — will face from the economic model currently being implemented.

The dimensions of the matter and of the struggle involved have surpassed the level of Hava-Is and become a problem for the Turk-Is leadership.

Turk-Is, with a million and a half members, is a confederation that has organized and developed primarily within the state sector. The unions

and federations in almost all the various enterprises of the state sector, from maritime transport to air and railroad transport, are members of Turk-Is.

As a result of this structure, the top leaders of Turk-Is have generally avoided harsh conflicts with the governments in power and, with the policies which they have followed, have enabled their member-unions to reach satisfactory agreements within the state sector.

But, as a result of the most recent economic model which the Demirel government has been attempting to implement, Turk-Is and its affiliated unions have begun to be faced with serious problems. The first example of this was the collective bargaining of the Hava-Is union. Meanwhile, the discussions held with the Coordination Council which was formed in order to determine the basic principles of the collective bargaining to be held in the State Economic Enterprises have also begun to worry the Turk-Is leadership. These developments gave rise to a period of anticipation for the unions affiliated with Turk-Is.

Everyone had been waiting for the collective bargaining of Hava-Is.

In a period in which wholesale prices increased by 47.5 percent in three months, Hava-Is was able to obtain wage increases of only 133 percent (gross) effective from last year.

Above all, in a completely unexpected manner, Hava-Is lost the rights which it had won in an earlier agreement with THY on such administrative matters as employment, promotions, etc. In this regard, they took a step backwards. In addition, the article of the contract which read "May First is International Workers' Solidarity Day" was changed to read "May First is the Spring Holiday." Before this, the unions had been endeavoring to become more active in management with each contract.

In short, it can also be said that the Hava-Is contract has caused as great a reaction among the leaders of unions affiliated with Turk-Is as among the THY workers themselves.

In fact, the leader of one large union, who has begun collective bargaining for thousands of workers in one of the State Economic Enterprises, said that:

"How can we accept these wage increases given by the state?.. How can we get the workers to accept them? If, today, we can't secure for the workers the purchasing power that they had two years ago, how can we sign this contract?"

While some Turk-Is officials say that the collective contract signed during the Ecevit administration was inadequate and thus invalid, the member-unions of Turk-Is have begun to wonder how they will be able to obtain benefits of even that level today.

While the collective bargaining by Turk Deniz Ulas-Is Federasyonu [Turkish Maritime Transport Workers Federation] is going on for its 3,700 members in the sea transport industry, bargaining for its 8,500 members working for the Maritime Bank will begin shortly.

Tek Gida-Is [Turkish Tobacco, Intoxicants, Food, and Ancillary Workers Union], whose General Chairman is Ibrahim Deniscier, also General Chairman of Turk-Is, has come to the "monetary issues" in its collective bargaining for its 70,000 members in the State Monopolies.

Collective bargaining has recently begun for the approximately 40,000 tea-industry workers employed in the Cay-Kur [Tea Producers Organization].

Preparations are also underway for contract talks within DYP-Is [Federation of Turkish Railway Workers Unions] for its 40,000 workers in the State Railways.

These examples could be multiplied: This year, member-unions of Turk-Is will sign contracts with the state covering over 600,000 of their members.

Meanwhile, Turk-Is officials have granted the government a period of time in order for laws containing social reforms to be passed.

All these developments have given rise to gradually increasing tension within the Turk-Is organization.

As a matter of fact, Turk-Is General Chairman Ibrahim Deniscier said in a recent statement that "Turk-Is can do nothing at present. The mentality of talking but being unable to do anything should be abandoned."

It is being said that all these developments are signs that the working class and Turk-Is are going to be faced with very serious problems, in addition to the accustomed ones, and that they will follow a more forceful policy in order to resolve these problems.

9173

CSO: 4907

KAFAGLU, YALCIN PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Istanbul **MILLIYET** in Turkish 15 May 60 p 7

[Text] Ankara: Holding a press conference yesterday, Contingent Senator Adnan Baser Kafaoglu and Prof. Aydin Yalcin revealed their "proposal for reform of the system of government and the Constitution." The full text of the proposal, as well as arguments which support it, have been published as a 52-page supplement to the journal **FORUM**.

According to the statement made, the proposal calls for the President of the Republic to be elected by the people and to have extraordinary executive authority when necessary, for the Senate to be abolished, for elections to the National Assembly to be carried out in two stages, and for a number of new principles to determine the workings of the Assembly.

In his statement, Prof. Yalcin charged that "The decision-making bodies of the democratic system in Turkey have lost their vitality." He also stated that "Both Parliament and the courts have become incapable of making decisions" and went on to say that they had "put forth these proposals in order to eliminate these deficiencies."

As for Kafaoglu, he provided a summary of the proposals as follows:

1. The voting rights of the voting citizen would be expanded. In addition to electing the President and the National Assembly Representatives, he would obtain the right to truly utilize the vote if recourse were made to the popular vote for changes in certain laws and the Constitution.

2. The Senate of the Republic would be abolished, while a Council of the Republic of 75 - 100 members would be set up in its place. Former Presidents and Chiefs of the General Staff, as well as former chairman of certain Constitutional institutions, would be members of this; the President would appoint a third of the members, while another portion would be elected to six-year terms. The Council would function as an advisory body, and would in certain circumstances have oversight authority. Laws would not, however, be submitted to it.

3. If the Assembly should bring down the government on a vote of confidence, the President would be able to repeat the voting if he so desired. If the President should not decide to repeat the voting, then a new government would be formed. The President would also be empowered to call for a repeat vote of his own accord. However, once this right is used, it could not be used again for three years.
4. The government would be able to link a proposed law to a call for a vote of confidence. If it should receive the vote of confidence, then the bill would become law in the form desired by the government.
5. The term for the National Assembly would be five years. In order to reduce by-elections, a system of auxiliary Assembly memberships would be set up. Local elections would be carried out in conjunction with elections for the National Assembly.
6. The election system would be carried out in a two-staged system of proportional representation. In the elections, if one party should win a majority of the Assembly seats for a given election district, then the election there would be considered completed. If this should not occur, then another election would be held there a week later, and the two parties which had received the most votes nationwide would be able to participate in the second election in that district. In this way, the public would determine both the government and the opposition, and the possibilities open to small and extremist parties would be restricted.
7. The operation of Parliament would be changed. The principle of a set agenda would be established. A total of 226 would not be sought in order to convene the session. The number of commissions would be reduced. If the budget should not be passed on time, the President would be able to implement on a temporary basis the budget proposal submitted by the government.
8. A total of 226 votes would be necessary in order for laws sent back to the Assembly by the President to be passed in their original form.
9. The President would be able to refer certain laws to public vote in situations in which he deemed such an action necessary.
10. Within the institution of the government itself, the number of Ministers would be limited to twenty. In compensation for this, the institution of Assistant Ministers would be introduced. The Assistant Ministers would be appointed by the Prime Minister upon the recommendation of the relevant Minister, but they would not be members of the Council of Ministers. The President would not be able to dismiss the Prime Minister whenever he wished.
11. The method of having the government begin its rule with a vote of confidence would be abolished. As the opposition would be able to call

for a no-confidence vote at any time, this system would be applied: Governments would begin their duties as soon as they are appointed.

12. In voting on motions of no confidence, only Members which would be going to vote for the motion of no confidence would enter the voting. In this way, the resignation of the government due to its receiving fewer than 226 votes in such a confidence test would be prevented.

13. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, in addition to the members elected by the judges, would be able to become members of the High Council of Judges. The President of the Republic would appoint the judges proposed by the High Council of Judges.

14. A Constitutional Council would be formed in place of the Constitutional Court. The Parliament wouldn't choose the members of this body. The Constitutional Council would review only laws actually passed, from the standpoint of content only, and would not rule upon them from the standpoint of form. In order for a law to be found unconstitutional, it would be necessary for both the Constitutional Council and the President to agree on this point. If the Council should decide one way and the President should express an opposite view, the matter would be referred to a popular vote for the final decision. Once a law were ratified, there would be no possibility of applying once again to the Council for its repeal. Furthermore, the Council would not be appealed to for changes in the Constitution.

15. A security court would be formed in the capital to deal with offenses committed against the state and the system of government. The decisions of this court would be final; in addition, it would act as a High Court.

16. Recourse would be made to a popular referendum in order to determine whether or not extremist movements — for example: communists, fascists, proponents of religious law, and separatists — would be able to carry out their propaganda freely. In accordance with the results of the referendum, either these movements would be outlawed, or they would be left alone.

17. In certain situations, the President would be endowed with extraordinary executive authority. The President would make this decision in consultation with the National Security Council, the chairmen of the National Assembly, and the Council of the Republic. Within the term of this special authority — which would be for a limited period only — the President would be able to make laws. Within this period, the government would function subject to the President. In the event that he should misuse his authority, the President could be convicted of treason against the nation.

18. The President would be elected by popular vote to a term of seven years. In this, also, a two-stage election process would be implemented.

Candidates would be nominated by the National Assembly. An individual would have to receive at least 100 votes in order to be a candidate. Party groups would be able to nominate only one candidate. Whoever might win 51 percent of the votes in the first stage of the voting would be elected President. If no candidate should receive the requisite 51 percent, then the two candidates receiving the most votes would compete in a second election one week later.

9173

CSO: 4907

END

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

WESTERN EUROPE SERIAL REPORTS

WEST EUROPE REPORT

WEST EUROPE REPORT: Science and Technology

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

3 July 1980

~~DD E.H.~~